Friday, March 9, 2018

Pakistani Military's Conventional Deterrence Against India's Cold Start Doctrine

It is widely assumed that India enjoys substantial conventional military superiority over Pakistan. Many speculate that the difference between the conventional military strengths of the two South Asian rivals is so great that Pakistan would be forced to quickly resort to the use of nuclear weapons in the event of an Indian attack. Are these assumptions and speculations accurate? How has the situation evolved since the nations went nuclear in 1998? Are nukes Pakistan's only deterrence against Indian aggression? Let's examine the answers to these questions based on the recent work of several analysts and authors.

India-Pakistan Standoff 2001-2002:

Soon after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, there was an incident with several gunmen entering the Indian parliament building and killing 14 people on December 13, 2001. India immediately accused Pakistan of involvement in the attack and vowed to respond militarily. Pakistan categorically denied India's accusations.

What followed was a massive mobilization of Indian troops to the Line of Control in Kashmir and the international border with Pakistan.  It was dubbed "Operation Parakram" by the Indian Army.  Pakistan responded with its own major mobilization of troops on its side of the LoC and the international border. Thus began the longest standoff between the two neighbors.

By October 2002, India began to pull back its troops along her border and later Pakistan did the same, and in November 2003 a cease-fire between the two nations was signed. Why did India back off from its explicit threats to attack Pakistan? A recent book "Defeat is an Orphan" by Myra McDonald answers this question as follows:

"Since partition, the Indian Army--with 1.1 million men compared to 550,000 in the Pakistan Army--had the advantage in terms of numbers. But it was a lumbering beast. India's vast size meant the army was spread more thinly across the country than in Pakistan, acting as a brake on mobilization. Its three armoured strike corps, designed to strike deep into Pakistan territory, were based in central India and took nearly three weeks to maneuver into position because of their sheer size. The slowness of the mobilization gave Pakistan enough time to prepare its defenses....Much of the equipment pressed into frontline service, from Vijayanta tanks of 1970s vintage to even older artillery pieces, was barely suited to fighting a modern war. It was only when the Indian Army began to mobilize that its slowness and shortages ---of road vehicles for deployment, missiles, ammunition, and war stores---became apparent. "The very first few days of Operation Parakram exposed the hollowness of our operational preparedness," said General V.K.Singh, who was then with XI Corps in Punjab. Having lost the advantage of surprise because of its slow mobilization, the Indian Army did not have enough superiority in numbers and equipment to guarantee a decisive victory. Nor could it rely on air power to make up for its weakness on the ground. At independence, India had abolished the role of commander-in-chief of all armed forces, replacing it with three weaker, co-equal, service chiefs who each had a tendency to go their own way. Thus though India's air power was superior to that of Pakistan in 2001-2002, the different branches of its armed forces were not integrated enough to consider a ground assault backed by air strikes and close air support. Had India pressed ahead with an attack on Pakistan that January--and in such situation is with the defender--it risked becoming quickly bogged down. "The slender edge that India had could have led to nothing but a stalemate and...a stalemate between a large and much smaller country amounts to victory for the smaller country, " said Brigadier Kanwal in an analysis of India's military preparedness. Nor did India have the capacity to dig in for a long war where its greater size relative to Pakistan could have eventually triumphed. Thanks to cutbacks, it had run down stocks of ammunition to save money. Even without Pakistan's possession of nuclear weapons to deter an Indian invasion, the balance of power in conventional forces was enough to give pause for thought."

India's Cold Start Doctrine:

The Failure of India's Operation Parakram forced some soul searching and a re-evaluation that gave birth to the Indian Army's Cold Start Doctrine (CSD). It is a limited-war strategy designed to quickly seize Pakistani territory without provoking a a nuclear conflict. Supposedly a secret strategy, Indian Army Chief General Rawat confirmed its existence in 2017. Here's an analysis by Indian analyst Meenakshi Sood of India's CSD and Pakistan's expected response:

"While Pakistan’s nuclear response to CSD (Cold Start Doctrine) has dominated the narrative, it is the conventional response that was devised first. In the last few years of General Musharraf’s presidency, especially between 2004 and 2007, India and Pakistan were engaged in backchannel negotiations and came tantalizingly close to finding a solution to the Kashmir issue. Then the 2007 Lawyers’ Movement forced Musharraf out of power and a new leadership took charge. With General Kayani as the new chief of army staff, the threat from India came back into focus, and so did the perceived risk of CSD. Given India’s military capability and its declared Cold Start Doctrine, Kayani believed that Pakistan could not afford to let its guard down as the country prepared according to “adversaries’ capabilities, not intentions.” He went on to give his assessment of the timeline by which India would be able to operationalize CSD — two years for partial implementation and five years for full — betraying the urgency he attached to a counter-response. Between 2009 and 2013, the Pakistan Army conducted military exercises codenamed Azm-e-Nau to formalize and operationalize a conventional response to CSD. At its conclusion, Pakistan adopted a “new concept of war fighting” (NCWF) that aims to improve mobilization time of troops and enhance inter-services coordination, especially between the Army and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). To this end, Pakistan Air Force’s aerial exercise High Mark was conducted alongside Azm-e-Nau III in 2010, which saw the participation of over 20,000 troops from all services in areas of southern Punjab, Sialkot, and Sindh along Pakistan’s eastern border with India. The 2010 exercises were the largest conducted by the Army since 1989. PAF’s exercise High Mark, conducted every five years, synchronizes the Air Force’s response with Army maneuvers, covering a vast area from Skardu in the north to the Arabian Sea in the south. As per military sources, with the implementation of the NCFW, the Pakistan Army will be able to mobilize even faster than India. This should worry India as CSD’s raison d’etre lies in the short reaction time it requires to launch an offensive. If Pakistan is indeed able to mount a counter-offensive even before India fires the first shot, literally and figuratively, it blunts the effectiveness of the Indian military doctrine."


Source: SIPRI

India's Conventional Superiority:

Professor Walter Ladwig III of the Department of War Studies at London's Kings College  says that India's conventional edge over Pakistan is overblown. In a 2015 paper, Ladwig wrote that Pakistan’s conventional deterrence against India in the near to medium term is "much better than the pessimists allege". Here's an excerpt of Ladwig's paper titled "Indian Military Modernization and Conventional Deterrence in South Asia":

"In recent years, headline grabbing increases in the Indian defense budget have raised concerns that India’s on-going military modernization threatens to upset the delicate conventional military balance vis-à-vis Pakistan. Such an eventuality is taken as justification for Islamabad’s pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons and other actions that have worrisome implications for strategic stability on the subcontinent. This article examines the prospects for Pakistan’s conventional deterrence in the near to medium term, and concludes that it is much better than the pessimists allege. A host of factors, including terrain, the favorable deployment of Pakistani forces, and a lack of strategic surprise in the most likely conflict scenarios, will mitigate whatever advantages India may be gaining through military modernization. Despite a growing technological edge in some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for deterrence failure".







Summary:

Common assumptions about India's insurmountable conventional superiority over Pakistan are not founded in reality, according to military experts.  Professor Walter Ladwig of the War Studies Department at London's Kings College believes that Pakistan’s conventional deterrence against India in the near to medium term is "much better than the pessimists allege".  Pakistan's  NCWF (New Concept of War Fighting) developed in response to India's CSD (Cold Start Doctrine) is designed to "mount a counter-offensive even before India fires the first shot", according to Indian analyst Meenakshi Sood. Ladwig sums it up well: "Despite a growing technological edge (over Pakistan) in some areas, Indian policymakers cannot be confident that even a limited resort to military force would achieve a rapid result, which is an essential pre-condition for deterrence failure".

Related Links:

Haq's Musings

Is Pakistan Ready for War with India?

India's Israel Envy: What If Modi Attacks Pakistan?

Project Azm: Pakistan to Develop 5th Generation Fighter Jet

Pakistan Navy Modernization

Pakistan's Sea-Based Second Strike Capability

Who Won the 1965 War? India or Pakistan?

47 comments:

Jai Hind said...

And then there is Christine fair too..

Riaz Haq said...

Jai Hind: "And then there is Christine fair too..."

Christine Fair lacks even the basic understanding of the military strategies. She's so unhinged that she's incapable of having a rational discussion on the subject.

Fair has called herself a "Rambo B**ch"; she supports US military interventions around the world; she encourages India's hawkish Hindu Nationalist Prime Minister Narendra Modi to invade Pakistan.

In a Facebook post, Fair called Pakistan “an enemy” and said “We invaded the wrong dog-damned country,” implying the U.S. should have invaded Pakistan, not Afghanistan, according to Salon magazine.

In another Facebook post, Fair insisted that “India needs to woman up and SQUASH Pakistan militarily, diplomatically, politically and economically.” Both India and Pakistan are nuclear states.

http://www.riazhaq.com/2016/12/christine-fairs-anti-pakistan-rants.html

Tambi Dude said...

Yes. Mr Riaz Haq is an authority in

- Military
- Economy
- History
- Sports
- Arts

And this is over and above his priceless knowledge in Chip making.

Riaz Haq said...

TD: "Yes. Mr Riaz Haq is an authority in...And this is over and above his priceless knowledge in Chip making."


I do not claim to be an authority on every subject I write about.

However, I do read experts' analyses and opinions on each subject and refer to them in my blog.

In this post, for instance, I have quoted Kings College war studies professor Walter Ladwig and Indian think tank researcher Menaakshi Sood from the Center for Land Warfare Studies in New Delhi.

I have also included quotes from Indian generals with first hand knowledge of the subject.

Riaz Haq said...

#Pakistan Has Just Tested the Ultimate #Nuclear #Ababeel #Missile: #SouthAsia's First MIRV with multiple warheads. #India

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/pakistan-has-just-tested-the-ultimate-nuclear-missile-24834


Pakistan has tested a ballistic missile with a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV), the United States confirmed this week.

During testimony to Congress outlining worldwide threats on March 6, Robert Ashley, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), stated: “In January 2017, Pakistan conducted the first test launch of its nuclear-capable Ababeel ballistic missile, demonstrating South Asia’s first MIRV payload.” It appeared to be the first time a U.S. official publicly confirmed that Islamabad tested a MIRVed missile; however, in a report last year on missile threats around the world, the Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee noted, “In January 2017, [Pakistan] began testing the MIRVed Ababeel MRBM.”

MIRVs allow a single missile to deliver multiple warheads against different targets.

The Pakistani military first announced its test of the MIRVed missile on January 24, 2017. “Pakistan has conducted its first successful flight test of Surface to Surface Ballistic Missile Ababeel, which has a maximum range of 2,200 kilometers,” the military announced in a press release at the time. “The missile is capable of delivering multiple warheads, using Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology.” The statement added that the test was aimed at “validating various design and technical parameters.” No other tests of the Ababeel missiles are known to have taken place since the first one.

Despite these claims, many outside experts questioned whether Pakistan really had developed or tested a MIRV. As the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Missile Defense Project noted, “Some experts have expressed skepticism as to whether Pakistan has indeed surmounted the various technological hurdles required for MIRVed missiles. MIRV warheads are typically much smaller than unitary warheads, and thus require greater miniaturization. It is unclear if the country has manufactured a miniaturized nuclear warhead small enough to use in a MIRV.” Ashley’s confirmation should put this skepticism to rest.

---
Islamabad’s stated rationale for pursuing MIRV technology is to defeat India’s ballistic-missile defense systems. “Development of Ababeel Weapon System is aimed at ensuring survivability of Pakistan’s ballistic missiles in the growing regional Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) environment,” the Pakistani military said in the statement announcing the test last January. “This will further reinforce deterrence.”

MIRVs are undoubtedly useful for defeating missile defenses, as they present numerous targets in close range that interceptors must locate and destroy. At the same time, MIRVs are extremely valuable for counterforce attacks—that is, trying to destroy an adversary’s nuclear arsenal in a surprise first strike. In that sense, they are extremely destabilizing for strategic stability; during the Cold War MIRVs greatly exacerbated the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers.


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Pakistan is not the first country in Asia to test a MIRVed missile. That distinction belongs to China. It is unclear when China initially tested a MIRVed missile, but the Pentagon first acknowledged that Beijing had that capability in its 2015 report on Chinese military power. France, Britain, Russia and the United States also have MIRVed missiles. During his time in office, President Barack Obama removed all MIRVs on America’s land-based ballistic missiles, but Washington continues to have MIRVed submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

Now that Pakistan and China have them, it seems inevitable that India will join the MIRV club sooner rather than later.

