US and Europe Must Accept Pakistan as a Legitimate Nuclear State

"The Pakistani establishment, as we saw in 1998 with the nuclear test, does not view assistance -- even sizable assistance to their own entities -- as a trade-off for national security vis-a-vis India". US Ambassador Anne Patterson, September 23, 2009

Pakistan has the world's fastest growing nuclear arsenal today in the midst of a fierce insurgency waged against the Pakistani state by Al Qaeda and the Taliban. How should the world respond? Should the response be to further isolate and sanction Pakistan as argued by some Indian and western scholars? Or, should the US and its Western allies engage with Pakistan by accepting it as a legitimate nuclear state and admitting it as a full member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group?

The first response, as advocated by the likes of TV Paul, a scholar of Indian origin at McGill University, has clearly not worked nor likely to work as explained well by former US Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson. The alternative, as advocated in a new book "Overcoming Pakistan's Nuclear Dangers" by former US diplomat Mark Fitzpatrick, is to recognize Pakistan's legitimacy as a nuclear-armed state and work with it to limit the risks of nuclear proliferation in future.

Ambassador Fitzpatrick began by exploring why the West  has been so obsessed with stopping Iran's nuclear program and not Pakistan's. In the end, he came to the conclusion that  Pakistan must be provided "a path to normalizing its nuclear program" in the same way that India was with the US-India nuclear deal. Here's how he describes it on the website of London-based Institute of International Strategic Studies (IISS):

The book was inspired by fellow Londoner Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times, who asked in a June 2012 column why the West was so obsessed with stopping Iran getting nuclear weapons when, ‘by any sensible measure, Pakistani nukes are much more worrying’. I suppose I was one of those who seemed obsessed with Iran, so Rachman’s words hit home. Let’s take a look at Pakistan, I decided.

Successive chapters of my book examine in detail the dangers Rachman ticked off, plus a few more. I concluded that some of the concerns about Pakistan are exaggerated. While the prospect for nuclear terrorism cannot be dismissed, the government’s efforts to ensure the security of its nuclear programme garner too little attention, and compare favourably with India’s nuclear security management. In the ten years since the leakage of the nation’s nuclear secrets masterminded by A.Q. Khan, lessons have been learnt and reforms adopted.

Other concerns get too little attention. As a nuclear wonk, I cannot help but fixate on Pakistan’s veto over negotiations to ban fissile material production and the nation’s move away from signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The most worrisome danger, though, is the prospect for nuclear war in the subcontinent.

One cannot write about Pakistan’s nuclear programme without examining the ways that it is motivated by India’s actions, and perceptions thereof. Therefore, the manuscript is about more than Pakistan. One key chapter assesses the South Asian arms race. Although it pales in comparison with the nuclear excesses of the Cold War, the strategic competition in South Asia is potentially destabilising.

In the conclusions, I offer a policy suggestion for the West that will be controversial. Pakistan, I argue, should be offered a path to normalising its nuclear programme. This recommendation did not sit well with one of the statesmen who, before reading it, had agreed to write a back-cover blurb commending my book. Having vehemently opposed making an exception for India, allowing it to benefit from nuclear cooperation while outside the confines of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, he had to back out because he objected to the idea of creating a second such hole in the NPT for Pakistan.

His is a respectable opinion. It had also been my view when I started the book project. If there is one tenet I have taken to heart at the IISS, however, it is that analysis should guide one’s research direction. I reached my conclusion with more surprise than enthusiasm.

I am looking forward to explaining more about my analysis in upcoming book launches in Washington, London, Geneva, Vienna and Islamabad.

In spite of the West's nuclear sanctions, Pakistan has managed to develop and build nuclear weapons using both uranium and plutonium since the 1990s. The country also has built solid-fueled and liquid-fueled missiles of various ranges from tactical to strategic. It has built multiple reactors at Khushab to produce large amounts of plutonium for its growing nuclear arsenal.

On the civilian nuclear side, Pakistan has acquired four 300 MW nuclear plants at Chashma. Two of these are currently operating and two are under construction. Three 1200 MW newer plants are being supplied by China for installation at Karachi as it ramps up its nuclear power plant manufacturing business. The West has essentially given away this civil nuclear business to China on a silver platter.

