Will Saudi Society Change Peacefully?

Saudi society has long been dominated by the overzealous religious police, known as mutawa or mutaween, who strictly enforce the Saudi version of the Islamic Sharia Laws. The most visible manifestations of such enforcement include the almost total gender segregation, conservative dress code in public, and interruption of business for prayers five times a day.

There are some recent signs that the Saudi government is moving toward broader social reform by beginning to create new mutawa-free spaces within the Kingdom where the rules are different. King Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST) is one such space. Not only is the university co-educational, it has no dress code, nor does it allow the mutaween to enforce their rules. By offering greater freedom, the university is attempting to attract the best and the brightest academics, researchers and students from around the globe to create a world-class institution.

This is how the University describes itself: "The principles of academic freedom ensure that faculty members and researchers may conduct research and publish the results without undue hindrance or control. As an international university with many partners, KAUST recognizes the importance of academic freedom and the challenges presented by taking account of the various intellectual property regimes in the home countries of KAUST partner institutions."

IBM is one of the many international partners of KAUST. According to Businessweek, KAUST agreed to buy an IBM supercomputer, which is an essential tool in the research projects that IBM and the Saudis are targeting for their first collaboration. Among other things, the two teams will collaborate on a study of the nearby Red Sea, which they believe will help improve oil and mineral exploration. "[The supercomputer] is a magnet for smart people, and it makes it possible for us to solve big problems," says Majid F. Al-Ghaslan, KAUST's interim chief information officer.

Not content with KAUST to spur change, the Saudi ruler King Abdullah is now pushing the creation of four new special cities, according to the New York Times.

The first of these four cities is King Abdullah Economic City-KAEC (pronounced "cake"), a 65-square-mile development along the Red Sea. With a projected population of two million, the city is a Middle Eastern version of the “special economic zones” that have flourished in places like China.

Here is how New York Times describes the implications of the planned Saudi effort:

If the plan works, at best it would transform Saudi Arabia into a technologically advanced society controlled by a slightly more tolerant religious autocracy. Or it could provoke militant violence and government crackdowns. “What they are trying to do is very difficult,” said Bernard Haykel, a professor of Near Eastern studies at Princeton University who has written extensively on Saudi Arabia. “Someone telling you to go pray — that in-your-face religion — that’s not going to be permitted in these cities. It’s a more ecumenical Islam. But it’s a slippery slope. Once you start, you’ve basically opened up the door to a certain degree of diversity and tolerance.”

KAEC is expected to be followed by three other cities: Knowledge Economic City near Medina, the second holiest city for Muslims; Prince Abdulaziz bin Mousaed Economic City, 450 miles north of Riyadh, which will focus on agribusiness; and Jazan Economic City, proposed to create industrial jobs for Saudis living near the border with Yemen, where al Qaeda is believed to be very active.

The fact that Saudi leaders recognize the need to change was articulated recently by Sir William Charters Patey, the British ambassador in Riyadh until May 2010, in a interview with Arab News as follows: “They accept that you can’t just go on the same old way. Some of the assumptions that underpin Saudi Arabia...may not be enough to see them into the future.”

The Saudi rulers understand that oil could no longer be taken for granted. It currently accounts for 60 percent of GDP and 90 percent of revenue. Moreover, the country’s population is forecast to double over the next three decades and the Kingdom will need to generate income from other sources by then.

Patey said that the strategy, “a sensible and pragmatic one,” was to use the Kingdom’s current energy advantage to diversify into industries that are energy intensive. Saudi Arabia, he said, had also embarked on an ambitious strategy of developing a knowledge-based economy.

Change will eventually come to Saudi Arabia, but many questions remain about the process. Can the Saudi rulers escape the inevitable backlash from the adherents of the extreme Wahabi ideology that they have exported to other Muslim nations such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Yemen? Will there be a process of political liberalization to match social and economic reforms? What will be the pace of this change? Will such change come peacefully? Can the current Saudi government manage this transition without unleashing widespread instability in Saudi Arabia, the Middle East and the wider Islamic world? How will the Saudi Kingdom's western allies and its neighbors react to such instability?

It's hard for any one, including the Saudis, to answer these and other similar questions now. The only thing that can be said with any certainty at this time is that the change is inevitable, and the face of the Middle East and Islamic world will change dramatically by the end of the 21st century.

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Yet another Peace Deal and Shia Blockade

News headlines from Pakistan's tribal belt proclaim a new "Peace Deal" with "militants" along with an appeal for the Shia victims of the Kurram agency blockade imposed by the Taliban. On the surface, these two developments seem disconnected.

The News Headlines:
The "Peace Deal" involves a leading militant in Pakistan's Khyber region, Mangal Bagh, and the local administration to end nearly two weeks of fighting, according to the BBC.

Another BBC report indicates that doctors in Pakistan's north western tribal region of Kurram have appealed for urgent medical aid to avert a humanitarian crisis. Shia Muslim areas in Kurram have been cut off by the Taliban from the rest of the country since November 2007 following violence between Shias and Sunnis.

No Strategy Behind Peace Deals:

Are these "Peace Deals" being made one deal at a time in a piecemeal way? Are there any enforcement mechanisms? Is there a comprehensive strategy to end the Taliban insurgency? Or is it just an interim effort to the postpone the inevitable battle for another day?

Given the history of the past "Peace Deals", each deal has helped the Taliban become stronger to make further demands. The Taliban have not only solidified their grip on the tribal belt on both sides of the Durand line, but the militants are now feeling strong enough to threaten settled areas in Swat and Peshawar as well as Kandahar. They are not on the defensive in FATA any more. They are bringing the war to Pakistan's and Afghanistan's major cities, including the capitals.