Riaz Haq said...

Walter Ladwig:

http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/Conventional%20Deterrence%20in%20South%20Asia.pdf

The 2,900km long Indo-Pak border is characterized by diverse and
varied terrain that has differential impacts on military operations. To
the north in Kashmir –—which has seen fighting in four wars –the
landscape is mountainous and heavily forested. When combined with a
lack of wide roads, the movement of vehicles and large military
formations is significantly hindered. Moreover, much of the highaltitude
territory suffers from significant snowfall in winter, high levels
of rain, and overall low visibility, the combination of which limit the
operability and payload of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, as well
as disrupting surveillance and surface communications.47 Depending on
the time of year, it is possible to conduct large-scale military operations
across the Line of Control (LoC) separating Indian and Pakistani
controlled Kashmir in the areas of Jammu south of the Pir Panjal
mountain range and the Kashmir valley.48 However, difficult terrain
and under-developed transport infrastructure in these areas hinders the
ability to concentrate forces, control dispersed units, and marshal
reinforcements and supplies.49 Consequently, as Jack Gill notes a
‘verity’ of combat in Kashmir is that ‘a combination of weather, terrain,
and logistical hindrances … makes swift, deep penetrations unlikely, if
not impossible, in the face of even minor resistance.’
50 This is hardly
ideal for a limited aims offensive that seeks to succeed by quickly
overwhelming or bypassing defending forces.
A second section of the border running from Southern Jammu and
Kashmir through the Punjab down to northern Rajasthan is marked by
a near continuous line of concrete irrigation canals that stretch for
2,000km. Not only does this network of canals and their tributaries –
which have a horizontal depth of up to several kilometers in some
places –form an obstacle in its own right, they have been turned into
defensive fortifications with the addition of large pilings of soil, concrete
bunkers, minefields, and fortified gun emplacements.51 This barrier
system –which runs as close as several kilometers to the international
border –significantly hinders the offensive operations of armored
vehicles while providing concealed fighting positions for defensive
troops who are protected from direct fire and artillery weapons.
Securing a bridgehead and mounting a cross-canal assault against a
dug-in opponent can be expected to be a time consuming and bloody
affair. Beyond the canals, many areas of Pakistani Punjab are densely
populated with several sprawling urban centers, which would also limit
the pace of military operations and the potential for battlefield
awareness.
This section of the border poses several problems for a limited aims
offensive. Regardless of whether the attacker achieves strategic surprise,
as Mearsheimer notes, the kind of forward defenses found here pose
problems for limited incursions on the ground because they allow even
thinly populated defenders to offer stiff resistance.52 Moreover, the
limited aims strategy is based on the belief that in the face of a
successful offensive a defender will either acquiesce or attempt a
counterattack against the aggressor turned defender that results in an
attritional stalemate so costly they eventually abandon it.53 In this
respect, it should be noted that both Kashmir and the Punjab hold great
political significance for both the Indian and Pakistani governments.

Loss of territory in these areas would be unacceptable to the defender,
who would be pressured to escalate the conflict either horizontally or
vertically instead of abandoning further military action.

Riaz Haq said...

Walter Ladwig:

http://www.walterladwig.com/Articles/Conventional%20Deterrence%20in%20South%20Asia.pdf


The third section of the international border, where the Sindh and
Punjab meet, is often described as Pakistan’s major point of strategic
vulnerability. It is in this region, between Sukkur and Rahim Yar Khan,
where the country’s primary north–south transportation artery runs
extremely close to the international border. Consequently, some
analysts have suggested that this leaves Pakistan extremely vulnerable
to a central assault that would spilt the country in two.54 It would be a
significant reversal for the Pakistani government were Karachi and
Hyderabad in the south cut off from Lahore and Islamabad in the north
by a limited incursion. However, that historical risk has been signifi-
cantly alleviated by the construction of a largely parallel highway on the
western side of the Indus River that can facilitate the movement of
goods and military traffic while remaining screened from the international
border by a major river. Although this region lacks the extensive
fortifications described in the northern Punjab, the presence of irrigation
canals and the Indus River will constrain the available axes of
advance for a military force moving from the border towards the
Sukkur–Rahim Yar Khan region. This in turn will allow Pakistani
forces to fight from prepared positions, albeit not as hardened as those
found further north.
The southern-most sections of the international border, consisting
of the flat, barren deserts of Rajasthan and Gujarat are extremely
suitable for mechanized military operations. Indeed, during the
2001–2002 Operation ‘Parakram’ the Indian Army reportedly concentrated
all of its offensive forces in Rajasthan, suggesting that the
Thar Desert and the Rann of Kutch is a likely location for either side
to undertake a large-scale armored offensive.55 Although the open
expanse of the Thar Desert lacks the kind of obstacles to a rapid
advance found further north, it also lacks the strategic value attached
to those regions. Irrigated and developed on the Indian side of the
border, on the Pakistani side areas of the harsh desert have been left
empty to provide a natural buffer-zone.
The story is similar in the Rann of Kutch, which depending on the
monsoons, is alternately a windswept desert or a salt marsh. In either
instance, the region has been described by one observer as ‘one of the
world’s least valuable pieces of real estate.’
56 Although relatively easy to capture in a limited aims offensive, neither of these two areas
would offer particularly useful leverage in post-conflict negotiations.
Loss of territory in this region would not impose a major cost on
Pakistan and if anything would allow it to trade space for time as it
readied a counterattack against Indian forces in significantly exposed
terrain.
The particular geography of the Indo-Pak border would inhibit an
RMA-enabled Indian limited aims offensive in two major ways. First,
the difficult terrain in the region north of the Thar Desert would prevent
modern sensor and weapons systems from operating at proving ground
effectiveness, while the presence of natural and man-made obstacles
would hinder a rapid advance. Second, the open spaces further south
that would allow an RMA-enabled force to shine lack the kind of
strategic objectives that would be worthwhile to target with a limited
offensive. Moreover, the vast, open expanse of the desert does not
provide significant advantages to an aggressor who subsequently has to
defend the territory they seized against a counterattack.



Ahmad F. said...

So what comes next? A hydrogen bomb? An ICBM?

I just don’t understand the priorities. Why develop this arsenal that will never be used. And, should it ever be used, it will kill everyone several times over.

Riaz Haq said...

Ahmad: "So what comes next? A hydrogen bomb? An ICBM?"

Pakistan’s MIRVs like Ababeel are designed to penetrate India’s anti ballistic missile defense systems that India is working on with Israel’s help

Ababeel is part of the strategy to maintain both strategic and conventional deterrence to keep peace in the region

Ahmad F. said...

Ladwig's conclusion is noteworthy. He raises a good question. What is the justification for Pakistan's increasingly belligerent nuclear program?

Pakistan’s justification for its current efforts to develop
tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems on security grounds lacks
a firm foundation. These systems only increase the likelihood of an
inadvertent nuclear exchange, while adding little to the deterrence value
of Pakistan’s force posture. There may be a variety of reasons why
Islamabad is expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal, but a
rational response to the threat posed by India’s on-going
military modernization is not one of them.140

Riaz Haq said...

Ahmad: "Ladwig's conclusion is noteworthy. He raises a good question. What is the justification for Pakistan's increasingly belligerent nuclear program?"

Ladwig has answered his own question when he talks of the ultimate deterrence that Pakistan has against India....India is hesitant to try CSD because of fear of getting bogged down in a war that could lead to nuclear escalation.

Pakistan’s ability to punch through Indian missile defenses with cruise missiles and MIRVs is a guarantee against and nuclear adventurism by India

Ahmad F. said...

The Ladwig paper points out that the conventional military balance is not decisively in India’s favor, as commonly believed. It is the professional opinion of many military officers and scholars that the attacker needs to have a 3:1 advantage to prevail over the defender.


At best, the ratio between India and Pakistani forces is 2:1. And after making some important adjustments, focusing on the age of the equipment and its lethality (combat aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery), the ratio is even lower than that. So India simply cannot hope to win a conventional war.

Moreover, the terrain favors Pakistan, and in a defensive war, the civilian population in Pakistan would unite behind the military, totally unlike what happened in 1971.

Furthermore, 80% of the Pakistani forces s are deployed near the border with India, while the bulk of India’s are mostly deployed in the central provinces.

He also argues that an Indian attack is only likely to take place in response to an ISI-coordinated terrorist attack on India.

So that leads to the BIG question. Why is Pakistan spending an inordinate sum of money on its conventional and nuclear forces, both of which have a huge opportunity cost in terms of human and economic development, in addition to raising the specter of a nuclear war in which there will be no winners.


Why does Pakistan live 24/7 in dread of an Indian attack which would not occur if it just called off its proxy war with India, and which may even then not occur, if history is any guide.


It seems to me that Pakistan has chosen to live in a self-imposed punishment.


Was this necessary?

Riaz Haq said...

Ahmad: "At best, the ratio between India and Pakistani forces is 2:1. And after making some important adjustments, focusing on the age of the equipment and its lethality (combat aircraft, tanks and heavy artillery), the ratio is even lower than that. So India simply cannot hope to win a conventional war."

Over 700,000 Indian troops are deployed in Kashmir alone....more than the all of the soldiers in Pakistani military.

http://www.riazhaq.com/2016/09/700000-indian-soldiers-versus-10.html

Pakistan does have the advantage of mobilizing faster than the Indians because of the size difference.

The talk of India attacking Pakistan only in response is absolute nonsense given the history of Indians blaming Pakistan for every attack.

Attacks such as those in Malegaon and Samjotha were blamed on Pakistan.

The alleged perpetrator Afzal Guru hanged by India was an innocent man according to most legal analysts.


Afzal Guru was accused of carrying out an attack on Indian parliament in Dec, 2001. The Indian supreme court judgment acknowledged the evidence against Guru was circumstantial: "As is the case with most conspiracies, there is and could be no evidence amounting to criminal conspiracy." But then, it went on to say: "The incident, which resulted in heavy casualties, had shaken the entire nation, and the collective conscience of society will only be satisfied if capital punishment is awarded to the offender." This shameful Indian Supreme Court verdict to approve Guru's execution is a great miscarriage of justice with few precedents in legal annals.


http://www.riazhaq.com/2016/02/massive-anti-modi-student-protests.html


Meanwhile there's little doubt left of India's proxy war inside Pakistan since the arrest of Kulbhushan Jhadav.


http://www.riazhaq.com/2018/01/indias-ex-intelligence-officers-blame.html

Ahsan H. said...

Presumably the learned Professor whose paper you brought to our collective attention reads the news as much as the rest of us combined since that is his full time job and just a casual interest for most of us and serious hobby for a couple.


His figures include data on all regular forces of the two countries, including those deployed in Kashmir.

As I have mentioned earlier, both sides have large paramilitary forces and the 700,000 figure you cite included a lot of paramilitary. They are not in a position to attack Pakistan.

If that was not the case, and India really wanted to launch a surprise attack on Pakistan, why would they not go for the jugular and attack Rawalpindi?

They had a good excuse in 2002 to do so. But they didn’t attack anywhere.

Riaz Haq said...

Ahmad: "Presumably the learned Professor whose paper you brought to our collective attention reads the news as much as the rest of us combined since that is his full time job and just a casual interest for most of us and serious hobby for a couple. "

It’s not the Professor; it’s you who’s missing the point of this discussion.

And the point is that India lacks the ability to score a quick and decisive victory by conventional means...even if it has 3:1 or even 4:1 advantage.

And India is afraid of a prolonged conventional war that could provoke a nuclear response from Pakistan.

It’s not just the conventional war alone but the fear of escalation to nuclear that holds India back

I suggest you also read Meenakshi Sood’s article I have cited in my blog

https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/pakistans-non-nuclear-plan-to-counter-cold-start/

Ahmad F. said...

So if India is being held back, then is why Pakistan going all out and pushing ahead with conventional and nuclear weapons like it is about to be attacked tomorrow?

Riaz Haq said...

Ahmad: " So if India is being held back, then is why Pakistan going all out and pushing ahead with conventional and nuclear weapons like it is about to be attacked tomorrow?"


It's simple; We're not dealing with a static situation. India is not sitting idle nor should Pakistan.

Pakistan is trying to keep India's military advantage from growing to the point where India can attack Pakistan with impunity.

Pakistan is responding to the evolving situation with massive increase in Indian defense spending.