The West's decades-long nuclear sanctions on Pakistan have clearly not worked to stop the country. It's time to try a different approach along the lines of what Fitzpatrick advocates If the West follows Fitzpatrick's advice and admits Pakistan to the exclusive international nuclear club called "Nuclear Suppliers Group" (NSG), the US and Europe will have a better chance of persuading Pakistan to agree to signing Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) when India also agrees to these international treaties. These two treaties are the cornerstone of the West's efforts to limit development, proliferation and growth of nuclear weapons stockpiles. In return, Pakistan will have access to the West's advanced civil nuclear technology and materials which it needs to deal with the nation's deepening energy crisis. It will be a win-win deal for both sides.

Related Links:

Haq's Musings

Is Pakistan a Warrior State? 

Nuclear Power Plants in Pakistan

"Eating Grass" Book Launch in Silicon Valley

India's "Indigenous" Nukes and Missiles

US-India Nuclear Deal

China Signs Power Plant Deal with Pakistan

Pakistan's Defense Industry

Energy Crisis in Pakistan

Pakistan, US Act in Mumbai's Aftermath

A series of actions are being taken by Pakistan and the US in the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks. Pakistan is cracking down on LeT militants and the US is pursuing sanctions on former ISI and Pakistani military officers. Here's a snapshot of what's happening as reported in the media:

Excerpt from President Zardari's OpEd in NY Times today:

India is a mature nation and a stable democracy. Pakistanis appreciate India’s democratic contributions. But as rage fueled by the Mumbai attacks catches on, Indians must pause and take a breath. India and Pakistan — and the rest of the world — must work together to track down the terrorists who caused mayhem in Mumbai, attacked New York, London and Madrid in the past, and destroyed the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad in September. The terrorists who killed my wife are connected by ideology to these enemies of civilization.

These militants did not arise from whole cloth. Pakistan was an ally of the West throughout the cold war. The world worked to exploit religion against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan by empowering the most fanatic extremists as an instrument of destruction of a superpower. The strategy worked, but its legacy was the creation of an extremist militia with its own dynamic.

The Wall Street Journal is reporting on Pakistani crackdown on militants as follows:

Pakistan intensified its crackdown on the terror outfit alleged to have orchestrated November's three-day siege of Mumbai, arresting about 40 people Tuesday in raids on militant camps and offices across northwestern and central parts of the country. But a senior Pakistani official made it clear that no suspect arrested by Pakistan would be handed over to India.

A report in Wall Street Journal says US is seeking UN sanctions against Pakistani individuals it believes support terror. Here's an excerpt from the report:

The Bush administration wants the United Nations to put several prominent Pakistanis ( including General Hamid Gul) on a financial blacklist for their alleged support of Lashkar-e-Taiba, the militant group blamed by India for last month's Mumbai terror attacks, according to diplomats familiar with the matter.

The diplomats wouldn't identify the names of the Pakistani individuals being targeted by the U.S., but they are expected to include some former leaders of Pakistan's powerful spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, or ISI.

A U.S.-led action by the U.N. against ISI officers, either retired or current, would mark a break from past U.S. policy towards the Pakistani spy agency, said South Asia experts.

Meanwhile, doubts also continue to be expressed about the causes and the culprits of the attacks. It appears that the Indian investigators of Mumbai are operating with only a few pieces of a much larger and more complex puzzle of the tragic terror attacks in Mumbai. What is needed is a broader, more independent, high-level investigation that also looks into the role of Indian intelligence agencies before, during and after Mumbai attacks. Just based on the few reported pieces of this large and complex puzzle, it seems that Pakistan is at least partially culpable, but India must also share responsibility for the horrible treatment of its Muslim minority and the role its security officials and intelligence agencies have played in their dealings with unsavory characters and gangs involved in domestic and international terror.

Former editor of Japan Times Yoichi Shimatsu believes that blaming LeT is a "convenient solution" for the politicians who are trying to cement an Indo-American civilian nuclear pact. Shimatsu writes in an article published by New American Media as follows:

Conservative politicians in New Delhi have seized on the brutal Mumbai attack to discredit the nationalist revolt in Kashmir and undermine the five U.N. Security Council resolutions (1948-1965) that call for a plebiscite on the status of the once-independent country. By linking Lashkar to Mumbai, the Indian right hope to deter President-elect Barack Obama from his oft-stated policy of bringing the Kashmir issue to the fore.