What Do the Taliban Want?

So, what do the Taliban want? Recently I had an email exchange with a gentleman in Pakistan on this question. I am sharing with you the message I received and the my reply below:

The Message I got:
No one wants to give the Country to Taliban and ironically neither are the Taliban interested.
All they want is purity in the Muslims all over the world, including, but not limited to Pakistan.
Their aims are simple. All Men should grow long beards, and be dressed properly, i.e. kurta (long tunic) shalwar (baggy pants) and turban.
Women were created to serve the menfolk, nothing more, nothing less. They should reproduce and look after the children, do house chores, like sweeping, washing of dirty linen etc. For doing all this they do not need to go to school and get education. Education at home is enough.
Since music, video, films and the like are all haram (forbidden), all indulging in these sins should be made example of. Video Shops, cinema houses, theaters and the like should be burnt down.
Idolatry is sin, so there should be no statues, no paintings of humans and animals, no cameras, still or movie.
Riba (Interest) is haram (forbidden) so there should be no banks, no cooperatives, and the like.
All females should be veiled, from 6 years and above, and the veil should be total coverage which some low intellect people call shuttle cock. (helps boost the textile industry)
As long as Muslims adopt this (what is the basic edicts of Islam) the Taliban would not bother them.

My Answer:
Really? I like your sarcastic tone. Here's more in the same vein.
If what you say is correct (and I have no reason to doubt it), who will be the judge, the jury and the executioner?
Isn't there a need to have a ministry of vice and virtue?
And the powerful intelligence service and religious police?
So , the bottom line is, they do want power to become the final arbiters of good and evil. Of who is a Muslim and who is not.
They want a theocratic Police state, not democracy.
And they want exclusive monopoly on the use of violence in society.

How Should Pakistanis Respond?

While the tone in this exchange is satirical, the topic is extremely serious with far-reaching consequences for Pakistan, South Asia and the world. Though his remarks are tongue-in-cheek, the gentleman I corresponded with clearly understands the Taliban agenda.

But do the rest of the Pakistanis understand it well enough to take a clear position? Why is there so much ambivalence on this subject in Pakistan? A majority of Pakistanis favor their government not fighting Al-Qaeda and Taliban but negotiating with the terror outfits, while viewing US as the greatest threat to their personal safety, according to a recent survey by the Center for Public Opinion and the New America Foundation. Frequent US attacks causing large numbers of innocent civilian deaths in Afghanistan and Pakistan reinforce this thinking. It seems to me that many Pakistanis are willing to accept the myth that the Taliban are fighting for Islam by standing up to "evil" Americans and America's allies in "war on terror". What they really need to understand is that this a defining battle between two competing visions of Pakistani society. A battle for a modern, pluralistic and democratic Pakistan versus a medieval, theocratic state bent on coercive implementation of their misguided interpretation of the Shariah laws. Pakistanis need to stop being confused or neutral in this fight and clearly understand the large implications of the Taliban's success for their own lives.

Cartoon by Kevin Kallaugher, The Economist

Sharia in Swat: Is This Appeasement?

Under a peace deal signed by the NWFP provincial government, the authorities say they will withdraw security forces and allow the pro-Taliban militants to impose Sharia law in Swat in return for promises to close training camps and end attacks. This is particularly astonishing as it involves secular nationalists of the Awami National Party that trounced the right wing JUI party in the last elections.

This announcement by Senior Minister of NWFP Bashir Ahmad Bilour followed a ceasefire announced by Taleban leader Baitullah Mehsud last month. There were also reports of a 15-point draft deal that called for an end to militant activity and an exchange of prisoners in return for the gradual withdrawal of the Pakistani military from part of the tribal region of South Waziristan.

The latest deal has been agreed in spite of the United States and NATO warnings to Pakistan against negotiating an agreement with militants along its border with Afghanistan.

The Bush administration has said such a deal would give the militants a free hand in Pakistan's tribal areas, which have long operated outside the central government's full control.

A previous deal reached with the militants by President Pervez Musharraf in 2006 was abandoned after accusations of violations by both sides and the US missile strikes on alleged militant targets inside Pakistan. The new deal is broader in the sense that it accepts the implementation of Shariah Law acceptable to the pro-Taleban elements in Malakand and Sawat.

Al Qaeda members as well as Taliban militants are believed to have taken refuge in North and South Waziristan, part of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, after US-led forces ousted the Taliban from Afghanistan in 2001.

This deal is likely to bring some peace and stability in the short term, if it is not immediately undermined by the US and NATO by missile strikes on targets inside Pakistan's tribal region along the Afghan border. However, it is likely to be seen as appeasement by many within and outside Pakistan who see this latest deal as the beginning of a slippery slope toward a full-fledged Taleban-style rule in the entire country. Such a scenario would put Pakistan in direct conflict with the West that could be very damaging to the interests of Pakistanis at large. It could mark the beginning of a brief period of peace followed by endless conflict involving US, NATO, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other regional players.

It is possible to avoid endless conflict and its devastating consequences for the entire South Asian and Central Asian regions and the world. However, this would require a broader strategy with political participation of the US, EU and the regional players. Pakistan can play a crucial role here by persuading its friends in the US and EU to go beyond the rhetoric of simply denouncing the Taliban as evil, refusing to engage with them politically and vowing to destroy them by military action alone. Unlike Al-Qaeda, the Taliban do have roots among the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal population. Such refusal adds to the "mystique of resistance and struggle" of the Taleban, in the words of Newsweek columnist Fareed Zakaria. Without dealing with the Taleban as a political entity, it is not possible to have a political strategy to fight and dilute the appeal of the Taliban or to marginalize the extreme elements within its fold.