India has now become the world's largest importer of weapons.

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-worlds-largest-importer-of-major-arms-in-the-last-four-years/articleshow/57244332.cms

Just yesterday, India signed a deal to buy 5th generation Rafale fighter jets.

http://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/prez-macron-sells-rafale-pm-modi-buys-china-antidote-top-10-developments-118031100371_1.html

Riaz Haq said...

#India Is World’s Largest Importer Of #Weapons With Insatiable Hunger, While #Pakistan Slashes #Arms Imports. #Modi #BJP


https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/india-is-worlds-largest-importer-of-weapons-with-insatiable-hunger-while-pakista/309385


Report by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute spotlights India’s floundering attempts to make firearms in India and growing preference of US over Russia as arms supplier.

India continues to be world’s largest importer for major firearms, an indication that Modi government’s Make In India drive for defence sector has faltered.

A report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute has found that India was the “world’s largest importer of major arms in 2013–17 and accounted for 12 per cent of the global total”.



The report spotlights India’s floundering attempts to make firearms in India. India has managed to get just Rs 1.17 crore as FDI in the defecne sector under the “Make in India” framework.

“FDI of amount $0.18 million has been received in the defence industry sector from April 2014 to December 2017,” said junior defence minister Subhash Bhamre, in a written reply to Lok Sabha recently.

India’s imports increased by 24% between 2008–12 and 2013–17, according to the report and majority of the firearms were sourced from India’s long-time supplier Russia, which accounted for 62 per cent of India’s arms imports in 2013–17.

"Asian and Indian arms procurement in particular are a reflection of the growing security competition in Asia," Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan , a senior fellow at ORF, told Outlook.

--------

Surprisingly, India’s long-time foe has slashed its imports despite its tensions with India and internal conflicts.

“Pakistan’s arms imports decreased by 36 per cent between 2008–12 and 2013–17. Pakistan accounted for 2.8 per cent of global arms imports in 2013–17. Its arms imports from the USA dropped by 76 per cent in 2013–17 compared with 2008–12.”

Riaz Haq said...

The worlds largest arms importers: New @SIPRIorg data shows Asia and the Middle East lead rising trend in arms imports

🇮🇳 India
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia
🇪🇬 Egypt
🇦🇪 UAE
🇨🇳 China
🇦🇺 Australia
🇩🇿 Algeria
🇮🇶 Iraq
🇵🇰 Pakistan
🇮🇩 Indonesia

https://www.sipri.org/news/press-release/2018/asia-and-middle-east-lead-rising-trend-arms-imports-us-exports-grow-significantly-says-sipri

Riaz Haq said...

#Pakistan ranks number 13 while #India is at number 4 among 50 most powerful militaries in the world. #US at 1, #Russia at 2, #China at 3. Ranking by global firepower uses 50 parameters including manpower available and diversity of weapons.

Global Firepower has ranked the world's military powers by more than 50 parameters, including manpower available and diversity of weapons. In this gallery, Newsweek looks at the most powerful military forces in the world, starting with the 50th strongest and working up to number one.

http://www.newsweek.com/pictures-30-most-powerful-military-forces-world-828666

Pakistan ranks #13. India ranks #4


13. Pakistan. Defense Budget: $7,000,000,000. Total Military Personnel: 919,000. Total Aircraft Strength: 951. Tanks: 2,924. Armored Fighting Vehicles: 2,828. Total Naval Assets: 197. Aircraft Carriers: 0. Submarines: 8. Power Index: 0.3287.

4. India. Defense Budget: $51,000,000,000. Total Military Personnel: 4,207,250. Total Aircraft Strength: 2,102. Tanks: 4,426. Armored Fighting Vehicles: 6,704. Total Naval Assets: 295. Aircraft Carriers: 3. Submarines: 15. Power Index: 0.1593.

3. China. Defense Budget: $161,700,000,000. Total Military Personnel: 3,712,500. Total Aircraft Strength: 2,955. Tanks: 6,457. Armored Fighting Vehicles: 4,788. Total Naval Assets: 714. Aircraft Carriers: 1. Submarines: 68. Power Index: 0.0945.

2. Russia. Defense Budget: $44,600,000,000. Total Military Personnel: 3,371,027. Total Aircraft Strength: 3,794. Tanks: 20,216. Armored Fighting Vehicles: 31,298. Total Naval Assets: 352. Aircraft Carriers: 1. Submarines: 63. Power Index: 0.0929.

1. The United States has the strongest military in the world, according to the Global Firepower ranking system. Defense Budget: $587,800,000,000. Total Military Personnel: 2,363,675. Total Aircraft Strength: 13,762. Tanks: 5,884. Armored Fighting Vehicles: 41,062. Total Naval Assets: 415. Aircraft Carriers: 19. Submarines: 70. Power Index: 0.0857.

Riaz Haq said...

China to upgrade radar of Pakistan’s JF-17 fighter aircraft
Gabriel Dominguez, London - IHS Jane's Defence Weekly

http://www.janes.com/article/78911/china-to-upgrade-radar-of-pakistan-s-jf-17-fighter-aircraft

China will upgrade Pakistan Air Force JF-17 Thunder multirole combat aircraft with the KLJ-7A active electronically scanned-array (AESA) radar, according to a 28 March report by the China Daily newspaper.

Hu Mingchun, head of the Nanjing Research Institute of Electronics Technology (NRIET) in Jiangsu province, was quoted by the state-owned paper as saying that the newest version of the KLJ-7 fire-control radar (FCR) will substantially improve the combat capabilities of the aircraft.

“Our product will tremendously extend the fighter jet’s detection range, giving it a much longer sight that will help it detect the enemy’s aircraft before they do; and this is very important, because in real combat if you see first, you fire first,” he said.

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In comparison to current-generation mechanically-steered radars, AESA radars provide key defensibility gains against electronic warfare (EW) jamming and enemy radar detection. Instead of relying on a single array that transmits a different frequency per-single-pulse, AESA radars utilize many arrays – i.e. transmit and receive modules (TRM) – that can each transmit in a different frequency. In unison, these TRMs enable a single AESA radar unit to transmit in different frequencies simultaneously.

East Pendulum was informed by NRIET deputy director Wang Hongzhe that the KLJ-7A has a range of 170 km, though it is unclear if this is against 5m² RCS (radar cross-section) or 3m² RCS targets. It can track 15 targets and engage four simultaneously. Though equipped with 1,000 TRMs, it is not known if the KLJ-7A’s TRMs are built from gallium arsenide (GaA) or gallium nitride (GaN).

In China, NRIET is competing with AVIC’s 607 research institute – i.e. Leihua Electronic Technology Research Institute (LETRI) – for the PAF’s Block-III contract, which is expected to comprise of 50 new-built aircraft. LETRI is pitching an air-cooled AESA radar, which omits dedicated liquid-cooling systems, thereby providing valuable space and weight benefits optimal for lightweight fighter platforms.

Leonardo’s Selex ES division had pitched the Vixen 1000E AESA radar as well, though industry analysts are skeptical that the PAF will select the Vixen. The PAF’s JF-17s are equipped with the SD-10 beyond-visual range (BVR) air-to-air missile (AAM) and C-802 anti-ship missile (AShM). These necessitate direct linkage to the radar for pre-terminal-stage guidance. It is unlikely that either side will cede their respective source codes to make linkage between Chinese munitions and European radars possible.

The PAF is also hoping to eventually manufacture AESA radars domestically at PAC. Proceeding with NRIET and/or LETRI for the JF-17 could set the stage for those entities to assist Pakistan in its efforts, which will be an integral aspect of Project Azm, which envisages developing and producing a 5th-generation fighter for the PAF. It is unlikely that Leonardo would be as forthcoming in this regard.

https://quwa.org/2017/11/21/klj-7a-proposed-aesa-radar-jf-17-undergoing-tests/

Riaz Haq said...

Pakistan raises military budget as India faces squeeze

http://www.arabnews.com/node/1297296/world

Dispute started when Chinese troops attempted to build a road in the area and India, at Bhutan’s request, sent in troops to stop the Chinese.
China sold Pakistan a highly sophisticated, large-scale optical tracking and measurement system, making it the first country in the subcontinent to acquire a missile capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads.
NEW DELHI: India should be concerned at the recently announced steep rise in Pakistan’s defense budget — especially as its own budget has been squeezed, experts said on Saturday.

Late last month in its budget announcement for the financial year, Islamabad laid out a nearly 20 percent hike in its military spend, a huge boost to its defense spending and one that is likely to stir more tension with its larger neighbor India.

The two are nuclear-armed and what worries experts about Islamabad’s budget rise is that the money could go toward boosting its nuclear program, including plans for a sea leg of its nuclear deterrent program.

“New Delhi should be concerned,” said Sharad Joshi, assistant professor its nuclear deterrent program.

“New Delhi should be concerned,” said Sharad Joshi, assistant professor at Middlebury Institute of International Studies in California, “especially when the increased focus by Islamabad is on its nuclear program, its quest for a sea-based deterrent capability, including the expansion of its nuclear-capable cruise missile fleet.”

The news comes at a time when India’s military, owing to a budget crunch, reportedly has a depleted arsenal and no cash to replenish it — even as the government wants its armed forces to be ready to deal with a conflict simultaneously with Pakistan and China.

The possibility of such a two-front war has been on the agenda for the forces. Last month the Indian Air Force held its biggest ever combat exercise — with an eye on being prepared for a simultaneous threat from Pakistan and China.

That two-week exercise, which ran day and night, was done in two phases — the first phase was on the Western side, along the border with Pakistan. The second phase was in the north and included operations that involved landing at high-altitude areas, reportedly aimed at Chinese defenses on the Tibet front.

Barely a week later, army commanders gathered to take stock of the country’s security in a bi-annual exercise in which they focused on management of existing security infrastructure, how to mitigate future security threats, how to increase India’s combat edge over potential adversaries and ways to optimize the budget to make up for the critical deficiency in ammunition.

Like Pakistan, India and China, too, are old rivals. India has lost one war to its eastern neighbor and the two continue to wrestle for dominance in the subcontinent where India likes to hold sway. More importantly, China is also a political and military ally of Pakistan.

In June, India and China were locked in a stand-off on the Doklam plateau, an area spread over less than a 100 sq km comprising a plateau and a valley between India, Bhutan and China, and which is disputed between China and Bhutan.

That dispute started when Chinese troops attempted to build a road in the area and India, at Bhutan’s request, sent in troops to stop the Chinese. The standoff lasted nearly three months.

More recently, China sold Pakistan a highly sophisticated, large-scale optical tracking and measurement system, making it the first country in the subcontinent to acquire a missile capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads and one that can overwhelm a missile defense system.

The news of that sale came on the heels of India testing its Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile, which has a range long enough to strike nearly all of China.

Riaz Haq said...

China, Pakistan to jointly manufacture Chinese aerial drones: report
By Liu Xuanzun Source:Global Times Published: 2018/10/8 23:18:39

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1122171.shtml

Pakistan will reportedly import 48 Chinese drones in what a Chinese military observer said must be the largest such arms deal of its kind.

Announcing the deal on its official Facebook account on Sunday, the Pakistan Air Force's Sherdils Aerobatic Team did not reveal how much it was worth, when it was struck or when the Wing Loong IIs will be delivered.

But the air force academy aerobatics team announced that in the future the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra and the Aviation Industry Corporation of China's Chengdu Aircraft Industrial (Group) Company will jointly manufacture the drones.

Wing Loong II, made by Chengdu Aircraft Industrial (Group) Company, is a high-end reconnaissance and strike multi-role endurance unmanned aircraft system.

It made its maiden flight in February last year, the Xinhua News Agency reported.

The largest overseas order for Wing Loong IIs was obtained even before the maiden flight, Xinhua reported. The report did not specify the buyer.

A deal involving as many as 48 Wing Loong IIs, if confirmed, would be China's largest export deal for drones to date, Song Zhongping, a military expert and TV commentator, told the Global Times on Monday.

Chengdu Aircraft Industrial Group did not confirm the deal when reached by the Global Times as of press time.

It makes sense the aerobatic team was closely involved with the deal, Song said, noting that the team is expected to train the drone operators.

The deal is trustworthy given the close military ties between the two countries and Pakistan's need for drones, Song said.

US drones like the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper are technologically more advanced, but Washington limits their export, Song said.

Chinese drones will enjoy more success in the international market in the future, he said, as they perform similarly at a lower cost.