These same politicians hope to repeat their successful handling of Bill Clinton, who reversed the American policy of sanctions for India’s nuclear bomb tests in 1998 within two short years by proposing nuclear cooperation with New Delhi. The Enron gas-fired electricity plant outside Mumbai played a major role in that about-face.


Yoichi Shimatsu believes that the recent Mumbai attack was "a made-in-Mumbai production much like the Bollywood crime movies about D-Company’s many bloody gang wars". According to Shimatsu, a Hindu breakaway gang, in concert with Hindutva politicians and police officers, revived the turf wars in 2007 with a spike in shootings and arrests, along with gaining Pakistani approval for Dawood’s deportation. Then D-Company (Dawood Ibrahim's gang), with a few lowly recruits from Pakistan, stuck back.

Solving the Mumbai Attacks Puzzle

It appears that the Indian investigators of Mumbai are operating with only a few pieces of a much larger and more complex puzzle of the tragic terror attacks in Mumbai. What is needed is a broader, more independent, high-level investigation that also looks into the role of Indian intelligence agencies before, during and after Mumbai attacks. Just based on the few reported pieces of this large and complex puzzle, it seems that Pakistan is at least partially culpable, but India must also share responsibility for the horrible treatment of its Muslim minority and the role its security officials and intelligence agencies have played in their dealings with unsavory characters involved in domestic and international terror.

Former editor of Japan Times Yoichi Shimatsu believes that blaming LeT is a "convenient solution" for the politicians who are trying to cement an Indo-American civilian nuclear pact. Here is a piece by Shimatsu published by New American Media website.


On India’s “most-wanted” list of 20 suspects believed to have planned the recent Mumbai attacks is the name of fugitive crime boss Dawood Ibrahim, who ordered an earlier wave of bombings 15 years ago. Among those chief suspects, only Dawood has sufficient local knowledge, an entrenched organization -- known as D-Company -- and the deep pockets for such a complex operation in a world city.

The bold raid by young gunmen, who apparently came by sea, was preceded by extensive preparations by city insiders – mapping and targeting were specific and explosives were stocked inside hotel rooms rented before the attack. Most telling was an early police report that indicated one of Dawood’s lieutenants inside the Mumbai Customs House organized the transfer of guns and ammunition from warehouses on Sassoon Dock onto the speedboats used in the landing.

The assault was a made-in-Mumbai production much like the Bollywood crime movies about D-Company’s many bloody gang wars. A Hindu breakaway gang, in concert with conservative politicians and police officers, revived the turf wars in 2007 with a spike in shootings and arrests, along with gaining Pakistani approval for Dawood’s deportation. Then D-Company, with a few lowly recruits from Pakistan, stuck back.

Why then is New Delhi and Washington insisting that Islamic militants in Pakistan are primarily responsible for the attack while downplaying Dawood’s larger role?

Lashkar-e-Taiba is the convenient solution for the politicians who are trying to cement an Indo-American “civilian” nuclear pact and military allinace, and every such arranged marriage demands a common enemy.

Blaming the Lahore-based Lashkar is all-too easy since the outfit was once the West Point of the Kashmir insurgency. The Army of the Righteous, as it is known in English, was a paramilitary force par excellence that routinely mauled the Indian Army along the Himalayan ridge that forms the Line of Control of divided Kashmir. In an attack on the strategic town of Kargil in late spring 1999, Lashkar broke through India’s alpine defense line and came close to forcing New Delhi to the negotiating table.

Along the sawtooth LoC, Lashkar is respected by professional soldiers on both side. A Pakistani hero who fought on the Baltistan heights, Corporal Ahmed, told me of his admiration for the stoicism of these jihadis, who wore sandals to battle in the snow. At a checkpoint in Indian-controlled Kargil, an army captain wearing a Sikh turban said frankly that nobody in the Indian Army could fight man-to-man against Lashkar.

Lashkar earned its reputation in clean-fought mountain warfare, pitting lightly armed guerrillas against Indian armor and superior firepower.