"Chinese UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) like Caihong series also has clients from countries like Iraq and Saudi Arabia," Song said.

Riaz Haq said...

Pakistan procuring 600 tanks to bolster capability along border with India: Intelligence Sources
Apart from battle tanks, Pakistan Army is also procuring 245 150mm SP Mike-10 guns from Italy out of which it has already received 120 guns, sources said.

https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistan-procuring-600-tanks-to-bolster-capability-along-border-with-india-intelligent-sources/story-wiMPaiwlKRgHliUSvlCpZM.html

Pakistan has drawn up an ambitious plan to procure close to 600 battle tanks including T-90 tanks from Russia, primarily to bolster its military might along the border with India, intelligence sources said Sunday.

Most of the tanks Pakistan was procuring will be able to hit targets at a range of 3 to 4 km, the sources told PTI.

Apart from battle tanks, Pakistan Army is also procuring 245 150mm SP Mike-10 guns from Italy out of which it has already received 120 guns, they said.

The sources said Pakistan was eyeing to buy from Russia a batch of T-90 battle tanks- the mainstays of the armoured regiments of the Indian Army - and that the move reflects Islamabad’s intent to forge a deeper defence engagement with Moscow.

Russia has been India’s largest and most trusted defence supplier post Independence.

The sources said as part of the mega plan to significantly revamp its armoured fleet by 2025, Pakistan has decided to procure at least 360 battle tanks globally besides producing 220 tanksindigenouslywith help from its close ally China.

Pakistan Army’s move to enhance its armoured corps comes at a time when the Line of Actual control in Jammu and Kashmir has witnessed growing hostilities in the last one year. The Indian Army has been strongly retaliating to every unprovoked firing by Pakistani side. But, when the Indian Army is focused on counter-terror operations, the Pakistan Army was fast reducing its gap with Indian forces in fighting a conventional war, sources said. The Indian Army had drawn up a mega plan to modernise its infantry and armoured corps.

However almost all the procurement projects including the Rs 60,000 crore Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) programme are stuck due to a variety of reasons. At present, India’s armoured regiments, comprising mainly T-90, T-72 and Arjuna tanks, have much more superiority over Pakistan, but sources said Islamabad was seriously planning to bridge the gap at the earliest. As against around 67 armoured regiments of Indian Army, the number of similar regiments in Pakistan Army is around 51, the sources said.

They said, at present, over 70 per cent of the tanks in Pakistan’s armory have the capability to operate during night which, they said, was a matter of concern.

Besides eyeing to procure T-90 tanks, Pakistan Army is also in the process of inducting Chinese VT-4 tanks as well as Oplod-P tanks from Ukraine, the sources said. Trials for both Oplod and VT-4 tanks have already been conducted by the Pakistan Army.

At present, Pakistan is learnt to have around 17 units pf Chinese origin T-59 and T69 tanks, which comprise 30 per cent of its total tank strength, the sources said. It also has 12 regiments of Al-Zarar tanks, which makes 20 per cent of the tank fleet while Ukrain origin T-80-UD and T-85 UD as well as upgraded version of T-59 tanks comprise the rest of the 50 per cent tank fleet, they said.

“The Pakistan Army is carrying out modernisation of its armored regiments in a calibrated and time-bound manner which is not the case in India,” said an expert, who wished not to be named.

He said it was a matter of concern the way Pakistan was modernising its tank fleet.

Riaz Haq said...

#Pakistan’s Consolidating #Conventional Deterrence: Pakistan will not be forced to retaliate with #nuclear weapons as an initial response to a limited conventional incursion by #India. #ColdStart #SouthAsia https://southasianvoices.org/pakistan-conventional-deterrence-assessment/

In the case of South Asia, India’s quest to explore the space for limited conventional war below Pakistan’s nuclear thresholds has shifted the strategic debate in the region to the merits of limited aim strategies, i.e. Cold Start, that might be pursued despite Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities. In response to potential Indian proactive war strategies, Pakistan has introduced the low-yield, short-range ballistic missile system (SRBMs), (HATF-IX)/Nasr, with the intention of using it as a last resort against Indian forces in the case of impending failure of conventional defenses. In this way, Pakistan has adopted a cost-effective solution to Indian proactive war strategies that complements its conventional forces, neutralizes India’s growing technological edge, and bridges the conventional disparity between the two rivals.

In response to Pakistan’s introduction of Nasr, India has begun to shift away from the traditional logic of conventional deterrence towards the use of conventional weapons and dual-capable missiles to bolster its deterrence by punishment strategy. With the aim of destroying Pakistan’s strategic and high-value assets (such as exposed Nasr batteries), India is pursuing new conventional weapon technologies to form the basis of its counterforce capabilities, including precision guided munitions, missile defenses, stand-off weapons, and cyber operations.

Pakistan’s Conventional Developments

Although Pakistan’s full-spectrum deterrence doctrine has succeeded in deterring an Indian full-scale military attack in the past, the persistent conventional imbalance and India’s revisions to its conventional doctrines have pushed Pakistan to modernize and upgrade its conventional capabilities.

Besides Nasr, Pakistan is improving its existing conventional platforms to deter (by denial) Indian proactive conventional war strategies and any potential conventional counterforce aims. To this end, it is updating its conventional strategies, conducting military exercises, improving its weapons systems, and seeking new defense partnerships. For instance, Pakistan developed an offensive-defense “Riposte” strategy after 1989. The strategy calls for a Pakistani Army strike corps to launch an offensive in an event of war, with the aim of occupying Indian-territory near border while holding back the initial hostile advances. To supplement this doctrine, Pakistan has reorganized its strategic reserves, i.e. the Army Reserve North and Army Reserve South. In addition, Pakistan’s six defensive Corps are situated in close proximity to Indian territory; these are the country’s initial defenses against Indian conventional aggression. In addition, conventional military exercises—such as Azm-e-Nau, New Concept of War Fighting (NCWF), High Mark, Strike of Thunder, and Sea Spark—are positioned to enhance the synergy of Pakistan’s three military services and combat readiness along the eastern border.

To further consolidate conventional deterrence against India, Pakistan is actively engaged in negotiations and contracts for upgrades and procurement of conventional armaments from various suppliers. Initiatives in the conventional domain such as additions to and/or modernization of its cruise missile program, air defenses, unmanned aerial vehicles, and surface and sub-surface fleet (see below table) will help Pakistan implement a limited or large-scale conventional military operation against India if the need arises by denying the Indian Air Force the ability to achieve air superiority over Pakistan. Furthermore, improvements in air defenses will enable Pakistani ground forces to conduct defensive and counter-offensive operations against Indian integrated battle groups (IBGs) or strike corps.

Riaz Haq said...

LESSONS FROM THE BRINK
Ejaz Haider Updated March 10, 2019

https://www.dawn.com/news/1468744


India thought — and many experts agreed — that there was a band in which India could act militarily and punitively. That, if India were to play within that band, it would make it extremely difficult for Pakistan to escalate to the nuclear level because such escalation would be considered highly disproportionate and would draw international opprobrium and consequences. The argument was that the certainty of international diplomatic and economic isolation would force Pakistan to stay its hand and not escalate to the nuclear level.

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The banal equivalent of such a situation would be someone punching another person in a crowded bazaar and the victim, instead of keeping the fight to fisticuffs, chooses to draw and fire a pistol. Not only would such a person lose the sympathy of the crowd, he would also invite the full coercive and normative weight of the law.

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The interesting assumption in all this, and one that should not be missed is this: the first-round result. Every subsequent assumption flows from what India could achieve militarily in the opening hand.


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It is precisely for this reason that the opening round is so crucial for the aggressor, in this case India. To recap, as noted above in the list of assumptions, every subsequent assumption flows from the success of the opening round.

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what is important is not whether Indian planes came into Pakistan (original claim), whether they struck in a stand-off mode (i.e. when aerial platforms are used from a safe distance, away from defensive weapons, and use precision munitions such as glide bombs to attack a distant target without actually coming upon the target and swooping down for a bombing run) or even whether they could or could not make a hit. The important and crucial point was that India had challenged Pakistan and Pakistan needed to put an end to the “new normal” talk. Pakistan chose its targets, struck to show resolve and capability and then also won the dogfight.

Later, we are told that India had thought of using missiles to hit nine targets in Pakistan. But Pakistan readied its missiles and informed India that it will hit back. That forced India to back off. If this is true — and it comes to us from a briefing by Prime Minister Imran Khan — then it seems that Modi had nursed the idea of playing a very dangerous hand, which he couldn’t because that would have meant exchange of missiles between a nuclear dyad — a development which has remarkable escalation potential. Missilery between nuclear powers is a big no. There’s no known technology in the world that can determine whether the incoming missile has a tactical or a strategic (nuclear) warhead and that can lead to response miscalculation.

The two sides are back to the ‘old normal’ — artillery and small-arms duelling across the LoC. The attempt by an Indian submarine to enter Pakistan’s territorial waters was also deftly picked up by Pakistan Navy, with the sub forced to return. It could have been sunk but Pakistan, in keeping with its policy of not escalating, chose not to make a hit.

From here on, there’s nothing more for India but to understand the imperative of positive engagement through a sustained dialogue. The framework for such engagement is already in place. There is no alternative to talking and walking that talk. But that will not happen until we see the electoral contest in India and its results.

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At the same time, Pakistan must not underestimate India based on these limited rounds. While India could not coerce Pakistan militarily at this moment, if the growth differential between Pakistan and India continues to grow, the technological asymmetry will increase to the point where strategies of coercion could kick into play. That scenario could see very different results on the ground. For instance, India will possess the anti-access, area-denial (A2/AD) S-400 system by 2020.

Riaz Haq said...

Report reveals #Pakistan’s progress on #military #equipment acquisitions on track amid financial woes. #Defense analyst Cloughley says Pakistan may have realized the use of tactical #nuclear weapons against #India would spark an uncontrollable escalation. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2019/09/19/government-report-reveals-pakistans-progress-on-military-acquisitions-amid-financial-woes/#.XYQ9NRqtC7A.twitter

Author, analyst and former defense attaché to Islamabad Brian Cloughley told Defense News that emphasis on heavy armor indicates Pakistan’s “preparedness for conventional war, and it seems that the riposte is alive and being refined in direct answer to India’s overwhelming numerical superiority.”

Details of ongoing development, the replacement of foreign equipment as well as acquisition programs were recently released by the Ministry of Defence Production in its “Year Book 2017-18” document. The ministry oversees all aspects of state-owned military industrial enterprises, indigenous development programs and foreign acquisition.

The document highlights the prioritization of armored platforms and air power.

Efforts toward improving armored capabilities include finding substitutions to component imports and indigenous development, specifically:

The manufacturing of auxiliary power units for the Al-Zarrar and T-80UD tanks.
The development and trials of a sabot FSDS-T round.
The development of a driver’s thermal imaging/night vision periscope.
The assembly of engines for the Al-Khalid and T-80UD tanks.
The rebuilding and upgrading of 160 Type-85IIAP main battle tanks between 2019-2020 and 2021-2022.
A pilot effort to rebuild T-80UDs (completed in August 2019).
The continued rebuilding of M113-series armored personnel carriers.
The continued upgrade of Type-59 main battle tanks to the Al-Zarrar version.
The low-rate production of 20 Al-Khalid I tanks, plus the final-stage development of the Al-Khalid II (featuring an enhanced power pack and fire-control/gun-control system).

A program for a tracked infantry fighting vehicle, or IFV, was also mentioned in the ministry’s document. State-owned armored fighting vehicle manufacturer HIT developed the Viper to meet this need. The static prototype was displayed at the IDEAS2018 defense expo. The platform was based on the M113 series, but was armed with a Slovak Turra 30 unmanned turret.

Riaz Haq said...

#Pakistan reveals orders for latest MANPADSs (shoulder-fired air defense missiles), anti-tank missiles and other #weapon systems in 2017–18 | Jane's 360 https://www.janes.com/article/91749/pakistan-s-modp-reveals-orders-for-manpadss-and-other-weapon-systems-in-2017-18#.XdBz0H-icHw.twitter


Pakistan's Ministry of Defence Production (MoDP) revealed in its recently released yearbook for 2017-18 that the country ordered 52 9K129 Kornet-E anti-tank guided missile weapon systems and 295 FN-16 man-portable air-defence systems (MANPADSs) during that period.