In its finest hours, these fighters would never consider the dirty tactics used against civilians in Mumbai, for example, the gangland-style executions using a shot to the back of a kneeling captive’s head. That is more typical of the Mumbai underworld.

Like many of the misguided decisions in the war on terror, the banning of Lashkar by Pakistan in 2002 did more harm than good. Without central discipline and a unifying cause, splinter groups broke off and many a cadet went solo. During his residency in Karachi, Dawood is known to have sent his young recruits for training by former Lashkar instructors. The moralistic cause had degenerated into a school for hitmen.

Conservative politicians in New Delhi have seized on the brutal Mumbai attack to discredit the nationalist revolt in Kashmir and undermine the five U.N. Security Council resolutions (1948-1965) that call for a plebiscite on the status of the once-independent country. By linking Lashkar to Mumbai, the Indian right hope to deter President-elect Barack Obama from his oft-stated policy of bringing the Kashmir issue to the fore.

These same politicians hope to repeat their successful handling of Bill Clinton, who reversed the American policy of sanctions for India’s nuclear bomb tests in 1998 within two short years by proposing nuclear cooperation with New Delhi. The Enron gas-fired electricity plant outside Mumbai played a major role in that about-face.

So did the Battle of Kargil. A greater international leader would have seen that the Islamic tactical victory was the key for dislodging New Delhi’s institutional inertia against Kashmir talks. Clinton intervened in the Kargil battle by pressuing Pakistani President Nawaz Sharif to order a pullback, and the Indian artillery in violation of the truce opened fire on the retreating guerrillas.

The Kashmiris again lost their right of self-determination, the U.N. resolution remained unresolved, and America got nothing out of the deal. Worse yet, this policy failure shattered any lingering hopes among Islamic militants for American evenhandedness. The inevitable consequence of the Kargil betrayal was 911, and the rise not of Laskar-e-Taiba but of Al Qaeda.

President-elect Obama should not submit to the hysteria being whipped up over the Mumbai atrocities. Mumbai was a criminal event that India’s elite cannot face up to, for Dawood’s D-Company was and still is their procurer of starlets, smuggled gold, drugs, loans for gambling debts and urban land for their new hotels and office blocks. Don’t mix up the healthy oranges for the rotten apples Kashmir is a historic judgment awaiting the verdict of a popular referendum.



Yoichi Shimatsu. Former editor of The Japan Times in Tokyo and journalism lecturer at Tsinghua University in Beijing. Shimatsu has covered the Kashmir crisis and Afghan War.

Manmohan Professes India's Deep Love for Bush

"The people of India deeply love you", said Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to President Bush on a recent visit to the White House.

The Prime Minister continued with the theme of affection and gratitude by adding, “In the last four and half years that I have been Prime Minister, I have been the recipient of your generosity, your affection, your friendship. It means a lot to me and to the people of India.”

Later, India's Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon explained: “I think, if you look at the public opinion polls, the ratings for President Bush are higher in India than in any other country. That is the factual basis.”

The Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll that Mr. Menon referred to shows that India tops the world in its admiration for President Bush who is deeply unpopular in the United States and most of the rest of the world. The survey found that 62% of Indians thought his second term as US president was positive for global security.

Another most recent PIPA poll conducted in 2008 shows that the one country with a majority expressing a positive view of Bush is Nigeria with 60 percent saying they have some or a lot of confidence. Indians also lean positive (45 to 34%). Interestingly, this year Chinese views have softened (41% positive, 45% negative)--with the number of those expressing positive views up 10 points since Pew's 2007 poll.

India has benefited from the Bush policies of closer economic and nuclear cooperation which led to India's rapid economic growth in recent years, and its acceptance as a legitimate member of the prestigious nuclear club, a distinction not bestowed on nuclear rival Pakistan. The US-led war on terror has also legitimized India's crackdown on Islamic and other insurgents and helped India regain influence in Afghanistan and South Asia. Bush's pressure on Musharraf was instrumental in reducing violence in Indian held Kashmir and India, a Musharraf policy that angered the Islamists who started targeting Pakistani civilians and military. Bush popularity is, therefore, based on concrete results India achieved from the support of the outgoing US president.