The document stated that the deal for the Russian-made Kornet-E ATGWs, which is likely to have included hundreds of missiles, was valued at USD62.46 million, while the procurement of the Chinese-made third-generation MANPADSs was valued at USD25.13 million.

According to Jane's Infantry Weapons , the Kornet-E system comprises the 9M133-1 anti-tank and 9M133F-1 anti-structure missiles, the 9P163-1 GLS, along with the optional 1PN79-1 thermal sight.

The missile, which is armed with the 9N156-1 tandem-shaped charge warhead, has a stated maximum range of 5,500 m during the day and of 3,500 m at night. The warhead is claimed to be able to penetrate between 1,000 mm and 1,200 mm of vertically inclined rolled homogeneous armour (RHA) plates protected by explosive reactive armour (ERA).

The Chinese-made FN-16 is an upgrade on the FN-6 MANPADS that has been designed mainly for battlefield air defence to intercept low altitude and ultra-low altitude air targets. In particular, the FN-16 missile has an extended range of 6,000 m and the capability to pull an 18 g turn. If required, the FN-16 can also be integrated into an overall air defence system or a local air defence system.

Also purchased were 369 additional anti-tank rockets for the Pakistan Army for USD9 million to supplement the 1,430 rockets the army had ordered in 2016 to arm 158 Instalaza ALCOTAN-100 man-portable, shoulder-launched, lightweight anti-armour systems.

According to MoDP's latest yearbook, which was released in September, Pakistan also ordered 60 additional Chinese-made CM-400AKG air-launched anti-ship missiles for the air force for USD100 million.

Riaz Haq said...

#China, #Pakistan complete 9-day joint #naval exercise in #ArabianSea. Special forces, warships, submarines and warplanes participated in live-fire drills. #India sent aircraft carrier to monitor events amid simmering tensions in region #CPEC https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3046064/china-pakistan-complete-sea-guardians-2020-joint-naval via @scmpnews

Chinese and Pakistani troops completed a nine-day naval exercise in the Arabian Sea on Tuesday, against a backdrop of simmering tensions in the Middle East and South Asia.
The operation – Sea Guardians 2020 – was the sixth joint naval drill between the two countries and took place in the northern reaches of the waterway and along the Pakistani shoreline. It involved special forces, warships, aerial assets and, for the first time, submarines in a series of live-fire exercises.
Tensions have been running high in the region since the killing of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in a US air strike earlier this month and the increased hostility between India and Pakistan in the disputed region of Kashmir

While the US and India were likely to have been keeping a close eye on the exercises – New Delhi deployed an aircraft carrier to monitor events – experts said the operation was largely routine and not intended to stoke tensions.
“It was planned well in advance, long before things began escalating in the Middle East,” said Du Youkang, director of the Pakistan Study Centre at Fudan University in Shanghai.

James Dorsey, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, agreed, saying the drills should not be seen as a reaction by China to the tensions in the Middle East.
“I don’t think it’s an issue of showing more muscle in the region … you have an ongoing cooperation between Pakistan and China and this is part of it,” he said.

“Others may read it as a signal, but I don’t think it’s the driving incentive. But the cooperation [between China and Pakistan] will be closely followed by India and the United States.”

Nonetheless, Beijing has been expanding its military presence in the Middle East, and last month took part in a four-day exercise with Russian and Iranian forces in the northern part of the Indian Ocean.
Dorsey said that the drills coincided with a shift in the security architecture in the region.
“Over a period of time, we will see changes, moving from a unipolar, US-centric system to a multipolar arrangement,” he said.
“That would most probably include China, as well as Russia, and potentially countries like India. It’s all on the drawing board, but that’s clearly the trend.”

Riaz Haq said...

#Pakistan and #China launch joint #naval drills for “augmenting interoperability and strategic cooperation.” Should #India be concerned? https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/surface-navy-association/2020/01/08/pakistan-and-china-launch-joint-naval-drills-should-india-be-concerned/#.XiZQIiqBX20.twitter

A nine-day Sino-Pakistani naval exercise commenced in Pakistan’s port of Karachi on Monday with the arrival of a Chinese naval task group from its South Sea Fleet. Sea Guardians 2020 is the sixth in the bilateral series, which, according to the Pakistan Navy, will focus on “augmenting interoperability and strategic cooperation.”

The exercise will include a range of drills to share “professional experiences on contemporary and non-traditional threats at sea” to improve regional security cooperation, plus promote a “safe and sustainable maritime environment.”

While stating the exercise aims to “enhance the capabilities of the two navies to jointly cope with maritime terrorism and crime,” China’s military media branch stressed it had “nothing to do with the regional situation and is not target[ing] at any third party.”

This was likely an attempt to reassure India that the drills were unrelated to the tension between rivals India and Pakistan.

However, India will certainly have noted that Sea Guardians included warlike air defense systems, anti-missile technology, anti-submarine warfare capabilities, and live-fire and joint marine training drills.

Sidharth Kaushal, a research fellow specializing in sea power at the Royal United Services Institute think tank, said “India has generally regarded Chinese exercises and naval activity in the Indian Ocean with apprehension.” Consequently, New Delhi has invested in countering China’s naval presence.

“The Indian Navy’s efforts over the past decade to improve its situational awareness in the region and to upgrade the capabilities of tri-service command in Andaman and Nicobar reflects a growing consensus that the [Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy] will be a challenger in the [Indian Ocean region] in the foreseeable future,” Kaushal said.

Riaz Haq said...

#India's big #military purchases from #US: 22 MQ-9 Reaper (Predator B) #drones for $2.6 billion; 6 P-8I maritime #surveillance #aircraft for $1 billion; 2 Gulfstream 550 aircraft for #intelligence for nearly $1 billion; #SAM #missiles for over $1 billion. https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2020/02/04/new-weapons-purchases-suffer-under-indias-latest-defense-budget/#.XpqKVKqPXtE.twitter


The senior MoD official told Defense News that due to the shortage of funds, at least a dozen pending defense contracts will experience delays. “The current $18.52 billion capital allocation is only [a] marginal increase from [the] previous year [capital] allocation of $18.02 billion [and] does not even adequately cover inflation costs.”

The Indian Air Force is to receive $6.76 billion from the 2020-2021 budget, a drop from the previous year’s $7.01 billion. The money is expected to go toward payments for orders of Rafale fighters from France and an S-400 missile system from Russia.

The Indian Navy is to receive $4.56 billion, which is expected to help cover the cost of leasing a nuclear submarine and stealth frigates from Russia, as well as pay for warships from Indian companies. A Navy official said it is unlikely the service will be able to sign a contract for 24 MH-60R multirole helicopters for more than $2 billion from the U.S. next year.

The Indian Army is to receive $5.06 billion to pay cover previous orders of wheeled and ultralight artillery guns, T-90 tanks, and ammunition.

India’s state-owned defense companies continue to receive 60 percent of defense-related business, with 30 percent going to overseas defense companies and 10 percent to domestic private defense firms.

Another MoD official said the armed forces plan to focus on industry-funded defense projects under the government’s “Make-II” category, which allows private companies to participate in the prototype development of weapons and platforms with a focus on import substitution, for which no government funding will be provided.

Riaz Haq said...

#Pakistan’s New Midget #Submarine: Emerging Challenge to #India in the Arabian Sea. What will Pakistan’s new indigenous midget submarine bring to its #naval capabilities? #PakistanNavy #SSG #NavySeals
@Diplomat_APAC https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/pakistans-new-midget-submarine-emerging-challenge-to-india-in-the-arabian-sea/

a recent satellite image (Figure 1) confirms that Pakistan might have indigenously developed a new midget submarine as it proposed in the MoDP 2015–2016.

From 2016 on, one can see the submarine partially covered in a tent in. Since 2019, the submarine can be seen in open view, suggesting that the construction is near completion and that sea trials may have commenced.

The new midget submarine, which is compact in size, is leading to speculation regarding its possible role in the Arabian Sea and in combat.

The midget submarine as seen from the satellite images has a length of around 55 feet (16.7 m) and a beam measurement of around 8 feet (2.43 m). The vessel’s displacement is currently unknown.

The prominent vertical rudder, propeller, and the round-shaped nose are visible from the shadow of the midget submarine. The snorkel is not visible in the image. But it is clear from the image that the submarine appears to be larger than the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle (SDV) and slightly smaller than the MG110 midget submarines.

The compact size of the submarine with simple hull constructions suggests that it is easy to operate and maintain. The vessel can likely be transported over land due to its size. The defense expert H. I. Sutton writes in Forbes that the submarine design is new and doesn’t appear to be an imported one.

Given the present level of cooperation between Pakistan and Turkey, one cannot rule out the possibility of a Turkish firm’s involvement in the development of new midget submarines. In an interview in 2019, Murat İkinci, the general manager of STM, confirmed that the “Pakistan Navy and STM are currently discussing new projects, including serious and dedicated works for midget submarines.” However, there are no official sources to confirm that the new midget submarine has been codeveloped with Turkey.

A Role for the Midget Submarine

The Pakistan has been using new midget submarines for many years now. The development of a new midget submarine not only showcases its indigenous capability, but also shows that Pakistan is prepping its underwater warfare capability.

As Pakistan continues to lay emphasis on a sea denial strategy there is a possibility that it may use the midget submarine in an offensive role during any conflict with India in the coming months and years.

The seaward defense of Karachi has been one of the major challenges for the Pakistan Navy since the 1971 war with India. The midget submarine would fill a gap in protecting Karachi Port from sea-based attack. Most importantly, it would replace the current MG110s in service with the SSG (Navy) for operations such as frogmen operations, laying mines, and so on.

Riaz Haq said...

General Bajwa pledges to modernize Pakistan Infantry
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa aims to equip infantry divisions in Pakistan Army with the best training and equipment to prepare it for future threats

https://www.globalvillagespace.com/general-bajwa-pledges-to-modernize-pakistan-infantry/

Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa on Friday said the Pakistan Army would do all that was possible to modernize the Infantry as part of its overall drive to prepare for future threats.

He expressed these views while visiting Punjab Regimental Centre (PRC). He installed Lieutenant General Majid Ehsan, Inspector General Arms as Colonel Commandant of the PRC, said an ISPR news release.

Interacting with the officers and troops, the COAS appreciated the Regiment for displaying the highest standards in all professional pursuits, including their exemplary performance in operations.

Earlier on arrival at Punjab Regimental Centre, the COAS was received by the Incoming, Outgoing Colonel Commandants and Commandant of Punjab Regimental Centre.

The COAS also laid wreath at Yadgar-e-Shuhada.

Outgoing Colonel Commandant of the Punjab Regiment Lieutenant General Shahid Baig Mirza (R), large number of serving and retired officers and soldiers were attended the ceremony.

“The role of national security dialogue is not limited to Army nowadays, other stakeholders are in this too,” said Bajwa.

“National security is thus multi-layered. The outer layer being the exogenous factors of the global and regional environment, and the internal layers being indigenous factors of internal peace, stability and developmental orientation, he added.

“A nation at peace and a region at harmony are thus essential pre-requisites for attaining national security in the true spirit.”

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) had been at the heart of Pakistan’s economic transformation plan and the country had aimed make the project inclusive, transparent and attractive for all global and regional players, remarked Bajwa.


However, only seeing Pakistan through [the] CPEC prism is also misleading, he said.

COAS satisfied over stabilization operations
Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Qamar Javed Bajwa last month expressed satisfaction over progress of the stabilization operations across Pakistan following the successes of Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad.

Addressing the two-day long 78th Formation Commanders’ Conference held here at GHQ (General Headquarters), he said, “Pakistan Army shall continue defending and serving the nation in every possible way.”


The COAS General Qamar Javed Bajwa was presiding over the conference which was attended by corps commanders, principal staff officers and all formation commanders of Pakistan Army, said an Inter Services Public Relations news release.

Riaz Haq said...

Pakistan resumes armor modernization as terror threat recedes

https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/11/19/pakistan-resumes-armor-modernization-as-terror-threat-recedes/


Though he was unable to provide details on the Type-85APII upgrade, Defense News understands it was upgraded along similar lines to the T-80UD.

HIT officials previously told Defense News that the T-80UD and Type-85APII tanks would receive upgrade after undergoing a pilot rebuild, although the Type-85APII fire and gun control systems had already received some attention, and the gunner was already equipped with a thermal sight.

The Type-85APII has also received an upgraded power pack, with some sources now referring to the platform as the Type-85UG.