A grateful Prime Minister acknowledged Mr. Bush’s part in ending India’s nuclear isolation: “For 34 years, India has suffered from a nuclear apartheid. We have not been able to trade in nuclear material, nuclear reactions, and nuclear raw materials. And when this restrictive regime ends, I think a great deal of credit will go to President Bush. And, for this I am very grateful to you, Mr. President.”

President Bush's lame duck status was clearly on Dr. Singh's mind. Turning to Mr. Bush, Dr. Singh said with apparent sincerity: “So, Mr. President, this may be my last visit to you during your presidency, and let me say ‘Thank you very much’. The people of India deeply love you.”

The Americans clearly see India as a strategic partner and a counterweight to China's growing influence in Asia, Middle East and Africa. While the US has made the effort to cultivate close friendship with Indians, it is not clear how this partnership will unfold in terms of specific Indian policies to help the US.

Isolating Iran is one its goals where the US wants India's help. Energy-hungry India needs Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project to move forward. The US is clearly opposed to it. How will India respond to the US pressure? Alastair Scrutton, Reuters Chief Correspondent in Delhi, has addressed this in an analysis of the nuclear deal, saying those hoping that India will now fall into line with western policy will be disappointed.

Scrutton quotes Brahma Chellaney as saying that India will be reluctant to get sucked into U.S. efforts to isolate Iran.

“Now the (nuclear) deal has been sealed, India will have to mend ties with Iran,” Chellaney said. “For India’s strategy, to give up Iran would be a very difficult proposition … There is no way India can pursue an effective Afghan, Central Asian policy without Iran.”

I have a feeling that the I-P-I gas pipeline will be built with or without the US blessing. The reason is simple: Both India and Pakistan are energy-hungry and Iran is the closet source of abundant natural gas for South Asia. It is in their own best national interest to defy the U.S. on this particular issue. The only thing that is likely to delay it significantly is the deep distrust between India and Pakistan where U.S. can and must play a role regardless of the I-P-I project. It is in U.S.’s best interest to do so for its own economic and strategic interests in South Asia.

Bush and Musharraf Share Lowest Approval Ratings

Beyond their commitment to fighting the "war on terror", George W. Bush and his former ally Pervez Musharraf have something else in common. Both of them share the dubious distinction of having the world's lowest approval ratings as leaders, according to a study released recently by the University of Maryland outside the US capital.

While George W. Bush's approval rating at home dipped to 30% and disapproval at 64%, respondents in two countries - Nigeria and India - gave Bush stronger positive than negative ratings. Thailand was about evenly divided. Nigeria gave Bush a 60-per-cent positive and 33-per-cent negative rating. India gave the US leader a 45-per-cent positive and 34-per- cent negative score.

With two countries approving of George W. Bush, he is doing slightly better than Musharraf's fan club of one - China, which gave him a 37-per-cent positive versus a 30-per-cent negative rating. Some of the leaders were at least admired at home - such as Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, China's Hu Jintao and Russia's Vladimir Putin. Gordon Brown did pretty well with a 48-per-cent positive, 46-per-cent negative rating in Britain, after a dozen yeas of Labor Party rule. France's Nicolas Sarkozy got a 54 per cent negative rating at home.

President Bush's popularity in Nigeria is quite understandable because he is the first ever US president to pursue policies and to provide substantial financial aid that have helped the entire continent of Africa. President and Mrs. Bush's Africa trip underscored the new approach to Africa Policy under the Bush administration, and built on a significant increase in the United States' commitment to African development.

India, the only other nation which approves of Bush, has benefited from his policies of closer economic and nuclear cooperation which led to India's rapid economic growth in recent years, and its acceptance as a legitimate member of the prestigious nuclear club, a distinction not bestowed on nuclear rival Pakistan. The US-led war on terror has also legitimized India's crackdown on Islamic and other insurgents and helped India regain influence in Afghanistan and South Asia. Bush's pressure on Musharraf was instrumental in reducing violence in Indian held Kashmir and India, a Musharraf policy that angered the Islamists who started targeting Pakistani civilians and military. Bush popularity is, therefore, based on concrete results India achieved from the support of the outgoing US president.