Future hopes are pinned on the VT-4, with the first delivered in April 2020. It entered service around June 2021.

Though derived from the Type-90II/Al-Khalid, the VT-4 features the improved gun of China’s high-end Type-99A main battle tank and therefore can fire the same rounds with greater penetrative power compared to Pakistan’s other tanks. The VT-4 also has more advanced composite and reactive armor; China’s third-generation thermal imaging systems; more advanced fire and gun control systems; and a Chinese-made powertrain.

Richard Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, said the VT-4 and related technology will deliver an element of parity between India and Pakistan.

“NORINCO’s VT-4, as a direct purchase or as the basis for the domestically produced Al-Khalid 2, would offer Pakistan a wide array of modern tank technologies competitive with the Russian T-90MS being acquired by India, from powertrain to fire control, high velocity gun, gun-launched anti-tank missiles and active protection systems,” he said.

However, he cautioned, “rough parity may be unsatisfactory for both Pakistan and India, so both likely will seek regular available upgrades or next-generation options.”

Unlike with the original Al-Khalid, Pakistan avoids with its VT-4 a reliance on expensive European sighting systems and the occasionally problematic supply of Ukrainian powertrains. But there is no indication that the Chinese powertrain will replace that shared by T-80UD and Al-Khalid tanks.

The Viper is based on the Saad armored personnel carrier (similar to the American Armored Infantry Fighting Vehicle), featuring additional armor protection and the unmanned Slovakian Turra 30 combat module with a 30mm gun and two anti-tank missiles. It carries a crew of three, plus nine dismounts.

Pakistan’s shift to infantry fighting vehicles comes many years after other major armies, which Cloughley said was unavoidable.

“IFVs are expensive, and their operation requires a great deal of training at all levels, which the Army, of necessity concentrating on counterinsurgency operations, did not want to commit to,” he explained. “The [Pakistan Army] has always wanted IFVs, and now sees the opportunity for a balanced introduction program, taking into account unit training.”

The Army is also sharpening its armored warfare skills, having this year held a series of large-scale exercises to improve integration among the various branches of its ground force, including infantry, mechanized forces, combat aviation, surveillance platforms, air defense and artillery.

Cloughley believes emphasis is also “being placed on maneuvers in the nuclear battlefield, and that closed-down operations are being practiced on almost all exercises.”

“HIT has always been conscious of the importance of developing [nuclear-, biological- and chemical-protected] technology, and crew comfort has received attention,” he said.

While the Army will be relieved its armor modernization program is back on track, Cloughley issued a word of warning: “While I agree that it is very important that the [Pakistan Army] continues to improve interoperability and must upgrade its armored capabilities, it must not lose sight of the COIN imperative, which is a significant aspect of its mission.”

Riaz Haq said...

Does Pakistan Have Any Countermeasures?
This begs the question- what strategies and weapons does Pakistan have in its arsenal to counter the S-400s?


https://eurasiantimes.com/challenging-s-400-missiles-pakistan-says-its-stealth-drones-india/

Peshawar-based journalist and editor of Global Conflict Watch, Farzana Shah told The EurAsian Times that the “S-400 acquisition by India is a continuation of Delhi’s drive to project her military power in the region. This system will boost Indian air defense capabilities. However, this acquisition was planned and so Pakistan was aware of it.”


Shah said that as an answer to India’s acquisition of this system, Pakistan has inducted a system of similar capability in the form of HQ-9B. “Pakistan Air Force is also evaluating another high-altitude long-range SAM system. S-400 is an expensive ABM system so using it as SAM will be expensive and counterproductive,” she opined.

Mid-October last year, Janes had reported that the Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing of the Pakistani military, had issued a press release stating that the Pakistan Army’s (PA) Air Defence forces had inducted a variant of the Chinese-made HQ-9 SAM system in their service.

The HQ-9/P is capable of operating as part of an integrated air and missile defense network. The ISPR noted that the system would be used to “significantly enhance” the ‘Comprehensive Layered Integrated Air Defence (CLIAD)’ along the frontiers of Pakistan.

This system’s engagement range against cruise missiles and aircraft is over 100 kilometers with a claimed high “single-shot kill probability.” However, it is believed that this range actually applies only to aircraft. Engagement ranges against cruise missiles and other such targets are thought to be close to 25 km.

Pakistani journalist Syed Ali Abbas, Managing Editor of Global Defense Insight, said that while Pakistan cannot afford to buy a costly missile defense system like S-400 due to economic constraints, the country already has the tools to counter India’s S-400 acquisition in its inventory.


“For instance, Pakistan’s missiles have the capability to penetrate the S-400; MIRV technology can have a substantial impact on S-400. Moreover, with drones coming to assist on the battlefield, and proving to be notably effective in neutralizing various air defense systems, Pakistan also has the option of the Pakistan Air Force acquiring Turkish Bayraktar drones, coupled with its indigenous armed drone inventory,” he explained.

In July last year, it was reported that Pakistan was looking to acquire armed drones from Turkey, while simultaneously seeking to deepen the already strong bilateral cooperation with Ankara.

Shah highlighted other strategies that the PAF has to deal with the S-400. “Options range from suppressing S-400 radar using stand-off jamming capabilities to taking it out using saturated drone attacks. The system’s radar can pick hundreds of targets but each regiment has only a limited number of interceptor missiles.“

Another weapon that Pakistan could potentially use to deal with the S-400 is the ZF-1 stealth drone. This drone was made specifically to attack heavily defended targets. The drone was promoted at Pakistan’s biennial arms exhibition IDEAS in 2018 by UAS Global.

According to some experts, Pakistan might also benefit indirectly by holding joint military exercises with friendly countries, which already possess the S-400, such as China and Turkey. Such drills might assist in helping Pakistan identify the system’s strengths and weaknesses.

Riaz Haq said...

#China may sell or help #Pakistan develop its own HGV (Hypersonic Glide Vehicle) or sell #hypersonic DF-17 #missile. It's in response to #India's #Russian S-400 acquisition which may limit Pakistan's use of its own airspace, given its geography/proximity https://www.hindustantimes.com/videos/china-may-sell-pak-its-df-17-missile-why-china-thinks-india-s-s-400-is-a-threat-101643369071114.html

Pakistan and China have come up with a new strategy in wake of India flexing its military muscle. Experts suggest that China is likely to equip Pakistan with its DF-17 hypersonic missile system in a bid to counter India's S-400 air defence system. Richard D. Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center in an interview has claimed that China is likely to sell the DF-17 or assist Pakistani HGV like it has supported North Korea’s new hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) missile warhead. Hypersonic weapons, which travel at Mach 5 speeds (five times the speed of sound), are difficult to track and engage for air defence systems like S-400, that both India and China possess. Pakistan sees India's acquisition of the S-400 as a threat because of the system's versatility, which allows it to shoot down planes even in Pakistani airspace. A notable element of the S-400 is its potential offensive capabilities, which would limit an adversary's usage of its own airspace. The defensive system can cover a huge portion of Pakistan because of the country's terrain and lengthy border with India.

-----------


https://eurasiantimes.com/china-to-equip-pakistan-with-hypersonic-df-17-missiles-india/

Richard D. Fisher, a senior fellow at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, testified before the US Congress about China’s military advances and has written extensively about the People’s Liberation Army.

“To the extent that China has supported North Korea’s new hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) missile warhead, it has or will similarly assist a Pakistani HGV, or just sell the DF-17,” he told Defense News.

Given the air defense system’s superior sensors and the array of missiles, the Indian Media has referred to the S-400 as a “game-changer.” The S-400 employs four different types of surface-to-air missiles having a range from 40 to 400 kilometers.

Riaz Haq said...

Russian tanks being destroyed by Ukraine's US-supplied anti-tank missiles:


https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/russian-tanks-in-ukraine-are-sprouting-cages/21808191


This approach is known as statistical armour, because the protection it offers is all or nothing. It is typically quoted as having a 50% chance of disrupting an incoming rpg. But Dr Appleby-Thomas notes that it works only against munitions with a nose fuse, which Javelins, nlaws and mam-ls do not have.

Russia has been fitting slat armour to vehicles since 2016, but the design of the new cages, seemingly improvised from locally available materials, is baffling. They appear to be oriented in a way that protects only against attacks from above. In principle, that might help against Javelins, which have a “top attack” mode in which they first veer upwards and then dive to punch through a tank’s thin top armour. But, as Nick Reynolds, a land-warfare research analyst at rusi, a British defence think-tank, notes, even if the cage sets off a Javelin’s precursor warhead, the main charge is still more than powerful enough to punch through the top armour and destroy the tank—as the Ukrainian army itself proved in December, when it tested one against a vehicle protected by add-on armour replicating the Russian design. As expected, the Javelin destroyed the target easily.

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Notable purchases made with national funds since 2001 include: 18 new F-16 combat aircraft, 500 AMRAAM air-to-air missiles, 500 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and six Phalanx Close-In Weapons System naval guns. Also, using U.S. military aid, Pakistan has purchased about 5,250 TOW anti-armor (anti-tank) missiles, five refurbished SH-2I Super Seasprite maritime helicopters, and one ex-Oliver Hazard Perry class missile frigate.

https://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2010/05/03/the-problem-with-pakistan/

Riaz Haq said...

The Army in Indian Military Strategy: Rethink Doctrine or Risk Irrelevance
ARZAN TARAPORE

https://carnegieindia.org/2020/08/10/army-in-indian-military-strategy-rethink-doctrine-or-risk-irrelevance-pub-82426

India’s military strategy has been dominated by an orthodox offensive doctrine—a method of using force that favors large formations tasked with punitive incursions into enemy territory. This doctrine is orthodox in its preference for large combined-arms army formations, usually operating with minimal coordination with other services and relatively autonomously from its political masters. It is offensive in its military aims of imposing a punitive cost on the enemy––usually in the form of capturing territory for the purposes of gaining leverage in postwar negotiations––even if it is usually deployed in the service of a strategically defensive policy of maintaining the territorial status quo. And it is a doctrine in that it represents an enduring set of principles governing the Indian Army’s use of force, regardless of the scarcity of public doctrinal publications.

This paper argues that the stubborn dominance of the orthodox offensive doctrine, even in the face of drastic changes in India’s strategic environment, renders the military a less useful tool of national policy. In the two decades since India fought its last war in and around the district of Kargil in 1999, three major strategic trends have fundamentally changed India’s security environment: nuclear deterrence has made major conventional war unlikely; China’s military power and assertiveness now pose an unprecedented threat; and radical new technologies have redefined the military state of the art. India’s security policy has not kept pace. Given the balance of military power on India’s northern borders, India cannot decisively defeat either Pakistan or China on the battlefield. Without the ability to impose such unacceptable costs, India’s doctrine will not deter its rivals, which both have significant resolve to bear the costs of conflict. The continued pursuit of large, offensive military options also raises the risk that its enemies will rely on escalatory—even nuclear—responses. And because the doctrine demands a force structure of large ground-holding formations, it pulls scarce resources away from modernization and regional force projection—a problem made especially acute as the Indian government makes tough economic choices amid the coronavirus pandemic.

The remainder of this paper is divided into five parts. First, it surveys the history of India’s military strategy, showing its reliance on ground forces and the orthodox offensive doctrine. Second, it outlines the three major strategic changes that have upended India’s security environment in the twenty-first century. Third, it analyzes the reasons why India’s strategy and doctrine have failed to adapt. Fourth, the paper argues that India’s military is less useful in this new environment. Finally, the paper concludes with some recommendations for the Indian Army.

Riaz Haq said...

The Army in Indian Military Strategy: Rethink Doctrine or Risk Irrelevance
ARZAN TARAPORE

https://carnegieindia.org/2020/08/10/army-in-indian-military-strategy-rethink-doctrine-or-risk-irrelevance-pub-82426


Modern India’s military strategy has been dominated by ground forces managing threats on its northern continental periphery. Air power has traditionally been used only as a supporting adjunct to land power, rather than an independent strategic tool; and India has not projected significant maritime force despite a notable history of seafaring and influence across the Indian Ocean region. Historically, there were sound reasons for this emphasis on ground forces. Wedged between two powerful and hostile neighbors, Pakistan and China, independent India fought five land wars along its northern land borders. Its most formative modern episodes were entirely or almost entirely ground-force actions. This includes its most searing defeat against China in 1962 and its most celebrated victory, in East Pakistan in 1971. India’s most immediate security threats today, from cross-border terrorism in the northern territories of Jammu and Kashmir to periodic incursions across its disputed boundary with China, are managed by the army and ground-force paramilitaries. To handle all this, the army attracts an ever-growing share of the military budget and resources. Despite its potential as a hybrid continental-maritime power, India’s security policy is dominated by ground forces.

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The orthodox offensive doctrine took center stage by the mid-1960s, propelled by two formative experiences that taught the Indian military the limits of the British Raj’s frontier defense doctrine.2 The first Kashmir war, in 1947–48, was a light-infantry conflict to gain control of the disputed territory.3 India quickly seized control of Srinagar and the Kashmir Valley, with most fighting thereafter occurring in the surrounding mountainous terrain. This reduced the scope for using combined arms, let alone other services. Air power did, however, play a vital—if not decisive—role in the war, when India used an air assault on Srinagar airport to launch its initial deployment into Kashmir. This allowed Indian forces to seize the initiative, establish and reinforce their military presence in the vital valley before Pakistan could, and resupply its lead forces. Without that initial use of air power, India would not have been able to make its timely intervention or sustain its operations in Kashmir. The bulk of the subsequent inconclusive fighting was done by India’s newly inherited ground forces. They secured ground lines of communication through Jammu to sustain the fight in the following months and pressed out of the valley to fight for control in the mountains until a ceasefire suspended hostilities.

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In response to the Cold Start doctrine, Pakistan has made tactical nuclear weapons an integral part of its military strategy and consistently warns that it will not hesitate to escalate a crisis past the nuclear threshold. Perhaps to preclude the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear attack, Indian strategists and planners may be developing a counterforce option to preemptively defang Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.63 A counterforce element of a cost imposition strategy—a contentious but plausible supposition—would multiply the risks already inherent in its orthodox offensive doctrine, especially while India’s counterforce capabilities are still under development and unproven. In response to India’s growing military presence near the Line of Actual Control, China has reinforced its border deployments and periodically seeks to revise the territorial status quo with provocative incursions, as it did most recently from April 2020.64

Riaz Haq said...

The US intelligence community is carrying out a sweeping internal review of how it assesses the fighting power of foreign militaries amid mounting pressure from key lawmakers on Capitol Hill who say officials have failed twice in one year on the two major foreign policy crises faced by the Biden administration in Ukraine and Afghanistan.

The Senate Intelligence Committee on Tuesday sent a classified letter to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Defense Department and the CIA pointing out that the agencies broadly underestimated how long the Ukrainian military would be able to fend off Russian forces and overestimated how long Afghan fighters would hold out against the Taliban last summer after the US withdrawal from the country, multiple sources familiar with the matter tell CNN. They questioned the methodology behind the intelligence community's assessments, and the underlying assumptions behind them, the sources said.
CNN has learned that one smaller intelligence agency within the State Department did more accurately assess the Ukrainian military's capability to resist Russia. But while that assessment was shared within the US government, it did not override the wider intelligence community's predictions.


https://www.cnn.com/2022/05/13/politics/us-intelligence-review-ukraine/index.html

Current and former intelligence officials acknowledge that only looking at military "capabilities" leaves out the quintessentially human factors that could prove decisive. Assessing a population's will to fight is an art, not a science, that defies purely data-driven analysis, the senior State Department official said. But, the official said, it is a key element to determining how successful a military will be in a fight.
"The basic challenge is, you can see what you can count: so you know something about the armaments they have and you can maybe see something about the training they have," said Treverton.
"But the things that matter are all intangible," he said. "You just don't know how good they're going to be and how willing they're going to be to fight. I've never seen us have much by way of a good method for doing that."

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Ukraine crisis: Could India cut its defence ties with Russia?


https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-61274042

"There's strong reason to believe that... Russia will be unable to fulfil its contractual commitments to India with delivery of all of the S-400 system," says Mr Lalwani.

He also believes that the losses Russia has incurred in Ukraine could mean it may not be able to meet India's needs "because it will be desperate to use all the spares to replenish its own forces".

Why is Russia losing so many tanks in Ukraine?
And he says Indian policymakers may be taking note of some of the issues that have faced Russian battlefield equipment and munitions in Ukraine.

Could India manage without Russian arms?
That looks unlikely at the moment.

A US Congressional report in October last year said that the "Indian military cannot operate effectively without Russian-supplied equipment and will continue to rely on Russian weapons systems in the near and middle term".

The report noted that Russia offers its weapons at relatively attractive prices.

Sangeeta Saxena, editor of Delhi-based Aviation and Defence Universe, says the Indian army in particular will continue to keep buying from Russia.

Riaz Haq said...

Early in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it wasn’t just Moscow that believed its offensive could succeed quickly. In February, even U.S. officials warned Kyiv could fall in days.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-simple-ratio-came-to-influence-military-strategy-11652434202

Russians had numbers on their side, or more precisely a number: the 3:1 rule, the ratio by which attackers must outnumber defenders in order to prevail. It is one of several “force ratios” popular in military strategy. Russia, it seemed, could amass that advantage.

The war in Ukraine has brought renewed interest in force ratios. Other ratios in military doctrine include the numbers needed to defeat unprepared defenders, resist counterinsurgencies or counterattack flanks. Though they sound like rules of thumb for a board game like Risk, the ratios have been taught to generations of both American and Soviet and then Russian tacticians, and provide intuitive support for the idea Ukraine was extremely vulnerable.

“I would imagine that most of them are thinking in those terms, that you need something on the order of a 3:1 advantage to break through,” said John Mearsheimer, a University of Chicago professor whose work focuses on security competition between great powers. “It’s clear in this case that the Russians badly miscalculated.”

Modern versions of the 3:1 rule apply to local sectors of combat. A Rand Corp. study determined a theater-wide 1.5-to-1 advantage would allow attackers to achieve 3:1 ratios in certain sectors.

Overall, Russia’s military has quadruple the personnel and infantry vehicles, triple the artillery and tanks, and nearly 10 times the armored personnel carriers, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the London-based think tank.

With 190,000 Russian troops concentrated to invade in February, and Ukraine’s military spread across the country, (only 30,000 troops, for example, were estimated to be in Ukraine’s east near the Donbas region) it appeared Russia had the numbers to overwhelm Ukraine.

-----------

Ratios don’t account for Western intelligence and materiel support, for Ukrainian resolve, for low Russian morale, for Russia’s logistical struggles, or for severe Russian tactical errors, like leaving tanks exposed in columns on major roadways, Mr. Biddle said.

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These ratios originate from 19th-century European land wars.

In his seminal 1832 text on military strategy, “On War,” the Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz proclaimed: “The defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the offensive.” By the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, Prussians distilled this to requiring triple the attackers. Prussia decisively triumphed; maybe they were on to something.

World War I, with years of stalemate in the trenches as combatants struggled to break through defenses, lent further credibility to the idea.

English Brigadier-General James Edmonds, writing shortly after World War I, recorded an early version of the rule: “It used to be reckoned in Germany that to turn out of a position an ebenbürtigen foe—that is, a foe equal in all respects, courage, training, morale and equipment—required threefold numbers.”

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Still, he said of Ukraine: “It’s obvious in this case, the force ratio, the number of static units, are a very poor predictor of what’s going to happen on the battlefield.”

To Mr. Epstein, force ratios exemplify a quip from the writer H.L. Mencken—and a lesson Russia is learning the hard way:

“There is always a well-known solution to every human problem—neat, plausible and wrong.”

Riaz Haq said...

Pakistan’s Policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence
July 12, 2022 Telegraph Nepal


-Zafar Khan and Rizwana Abbasi, Pakistan

http://www.telegraphnepal.com/pakistans-policy-of-credible-minimum-deterrence/


Empirical evidence suggests that Pakistan has successfully deterred India with its minimum deterrence capability. The policy statements of Pakistani leaders, however, indicate that minimum is not a static capability; it is flexible; and it would evolve in accordance with the changing strategic environment.
For example, Sattar et al stated: ―Minimum is open for debate. It has got an open interpretation. It remains flexible. There is no number game. It, thus, remains a non-fixed entity.‖14They added:
―Minimum nuclear deterrence will remain the guiding principle of our nuclear strategy. The minimum cannot be quantified in
Static numbers.

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It would be extremely pessimistic, as the Carnegie-Stimson report suggests, that Pakistan would need to find an alternative nuclear future to become a ―normal nuclear weapons state, keep ―strategic deterrence based upon the principles of ―assured destruction and stop developing short range delivery vehicles in response to a limited war that could be imposed on Pakistan by India‘s proactive military doctrine. In other words, Pakistan would need to keep strategic weapons for the worst-case scenario and cap the short and longer-range deterrence capabilities against the adversary. This proposed alternative nuclear future does not fully serve Pakistan‘s security and national interests. Some reasons are highlighted below.

First, such a policy would undercut the credibility of its minimum deterrence if Pakistan did not develop a short-range deterrence capability to counter the CSD that aims at waging a limited war against Pakistan from eight integrated points31 under the nuclear overhang.

Second, plugging no gaps against the possibility of CSD operations for a ―limited conventional war, as the report suggests, would allow India to exploit Pakistan‘s vulnerabilities and deterrence weaknesses. This is not merely theoretical because India in pursuance of the CSD did contemplate a surgical strike against Pakistan in the aftermath of the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008. Conceptually, the development of Nasr as a low-yield battlefield weapon demonstrates what Lawrence Freedman once stated ―I exist; therefore, I deter. Nasr can, therefore, be seen as an instrument for nuclear peace in South Asian deterrence stability disrupted by India‘s Pragati/Prahaar short range nuclear capability. Therefore, the development of Nasr, specific to India‘s development of battlefield nuclear weapons and CSD, becomes part of Pakistan‘s deterrence capability without which its deterrence credibility could be extremely weakened.

Third, strategic deterrence, as defined by the Carnegie Stimson report in the worst-case scenario resulting in nuclear exchanges and major conventional warfare, cannot be a rational response to deter a limited war emanating from the CSD. If this was the case, both the Soviet Union and the US would not have crafted a strategy for building and deploying the TNWs to deter a limited war. Although neither the US nor the Soviet Union had used the TNWs, they still exist both in Europe and Russia, successor to the Soviet Union, for deterrence purposes. In fact, despite the end of the Cold War, TNWs still play a role in the United States‘extended deterrence in Europe.

Finally, Nasr’s development falls within the broader contours of Pakistan‘s declarations on credible minimum deterrence and full spectrum deterrence. It does not imply numerical expansion in deterrence forces. The increase within Pakistan‘s deterrence capability would be in proportion to India‘s planned expansion. This may, however, not exactly be within the parameters of weapon-to-weapon competitive strategy practiced during the Cold War. Whether Pakistan would practice recessed deterrence or follow the ready-arsenal strategy for some of its deterrence forces would depend on the prevailing strategic environment.

Riaz Haq said...

Venkatesh Kandlikar, defence analyst at GlobalData, told Naval Technology that the INS Vikrant features a significant amount of Indian industrial contribution in the design and manufacturing stage, even using locally sourced steel.

However, the programme was not without its difficulties, with component and equipment delivery and supply chain issues delaying the commissioning by around five years. The programme also suffered from cost overruns, coming in at $3bn more than the initial allocated budget.


INS Vikrant (specifications)
Displacement 43,000t
Speed 28kt
Endurance 7,500nm
Embarked aircraft 30 fixed- and rotary-wing

https://www.naval-technology.com/analysis/ins-vikrant-a-profile-of-indias-newest-aircraft-carrier/

According to Kandlikar, the Indian Navy is expected to field three aircraft carriers in its fleet by the next decade. With Vikramiditya in service and Vikrant now commissioned, India is beginning to plan the build of the future INS Vishal, which is expected to be larger still than existing carriers and feature updated technologies, such as an electromagnetic air-lift systems, also known as EMALS, as being installed on the US Navy’s Ford-class super carriers.

“With the experience gained in the construction of IAC-1, supported by the indigenous ecosystem it is expected that the Indian Navy will soon get a green light from the Indian Ministry of Defence to start designing the third aircraft carrier,” Kandlikar said.

Air wing composition
In terms of embarked aircraft, Kandlikar said the Indian Navy was looking to deploy a new carrier air wing comprising of either F/A-18 Super Hornets or Rafale-M fighters. The Indian Air Force currently operates the conventional Rafale 4.5 generation fighter, which is manufactured by France’s Dassault Aviation, offering a commonality option for the Indian Navy.

Capability-wise, the two aircraft are similar, although the Rafale is the newer aircraft and is being heavily pushed for export. The Super Hornet, meanwhile, is entering the twilight of its naval career. Although it still broadly matches the Rafale in terms of engine thrust it, is slightly slower at Mach 1.6 compared to Mach 1.8, but with a higher payload capacity at 66,000lb (29,937kg) to the Rafale’s 54,000lb.

However, in the near-to-mid-term, India will utilise its fleet of 45 MiG-29K/KUB fighters, acquired from Russia following the signing of separate deals in 2004 and 2010. India is also developing a navalised variant of its LCA/HAL Tejas fighter, although it is not known when the platform will be integrated into the country’s carrier fleet.

The rotary component, vital for search-and-rescue and airborne early warning and surveillance roles, will be fulfilled by the Russian-supplied Kamov 31 helicopter.


Riaz Haq said...

Istanbul Naval Shipyard Launches MILGEM Corvette “PNS KHAIBAR” For Pakistan Navy
On Nov. 25, 2022, the PN MILGEM-class corvette PNS Khaibar (282) was ceremonially launched for the Pakistan Navy at Turkiye's Istanbul Naval Shipyard. "Khaibar" is the third corvette under construction but is expected to be the second ship delivered.

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/11/istanbul-naval-shipyard-launches-milgem-corvette-pns-khaibar-for-pakistan-navy/

Three important events took place at the Istanbul Naval Shipyard. The primary event was the launching of the third PN MILGEM corvette for the Pakistan Navy, the future PNS Khaibar (282). Following the ceremony, the keel of the first Hisar-class offshore patrol vessel, the future TCG Akhisar (P-1220), was laid and the first steel of the second OPV (P-1221 – TCG Kochisar) was cut.

The ceremony was attended by high-ranking representatives of both countries. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan was the chief guest at the ceremony, while Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sherif and Turkish Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, as well as high-ranking officers of the two navies, were other guests VIP.

In his speech, President Erdogan highlighted Turkish-Pakistani relations in the field of defense industry in recent years. He also stated that Turkey will realize significant developments in the defense industry within the next year.

President Erdogan also remarked that the 4th corvette of the PN MILGEM project will be delivered to Pakistan in February 2025.

After the launching ceremony, the keel of the lead vessel of the Hisar-class OPV was laid, and the construction of the second OPV has officially begun.

In July 2018, a contract was signed between the Military Factory and Shipyard Management Corporation (ASFAT) of Turkey and the Pakistani National Defense Ministry Ammunition Production and Karachi Shipyard for the construction of four Milgem class vessels based on Turkish Ada-class design. Turkish defence minister at the time, Nurettin Canikli, described the deal as “the largest defense export of Turkey in one agreement.”

The contract entails the construction of two corvettes in Turkey and two at Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works (KS&EW). The contract has also provisions for the transfer of design rights and construction know-how from Turkey to Pakistan.

N MILGEM Program consists of 4 ships, 2 ships will be built in Istanbul Shipyard Command and 2 ships will be built in KSEW. The program started on 11 March 2019. The deliveries of the ships, which will be able to perform all kinds of military duties from air defense to submarine defense, are expected to be made at six-month intervals starting from August 2023.

The exact configuration of the Pakistan Milgem-class ships has not been made public yet. During the Aman Naval Exercise held in February 2019, Admiral Abbasi said that Pakistan ships will be fitted with a 16-Cell VLS behind the main gun. It is expected that the Babur-class corvettes will be armed with MBDA’s Albatros NG air defence system and Harbah Anti-ship and land attack missiles.

The propulsion system for all the MILGEM ships consist of one LM2500 gas turbine in a combined diesel and gas turbine configuration with two diesel engines; total propulsion power is 31,600 kilowatts.

Turkey’s Ada-class are multipurpose corvettes able to conduct a wide a range of missions, including reconnaissance, surveillance, anti-submarine warfare, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air warfare.

Key data:

Displacement: 2,926 tonnes
Length: 108.2 m
Beam: 14.8 m
Draft: 4.05 m
Propulsion: CODAG
Max speed: 31 knots
Range: 3500 nautical miles
Endurance: 15 days at sea
Crew: 93+40

Riaz Haq said...

Pakistan PM Sharif, Turkish President Erdogan jointly inaugurate new warship for Pakistani Navy - The Hindu

https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan-pm-sharif-turkish-president-erdogan-jointly-inaugurate-new-warship-for-pakistani-navy/article66188327.ece

In response to a question about increased defence cooperation between the two nations, Mr. Niazi noted: "Both militaries are continuously exchanging knowledge and expertise. Construction and upgradation projects such as 17,000 tonne Fleet Tanker, PN-MILGEM and Agosta 90B submarines, Super Mushak trainers, UAV drones, and so on are evidence of this strong friendship and military cooperation." Under the bilateral project, Turkey was tasked to build four corvette warships for the Pakistan Navy — two in Istanbul and two in Karachi.

The first corvette warship for the Pakistan Navy known as PNS Babar was launched in Istanbul in August 2021 while the foundation stone for the second ship PNS Badr was laid in Karachi in May 2022, another report on the inauguration ceremony by the Dawn newspaper said.

Mr. Sharif during the inauguration informed that the fourth warship would be delivered in February 2025.

The new warships have a length of 99 metres, a displacement capacity of 2,400 tonnes, and a speed of 29 nautical miles.

Riaz Haq said...

Indian view of Pakistan Navy Modernization

https://thediplomat.com/2023/07/china-is-helping-modernize-the-pakistan-navy-what-does-that-mean-for-india/

by Guarav Sen

Pakistan has been proactively procuring technologically advanced naval vessels from China, headlined by a $5 billion deal signed in 2016 for Pakistan to acquire Yuan class Type 039/041 diesel submarines by 2028. Pakistan is all set to acquire eight such submarines from China, with four of them scheduled for delivery by the end of 2023. The first four subs are being built by China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation; the other four will be built in Pakistan by Karachi Shipyard and Engineering Works, further bolstering Pakistan’s indigenous capabilities.

These submarines are equipped with advanced sensors and modern armaments, which tilts the tactical power balance slightly in favor of Pakistan. These diesel attack submarines align with the Pakistan Navy’s offensive sea denial strategy, which prioritizes the use of submarines and missile-carrying maritime patrol aircraft in naval warfare.

Apart from this, Pakistan is also expanding its surface fleet. It has commissioned Zulfiqar-class frigates, based on China’s Type 053H3 vessels, which serve multiple roles, including anti-submarine warfare. It carries YJ-82 missiles for anti-surface warfare and FM-90N short-range surface-to-air missiles for self-defense.

In January 2022, the Pakistan Navy commissioned its most advanced vessel, the guided missile frigate Tughril. The Tughril is the first of four powerful Type 054A/P frigates being built in Shanghai for the Pakistan Navy. The vessel is armed with surface-to-air missiles and supersonic surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), is a versatile warship capable of undertaking multiple missions. The second such vessel, the Taimur, was commissioned in June 2022.

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While the Tughril-class frigates represent a significant addition to Pakistan’s surface fleet, they do not pose a credible deterrent against the Indian Navy’s superior capabilities and numerical advantage. But still, India needs to monitor Pakistan’s shift toward power projection in the IOR. The addition of these advanced frigates enhances the Pakistan Navy’s capability to operate in distant waters, which is demonstrated by its ability to conduct joint drills with China’s navy in the East China Sea this year.

Besides China, Turkey is also playing a key role in stretching and modernizing Pakistan’s naval fleet. In 2018, Pakistan and Turkey signed a contract for the construction of four Milgem-class corvettes based on the design of Turkish Ada-class ships. Under the deal, Turkey will deliver four ships to Pakistan by February 2025.

Pakistan’s continued induction of higher-tonnage surface vessels reflects its ambition to enhance power projection in the region. The concerns for India lie not only in the naval imbalance but also in Pakistan’s first-ever maritime doctrine, “Preserving Freedom of Seas.”

Pakistan’s maritime strategy has evolved from an offensive sea denial approach to one focused on a sustained presence in the IOR. The Chinese-made J-10 fighter, which is part of China’s naval arm, can be used by the Pakistan Navy to carry out maritime operations in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. The warplane can carry anti-ship missiles, which could enable the Pakistan Navy to play a more responsive role in the Indian Ocean.

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Presently, Pakistan cannot come close to matching the maritime power of its archrival India, but the continued push for modernization and renewed strategic cooperation with China and Turkey could change the status quo by transforming Pakistan into a genuine regional naval power. A strong Pakistan Navy equipped with advanced frigates and other weapons is part of Beijing’s grand plan to ensure the security of Chinese oil imports coming from the Persian Gulf and attain control of the sea lanes traversing the Indian Ocean.

Riaz Haq said...

C-130's Havoc! How Pakistan's 'Modified Bomber' Wreaked Havoc On Indian Positions After A 'Disastrous' Paradrop by Ritu Sharma


https://www.eurasiantimes.com/c-130s-havoc-how-pakistans-modified-bombe/

The wars in the Indian sub-continent have been dissected threadbare, but there have been little-known operations done by the American-made C-130s during the 1965 India-Pakistan war. The cargo aircraft supplied to the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was modified to become a bomber and raid the Indian runways.

The other important mission carried out by the C-130 fleet was the audacious para commando attack planned by Pakistan. The commandos were inserted by C-130B to cripple three frontline airbases of the Indian Air Force (IAF) in Punjab – Pathankot, Halwara (near Ludhiana) and Adampur (near Jalandhar).

The US Air Force (USAF) is now considering the dispersed nature of warfare that it will experience in the Indo-Pacific against China. It is turning its airlifters, C-130J, into traditional bombers and giving them more offensive capabilities. The PAF made the modification in 1965.

On the intervening night of 30-31 August 1965, the general atmosphere in the Indian subcontinent was tense. News of Pakistan’s military build-up along the border hinted at impending war. The IAF ordered its units to arm all its fighter jets and bombers on September 1, 1965.


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On the same day, PAF’s Sabres entered the Indian airspace and hit the Pathankot airfield. This strike resulted in the destruction of eight IAF aircraft on the ground at Pathankot. The Sabres were heading towards Adampur and Halwara airbase but were stopped by the IAF’s Hawker Hunter fighter jets.
On September 6, the PAF’s raid on Pathankot airbase inflicted large damage. The IAF had also suffered an early setback over Chhamb and had lost four Vampires. This was supposed to have left the IAF in disarray.



Till 6th September, the lack of significant activities on PAF’s side was intriguing the IAF. However, it was just a lull before the PAF put its most audacious plan into action. The Pakistanis dropped paratroopers at Pathankot, Adampur, and Halwara in the intervening night of 6-7 September. Three C-130 aircraft of PAF dropped 60 Special Service Group Commandos each in the wee hours.

The three groups of 60 paratroopers each were dropped in the vicinity of each airbase. Each group was led by one or two officers and a junior commissioned officer (JCO).

The drop was successful, but the Pakistan commandos ran into unforeseen difficulties. A concerted effort by civilians and the Punjab Police resulted in the apprehension of most of the Commandos.
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C-130 Bombers Modified
As the war proceeded, the Pakistan Air Force modified the C-130s to drop bombs. C-130 bombers targeted Indian tanks and guns in Ramgarh of the Sialkot sector. As part of its riposte strategy, the Indian Army had made advances in the Sialkot sector in response to Pakistan’s advent in Jammu and Kashmir.

In addition, Indian tanks advanced in the Chawinda region. Both areas resulted in two of the biggest tank battles in the history of the Indian subcontinent.

Two C-130s PAF came out in support of their forces and dropped nine tons of bombs each on the night of 15 September. On the following night, a single C-130 strike was repeated against Ramgarh, destroying Indian tanks and guns as well as ammunition and fuel dumps.

Seven officers of the Transport Wing were awarded the Sitara-e-Jurat, and 2 JCOSs the Tamgha-e-Jurat.

Some estimates suggest that the IAF flew over 4,000 combat sorties and the PAF a little over 2,000. The Indian account of the 1965 war suggested that the IAF lost 36 aircraft while still parked on the ground.

On the other hand, in aerial dogfights, the IAF lost just 14 aircraft while shooting down 18 Pakistani jet fighters. Pakistan ended the war, having depleted 17 percent of its front-line strength, while India’s losses amounted to less than 10 percent.