Regardless of whether Indians agree or not, two of the most important foreign relationships for India are with the US and Pakistan. With Musharraf already out of office and Bush to leave soon, Indians may well have to rethink their strategy vis-a-vis Pakistan and the United States. Delhi may have to be more conciliatory with Pakistan in its bilateral relations and with US in multi-lateral trade, environment and other negotiations to continue to be regarded as a reliable partner in Islamabad and Washington.

$100B Business at Stake in US-India Nuclear Deal

As the Indian parliament gets ready for a confidence vote this week, the fate of the government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and the US-India nuclear deal hangs in the balance.
The Indian government is pulling out all stops to win this vote to salvage the US-India nuclear deal. In addition to the Indian people, the international community and the nuclear suppliers group (NSG) are also watching the vote closely.

The NSG's interest lies in the estimated $100 billion worth of nuclear business in India over the next two decades. U.S. companies hope to capture as large of a share of that business as possible. Private studies suggest that if U.S. vendors win just two civil nuclear reactor contracts, they would create 3,000–5,000 new direct jobs and 10,000–15,000 indirect jobs in the United States, according to US International Trade Administration. Major nuclear plant manufacturers such as GE, Siemens, Urenco, Hitachi and others stand to gain from the consummation of the deal.

It has now been three years since the signing of the historic agreement between President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. During this period, political parties and media in India have been debating the merits and pitfalls of the agreement.

India has also asked the International Atomic Energy Agency to place the draft India-IAEA Safeguards agreement before its Board of Governors. After the board's approval, the U.S. will seek an exemption from the international Nuclear Suppliers Group that would allow the deal to proceed. The final step will be a vote in the U.S. Congress on the so-called 123 Agreement.

As the deal makes its way through the Indian parliament, the IAEA, the NSG and the US Congress, there is heavy lobbying taking place on all sides. The US nuclear suppliers lobby is actively pushing for passage in the US Congress, even if it requires a lame-duck session after the November elections. Some nonproliferation advocates in the U.S. have also stepped up their campaign against the deal. They claim the agreement will facilitate a new nuclear testing by India, and thereafter will allow India to upgrade its nuclear arsenal. Non-proliferation advocates have also argued that India could expel IAEA inspectors in the future and thwart the IAEA inspection regime.

The US legislation passed in 2006 -- the so-called Hyde Act -- that gave preliminary approval to the U.S.-India agreement, requires that Congress be in 30 days of continuous session to consider it. Congressional aides said that clock can begin to tick only once India clears two more hurdles -- completing an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, and securing approval from the 45 nations that form the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which governs trade in reactors and uranium. Because of the long August recess, less than 40 days are left in the session before Congress adjourns on Sept. 26, according to the Washington Post.

India is said to be running short of uranium needed to fuel its reactors. It is anxious to win "clean" agreements with the IAEA and the NSG that would not result in fuel cutoffs if it decides to resume testing nuclear weapons.

Sen. John McCain, the Republican presidential candidate, is a strong supporter of the agreement, but Sen. Barack Obama, his Democratic rival, is more skeptical. During the congressional debate on the Hyde Act, Sen Obama added language in the bill limiting the amount of nuclear fuel supplied to India from the United States to deter nuclear testing. Though proliferation is a constant concern raised in the US, there has not been much discussion of the implications of this deal for other nations in the neighborhood: Pakistan, Iran and China.

Pakistan's nuclear fuel needs are currently very modest and they currently are met by China. China has promised to help Pakistan achieve its target of generating 8,800 MW of nuclear power by 2030 by speeding up the delivery of the six nuclear plants and supply the necessary fuel, according to various reports. At the same time, Pakistan is building a $1.2 billion facility to develop the capability to manufacture full-cycle nuclear fuel and power plants. The Iranian situation is currently very murky with the US and EU threatening sanctions if Iran continues to enrich uranium.

If India wins the IAEA and the NSG approvals that would not result in fuel cutoffs in the event it decides to resume testing nuclear weapons, it could easily bypass any US restrictions and obtain needed nuclear supplies from other nations eager to do business with India.

Here's a brief video clip with Dr. Leonard Weiss, an NPT expert, explaining the US-India nuclear deal: