India's March 9 "accidental firing" of Brahmos nuclear-capable supersonic cruise missile into Pakistan has raised serious questions about the safety of the Indian nuclear arsenal. Do the people in charge of India's nukes have basic competence to handle such weapons? Was this really an "unauthorized" or "accidental" firing? Why was there a long delay by New Delhi in acknowledging the incident? Could Pakistan be blamed if it assumed that extremist right-wing Hindu elements had taken control of the missile system in India and fired it deliberately into Pakistani territory? Has the Indian government risked the lives of 1.6 billion people of South Asia?
Top Indian defense analysts Sushant Singh and Bharat Karnad have strongly criticized the Indian government for the incident and its response. Singh has accused the Indian government of risking the lives of 1.6 billion people. Karnad has called the incident "quite shocking and simply cannot be credibly explained away by referring to a 'technical glitch'". Both have praised Pakistan's "mature" response to the incident.
In an OpEd in the Deccan Herald, Mr. Singh says "we (India) have come out looking like either bumbling idiots or out of control, while the Pakistanis have come out as being both capable and mature". In an interview with Rediff, Professor Karnad said, "This is quite shocking and simply cannot be credibly explained away by referring to a ‘technical glitch’". Here are more detailed excerpts of remarks by Singh and Karnad:
Excerpts From "A Broken Arrow" by Sushant Singh published in the Deccan Herald:
"India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states that came close to climbing the escalation ladder in the aftermath of the Balakot airstrikes just three years ago. My column in this paper on February 27 (“Three years ago, we were on the brink of war”) had warned of the risks highlighted in February-March 2019, which have been overlooked since. The accidental firing of an Indian missile has brought the spotlight on those risks again. It would be irresponsible to ignore them now".
"The lives of 1.6 billion people of India and Pakistan cannot be dependent on such lucky breaks. It is for these reasons – the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, the minimal time available to take a decision, and Pakistan’s strategic mindset – accidents are unacceptable. Questions raised in western capitals about the safety and security of our nuclear weapon systems and processes were regularly dismissed by New Delhi by citing its impeccable track-record and supposedly fool-proof systems. It allowed India, despite the concerted efforts of certain American experts, to de-hyphenate itself from Pakistan’s poor track record of proliferation, its weak security systems always seen to be at risk of being infiltrated by religious religious extremists in uniform. On issues of nuclear safety, Pakistan has always attempted to bracket India with itself, but has often failed. But now, we have come out looking like either bumbling idiots or out of control, while the Pakistanis have come out as being both capable and mature. India can dismiss all Pakistani allegations but there will be renewed questions from the US non-proliferation lobby that are going to be tougher for New Delhi to respond to".
"India, as the bigger country, has the cushion of geography, while Pakistan, driven by the insecurity of a small territory, has a nuclear security doctrine of ‘first use’. To avoid the destruction of its arsenal and delivery systems by a pre-emptive Indian strike, it deems it necessary to strike India first in the event of hostilities threatening to break out. This makes the situation more dangerous in the subcontinent"
"An environment of relative calm between India and Pakistan, with a ceasefire on the LoC in Kashmir, definitely helped the Pakistani military keep its cool in the face of an Indian missile. Would it have reacted so maturely in the midst of military or political tensions? Or can Pakistan be blamed if they assume that certain rogue elements had taken control of the missile system in India and fired on it? Crucially, if the missile had a self-destruct feature, why wasn’t it activated? Should we expect every junior Pakistani military officer to display the same sagacity and courage as the Soviet naval officer Vasili Arkhipov, the Brigade Chief of Staff on submarine B-59, who refused to fire a nuclear missile and prevented a nuclear disaster in 1962? Or of the Soviet military duty officer Stanislav Petrov who, on seeing an early-warning system showing an incoming US strike, with about half-a-dozen missiles, in the early hours of September 26, 1983, made the call – in the face of incomplete information and doubt -- that it was a system malfunction, instead of reporting it to his superiors as enemy missile launches?"
Excerpts From Bharat Karnad's Interview with Rashme Sehgal:
RS: What does this say about their safety mechanisms and the technical prowess in the way these dangerous weapons are being maintained in India?
BK: That’s precisely the worry attending on this misfiring.
Indeed, the Pakistani government was quick to capitalise on this incident of the Brahmos missile going astray.
Prime Minister Imran Khan’s National Secrity Adviser Dr Moeed Yusuf publicly expressed concern and asked the international community to note the fairly casual manner in which missiles are operated.by the Indian armed forces.
He went on, understandably, to extend that concern to India’s handling of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.
Such criticism is bound to have an effect on international opinion and hurt India’s self-confessed status as a ‘responsible State’.
RS: The defence ministry seems to have landed with egg on its face.
BK: A whole barnyard full of eggs, in fact. This is quite shocking and simply cannot be credibly explained away by referring to a ‘technical glitch’.
The triggering mechanism is a hardy piece of work including a firing sequence and a final authorisation.
How this process was obviated is a mystery.
RS: Pakistan’s foreign office summoned India’s charge d’affaires in Islamabad to lodge a warning that this unprovoked violation of its airspace could have endangered passenger flights and civilian lives.
BK: Well, yeah, anything could have happened, including the missile, even with a dummy warhead, kinetically taking out a passenger aircraft.
In your view, could this have been a BrahMos cruise missile possessing nuclear capability?
The Brahmos missile has interchangeable warheads and can carry both conventional and nuclear weapons.
But most forward-deployed Indian cruise missiles are conventionally armed.
RS: If it was a nuclear missile — albeit unarmed — is there a possibility in the future that the command and control system could fail again in the future which could have dangerous consequences for both nations?
BK: Unless the government clarifies the nature of the ‘technical glitch’ everything is in the realm of speculation. That could include a faulty command and control system.
RS: According to reports, Pakistani officials claim it was fired from Sirsa. How far is that assessment correct?
BK: No reason to doubt the Pakistani claim because the Pakistani air defence complex at Sargodha, District Miani, is very advanced and capable of detecting cruise and ballistic missile firings and minutely tracking their trajectory.
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Shame on India who wants to be member Neuclare club.
I suggest the incident should be elevated to international level.
Security council should investigate the accidental fire of India's Neuclare capable missile.
Indian's attempt to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group seems like a joke now.
It's good they kept India out.
This is NOT new !
What is the worth of the Indian Weapons or Missile systems ?
The LACM Nirbhay missile of the Indians ALSO failed for the 5th time ! dindooohindoo
5th time ! The Indians never learn ! The missile does not EVEN cross the Boost phase ! It was forced to self destruct as it tilted.In other words even the booster engines failed.
What will happen at the Turbo stage when the missile inclines to a horizontal trajectory – as it is a Cruise missile – low Alt ! The Indians are only good at cheating – and so, it is better to ask the Pentagon, for the Tomahawk blueprints ! In any case the Indians are using US Military satellite data, and in future,will use the US Milit satellites also.
THE BRAHMOS IS THE 2ND STRIKE OPTION FOR THE INDIANS!
This Brahmos doom has happened 1 day after Chaiwala scraped through in 2 states.Chaiwala will launch a strike on Pakistan,in view of Kiev distraction - and the PAYBACK,EXPECTED FROM PUTIN -for Chaiwala support for Putin !
OMEN FOR 2022 !
THE BRAHMIS MISSILE DEBRIS IS IN PAKISTAN !
FOR THE PAKISTANI AND CHINESE TO RE-ENGINEER , AND THUS ACQUIRE RUSSIAN TECHNOLOGY ?
IS IT A THANK YOU FROM PUTIN TO PAKISTAN AND CHINA ?
IS THAT THE MESSAGE - BY PLAN OR PROVIDENCE ?
I think accident is just a ploy. It was used to determine the penetration in to Pakistani airspace without immediate radar detection, and it succeeded.
Pakistan held back after realizing something was amiss: people
India missile launch occurred due to human, technical errors
An accidental missile fired by India last week prompted Pakistan to prepare a retaliatory strike, people familiar with the matter said, showing how close the nuclear-armed neighbors came to blows over a potentially disastrous mistake.
Pakistan had prepared to launch a similar missile to strike India but held back because an initial assessment indicated something was amiss, people familiar with the matter said. The Indian missile ended up damaging some residential property but caused no casualties.
2022 is the year of doom for the Indians and the Pied Piper of the PMO
CDS - Killed
Chaiwala Polls - Uttarakhand CM loses and Goa - 2 Dy CMs lose and the CM wins by 666 votes
The Polls have shown the impact of the vote split by AAP and Congress
Basically Indians are incapable of making and using missiles !
This is a story from the Ramayana – when Rama could not stop a crow from lacerating the breasts of his wife Sita,when he was sleeping on her lap !
Book V : Sundara Kanda – Book Of Beauty
Chapter [Sarga] 67
सुख सुप्ता त्वया सार्धम् जानकी पूर्वम् उत्थिता |
वायसः सहसा उत्पत्य विरराद स्तन अन्तरे || ५-६७-३
“Seetha, who slept happily by your side (at one instance) got up before you. A crow coming down quickly, tore her flesh at an area in the midst of her breasts (with its beak).”
SO THEN WHAT DID RAMA DO ? THE RAMAYANA SAYS THAT HE MADE A MISSILE FROM A “BLADE OF GRASS” AND THAT ALSO FAILED ! THE INDIAN MISSILES ARE MADE AND TESTED IN THE FANTASY LAND OF THE RAMAYANA !
स दर्भम् संस्तरात् गृह्य ब्रह्म अस्त्रेण न्ययोजयः |
प्रदीप्त इव काल अग्निः जज्वाल अभिमुखः खगम् || ५-६७-१२
“Taking a blade of grass from your bed of the sacred grass, you charged it with the potency of Brahma missile. That flaming blade blazed forth like the fire of universal dissolution, with its end facing the bird.”
THEN HANOOMAN ASKS RAMA -WHY RAMA DID NOT USE HIS “MISSILE TECHNOLOGY” AGAINST RAVANA OF LANKA AND RAMA IS SILENT ! RAMA KNOWS HIS MISSILES “DO NOT WORK” ! BUT THE INDIANS DO NOT – AND THAT IS THE DISASTER !
एवम् अस्त्रविदाम् श्रेष्ठः सत्त्ववान् शीलवान् अपि || ५-६७-१८
किम् अर्थम् अस्त्रम् रक्षह्सु न योजयसि राघव |
“O Rama! Why are you not employing the same type of a missile on the demons, though you are the foremost among the wielders of missiles, though courageous and possessed of good disposition?”
THAT IS THE KEY ! dindooohindoo
RAMA KNEW THAT HIS MISSILES “DO NOT WORK – AND SO,HE GATHERED AN ARMY OF APES” ! BUT THE INDIANS STILL DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE STORY OF RAMA
#India reviewing procedures after missile "accidentally" fired into #Pakistan. Pak NSA Yusuf called for an investigation into the "real circumstances surrounding" the incident "to ascertain if this was an inadvertent launch or something more intentional" https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-says-reviewing-procedures-after-missile-accidentally-fired-into-pakistan-2022-03-15/
India is conducting a review of its standing operating procedures for operations, maintenance and inspection of weapons systems after accidentally launching a missile into Pakistan last week, its defence minister said on Tuesday.
"We attach the highest priority to the safety and security of our weapon systems. If any shortcoming is found, it would be immediately rectified," Rajnath Singh told parliament.
India accidentally released a missile, which landed in Pakistan, around 7pm last Wednesday during routine maintenance and inspection, he said.
"While this incident is regretted, we are relieved that nobody was hurt due to the accident," Singh said.
An Indian media report said that an unarmed, practice-version of the BrahMos supersonic missile was accidentally fired into Pakistan during an inspection at a secret satellite base of the Indian Air Force.
Quoting sources in the Indian defence ministry, the report claimed that the missile followed the trajectory that it would have in case of a conflict, but “certain factors” played a role in ensuring that any pre-fed target was out of danger.
The report said that since it was “a practice missile”, it had no warheads. The report also claimed that India informed Pakistan about this “accidental firing” soon after it happened. Pakistan, however, said that India failed to immediately inform Islamabad about the accidental launch, and waited until after the Inter-Services Public Relations announced the incident and sought clarification from New Delhi.
India subsequently acknowledged the incident on Friday, chalking it up to a "technical malfunction", and said that a "high-level court of enquiry" was ordered on the event.
The Foreign Office rejected the "simplistic explanation" offered by India and proposed a joint probe into the incident to establish the facts.
Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi also took the issue up on Monday with his German counterpart and United Nations Secretary General Antonio Guterres.
National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf had also questioned Delhi's ability to handle sensitive technology in the wake of the incident and urged the world to consider whether India was able to ensure the safety and security of its nuclear weapon systems.
Yusuf called for an investigation into the "real circumstances surrounding" the March 9 incident "to ascertain if this was an inadvertent launch or something more intentional", saying that "it is hard to believe anything this Indian government says."
An accidentally fired missle doesn't change its trajectory enroute. There is no doubt it was a deliberate act.
#China is poised to militarily dominate the #Indian Ocean w/in a decade, the #US bet on #India is faltering. #China acquiring #military facilities in Horn of #Africa, on #Pakistan’s Indian Ocean coast, in #Myanmar & #UAE with access to Persian Gulf. #QUAD https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/03/16/india-china-indian-ocean-00017520
By Sameer Lalwani
Why haven’t China’s increasing Indian Ocean capabilities raised more alarm bells in Washington, given the laser focus on China these days? One reason is that the U.S. has concentrated its efforts on East Asia, particularly the possibility of conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Another problem, however, is that the U.S. has long assumed India would be a counterweight to China in the Indian Ocean. Indeed, a deeper partnership with India — the world’s largest democracy, on an upward economic trajectory, seemingly perfectly positioned to counter China on land and at sea — has been something of a holy grail for at least four U.S. administrations.
Yet what former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton a decade ago called a “strategic bet” on India does not seem to be paying off. Indian naval and political power in the Indian Ocean region is faltering, giving way to influence by Beijing. Many of these problems are of India’s own making. But part of the problem is the way the U.S. has managed its relationship with New Delhi. The India relationship has become a case study of a partnership between two nations with naturally aligned geostrategic interests that is nonetheless faltering because of a lack of clear priorities, misaligned incentives, and a frequent inability to understand what the other side really wants.
Ultimately, it’s New Delhi that will need to make the most significant course corrections. But the U.S. can also help ensure this bet pays off, with clearer prioritization, incentives and expectations for what could be one of the most important security partnerships of the 21st century. To check China’s rising influence in the Indian Ocean, Washington needs a comprehensive strategy for the region and a revitalized approach to its partnership with India that prioritizes maritime security, bolsters India’s defense technologies and sets bold expectations for a country whose potential against the China challenge has yet to be realized.
Part of the reason the Indian Ocean hasn’t received as much attention as it should is that many U.S. defense experts assume or hope they can rely on India to automatically be a “counterweight” to China in this region. For over two decades, Washington has been enamored with the idea that India, at one point exceeding 8 percent economic growth annually, would become a military powerhouse that could “frustrate China’s hegemonic ambitions.” The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy released in February counts on India to be “a net security provider,” just as previous administrations officially banked on the Indian Navy taking a “leading role in maintaining Indian Ocean security.” Some former Trump administration officials even want to formalize a Japan-style alliance.
But India’s ability to play this role is in serious doubt. Indian officials had targeted a 200-ship navy by 2023, but today, the Indian Navy acknowledges it will be fortunate to reach 170 total ships sometime in the 2030s. Even if it does, analysts worry India may still be held back by a fleet that’s continuously underfunded and 60 percent obsolescent with serious deficiencies in equipment and manpower. As India’s navy slides in the opposite direction of China’s, it doesn’t help that India’s political influence in its neighborhood has also wobbled. Within a decade, India may not even be able to protect its own backyard against Chinese military coercion at sea just as on land.
THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE ACCIDENTAL INDIAN MISSILE LAUNCH
That earlier crisis had begun following a suicide-bomb attack on Indian paramilitaries in Kashmir, which had led to tit-for-tat standoff air attacks between the Indian and Pakistani air forces. In the course of those skirmishes, an Indian pilot was shot down and captured by Pakistan. According to subsequent accounts, India threatened to escalate violence further if its pilot was not returned unharmed, including reportedly explicit threats to launch a missile attack on Pakistani targets. Prime Minister Narendra Modi later told campaign crowds he had threatened a “qatal ki raat” (a night of bloodshed) if the Indian pilot was not released. As Vipin Narang and I commented at the time, “South Asia was a couple of wrong turns away from serious escalation.” It does not take a particularly creative imagination to conclude that an inadvertent missile launch in that atmosphere might have led to something different than a somewhat staid Pakistani press conference.
....Perhaps India hoped Pakistan would simply not notice, or that it wouldn’t find the debris. Alternatively, perhaps India was uncertain as to the missile’s trajectory and assumed that it had not strayed into Pakistan. The Indian defense minister told parliament that after the accident, “it was later learnt that the missile had landed inside the territory of Pakistan.” How much later? He didn’t say. What seems to have been a two-day delay in notification appears to contradict India’s obligations under a 1991 agreement with Pakistan on preventing air space violations which obligates both sides “if any inadvertent [airspace] violation does take place, the incident ....
Whether India’s opacity contributed to this episode is uncertain. The changing nature of India’s explanation in these early days has not been reassuring. Was the accident a result of “routine maintenance,” as India said in its official press release of March 11? Was it the result of “routine maintenance and inspection,” as India’s defense minister told parliament on March 15? Was it the result of a “simulation exercise” gone awry, as one of India’s largest newspapers reported on March 16? Transparency seems needed here, if for no other reason than to convince the Indian public that they are safe from accident. A majority of the missile’s flight trajectory, after all, was over Indian territory — Indian cities, towns, and villages that might have suffered from this accident that mercifully caused no harm to either country.
It is impossible to wring all the risk out of dangerous weapons. Brinksmanship works, to some extent, because the processes that unfold during a crisis are only partly controllable. They produce “threats that leave something to chance.” Yet the missile episode reinforces that policymakers should be under no illusions that they can fully control these weapons. Military organizations make mistakes, those mistakes cause accidents in peacetime, crisis, and war, and those accidents can be dangerous and deadly. While a full accounting of the causes of the March 9 launch remains to be done, and may never become publicly known, it is consistent with numerous odd and bizarre accidents that have occurred before in nuclear-armed militaries. “Things that have never happened before happen all the time in history,” Sagan observed three decades ago. Inadvertent cruise-missile launches on nuclear opponents are now definitively no longer on that “never happened before” list. We will be lucky if the next surprise is similarly inconsequential.
#India's Size Illusion by Arvind Subramanian. #Indian policymakers should avoid succumbing to the illusion of size, and reconcile themselves with their country's current status as a middling power. #Modi #BJP #Hindutva #Russia #Ukraine #China @ProSyn https://prosyn.org/hNyXBIw
True, India’s economy is undeniably large. According to the International Monetary Fund, India is the world’s third-largest economy in purchasing-power-parity terms, with a GDP of $10 trillion, behind China ($27 trillion) and the United States ($23 trillion). At market exchange rates, its GDP of $3 trillion makes it the sixth-largest economy, behind the US, China, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
But India’s economic size has not translated into commensurate military strength. Part of the problem is simple geography. Bismarck supposedly said that the US is bordered on two sides by weak neighbors and on two sides by fish. India, however, does not enjoy such splendid isolation. Ever since independence, it has been confronted on its Western frontier by Pakistan, a highly armed, chronically hostile, and often military-ruled neighbor.
More recently, India’s northern neighbor, China, also has become aggressive, repudiating the territorial status quo, occupying contested land in the Himalayas, reclaiming territory in the east, and building up a large military presence along India’s borders. So, India may have fish for neighbors along its long peninsular coast, but on land it faces major security challenges on two fronts.
Despite these challenges and its sizable economy, India has struggled to generate adequate military resources. Defense expenditure is notoriously difficult to estimate, especially for China and Pakistan, which have opaque political systems. But annual combined defense spending by India’s two adversaries is likely to be three times the $70-75 billion that India spends. And the effective gap is probably even larger, because India’s politically driven emphasis on military manpower has crowded out spending on military technology. In short, India may have a large economy, but dangerous geography and domestic politics have left it militarily vulnerable.
Then there is the question of market size. As Pennsylvania State University’s Shoumitro Chatterjee and one of us (Subramanian) have shown, India’s middle-class market for consumption is much smaller than the $3 trillion headline GDP number suggests, because many people have limited purchasing power while a smaller number of well-off people tend to save a lot. In fact, the effective size of India’s consumer market is less than $1 trillion, far smaller than China’s and even smaller relative to the potential world export market of nearly $30 trillion.
India needs to accept, and act in line with, its current status as a middling power. Over time, rapid and sustained economic growth could make India the major power it aspires to be. Until then, it must look past the illusion of size and reconcile itself with strategic realities.
the (Brahmos) incident raises questions about the safety of India’s cruise missile systems, especially given the real risk of accidental escalation between nuclear-armed adversaries.
The missile at the center of the accident was reportedly a surface-launched supersonic BrahMos cruise missile jointly developed by India and Russia with a range of 290 kilometers. India is also developing an extended air-launched variant with a range of 800 kilometers. The BrahMos is not a part of India’s nuclear forces, though it has been reported to be nuclear-capable. India may realize its nuclear potential if it moves toward a counterforce nuclear doctrine, according to some scholars.
The incident was dangerous for several reasons. First, the missile, cruising at 40,000 feet, “endangered many international and domestic flights in both Pakistani and Indian airspace,” according to a spokesperson for Pakistan’s armed forces. It could have hit civilian aircraft in its path.
Second, the missile could have landed in a heavily populated area. The Indian government acknowledged the potential for disaster in a statement: “While the incident is deeply regrettable, it is also a matter of relief that there has been no loss of life due to the accident.” Additionally, Indian Defence Minister, Rajnath Singh later clarified that it only “later learnt” that the missile had landed in Pakistan, raising the possibility that India had not tracked the missile’s trajectory. The misfired missile might have landed in a densely populated part of India as well.
Finally, the incident risked a military escalation between two nuclear-armed countries. In recent years, the threshold for military engagement between India and Pakistan has been reduced. In 2016, Indian troops conducted “surgical strikes” against militants on the Pakistani side of the “line of control” in the Kashmir area, in response to a terrorist attack on an Indian army base. In 2019, the Indian Air Force crossed the international border and bombed Balakot in Pakistan in response to a terror attack against Indian paramilitary troops in Pulwama, Kashmir. Pakistan’s response to this attack led to an air-battle over Kashmir that ended when a Mig-21—a supersonic fighter jet—was shot down. The potential for military escalation between both states is high. The accidental launch of the BrahMos missile could have sparked a military crisis.
India’s accidental missile launch joins a growing list of missile accidents, some of which were nuclear. In 1983, the Soviet Union’s early-warning systems mistakenly detected a US missile attack. At the time, Stanislav Petrov, a lieutenant colonel in the Soviet military, reported a system malfunction and saved the world from a nuclear exchange. In 1995, Russia detected a Norwegian research rocket launch (to study the aurora borealis) and mistook it for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) heading to Moscow. President Boris Yeltsin was prepared to retaliate but ultimately decided that that Washington had not launched a nuclear first strike on Russia. However, the incident highlighted the risk of accidental escalation during peacetime and the role of luck in averting disaster.
The recent exchange between India and Pakistan was more of a diplomatic incident than a military one. But unless the two countries establish measures to mitigate such dangers, the world may not be so lucky the next time.
#Indian Army Says Misfired Army Rockets Led To Blast In Crop Fields. The three rockets that were fired during an army exercise had lost track and landed in #Mohangarh in #Rajasthan, weeks after “accidental firing” of a #Brahmos missile into #Pakistan
Jaisalmer: Inquiry into the bomb explosion near Jaisalmer on Thursday revealed that three rockets that were fired during an army exercise had lost track and landed in Mohangarh area.
The bombs had exploded after getting misfired from Pokhran field firing range.
Fortunately, there was not much ammunition in the warhead of the rocket due to which a big accident was averted. Nearby fields caught fire but it was controlled. These rockets fell 2km away from Navodaya Vidyalaya.
Senior army official sources said army is regularly conducting exercises at the Pokhran field firing range these days and firing activities are underway. Trial of rocket firing was being done on Thursday and three rockets were accidentally misfired which fell in Nanod miner area in Mohangarh without hitting the target.
There was a loud noise and cloud of smoke and sand in the air along with three pits. Army is conducting a high level investigation and efforts are being made to prevent such incidents in future.
Jaisalmer district collector Pratibha Singh said that there was no loss to life and property except for minimum damage to the crops. The tehsildar has been asked for the report of the damage.
Like I said on March 15,2022
"2022 is the year of doom for the Indians and the Pied Piper of the PMO
Basically Indians are incapable of making and using missiles !"
AND THEN THIS HAPPENED !
LIKE I SAID - THESE PEOPLE ARE ONLY FIT TO CLEAN TOILETS AND CAMEL SHIT IN SAUDIA !
THESE ROCKETS WERE "MADE IN INDIA" BY THE OFB
MORE INDIAN ARMY SOLDIERS WERE KILLED IN 2021 - DUE TO OFB DEFECTIVE ORDINANCE - THAN IN KASHMIR IN THE LAST 2 YEARS !
PAKISTAN HAS TO END THIS MISERT - AND IT WILL START WITH A MISFIRED MISSILE FROM A SUB OR A SILO ! dindooohindoo
India’s Inadvertent Missile Launch Underscores the Risk of Accidental Nuclear Warfare
Complex weapon systems are inherently prone to accidents, and this latest launch is one of a long history of military accidents in India
By Zia Mian, M. V. Ramana on April 8, 2022
Last month, while most of the world focused on the war in Ukraine and worried that a beleaguered Russian leadership might resort to nuclear weapons, thus escalating the conflict into a direct war with the U.S.-led NATO nuclear-armed alliance, a nearly tragic accident involving India and Pakistan pointed to another path to nuclear war. The accident highlighted how complex technological systems, including those involving nuclear weapons, can generate unexpected routes to potential disaster—especially when managed by overconfident organizations.
India and Pakistan possess more than 300 nuclear weapons between them, and have fought multiple wars and faced many military crises. On March 9, three years after their dispute over Kashmir escalated into attacks by jet fighters, the Pakistan Air Force detected “a high speed flying object” inside Indian territory change course and veer suddenly toward Pakistan.* It flew deep into Pakistan and crashed. The object was a BrahMos cruise missile, a weapon system developed jointly by India and Russia. India soon stated the launch was an accident.
The firing of the BrahMos missile falls within a long history of accidents involving military systems in India. Military aircraft have strayed across the borders during peacetime. India’s first nuclear submarine was reportedly “crippled” by an accident in 2018, but the government refused to divulge any details. Secrecy has prevented the investigation of an apparent failure of India's ballistic missile defence system in 2016. Engagements between India and Pakistan can arise from such accidents, as in 1999 when a Pakistani military plane was shot down along the border by India, killing 16 people. Pakistan has had its share of accidents, including a Pakistani fighter jet crashing into the capital city in 2020.
South Asia’s geography is pitiless. It would only take five to 10 minutes for a missile launched from India to attack Pakistan’s national capital, nuclear weapon command posts or bases. For comparison, the flight times between missile launch sites and targets in the United States and Russia are about 30 minutes. Even this extra time may be insufficient. In the event of a military crisis, no leader can make a judicious decision during this period, when faced with impossible choices. But shorter flight timesincrease the likelihood of mistakes.
The mistake that is of greatest concern is a false alarm of an incoming nuclear attack, possibly directed against nuclear forces. Indian or Pakistani—or Russian or NATO—policy makers may find themselves under immense pressure to launch a preemptive attack, thereby compounding the crisis. The terrible dilemma confronting them would be whether to use their nuclear weapons first or wait for the bombs from the other side to land. Nuclear war, even of a limited nature, between India and Pakistan could lead to millions of deaths in the short term and even graver consequences in the longer term for the region and beyond.
Compounding these dangers is the overconfidence of India’s officials, who displayed no recognition of the gravity of the Brahmos accident. A “technical malfunction” had “led to the accidental firing of a missile,” the official statement declared, noting glibly “it is learnt that the missile landed in an area of Pakistan.” India’s defense minister assured parliament members that the system is “very reliable and safe.”
Riaz A. Khokhar
and I) argued in our .
piece that a group of IAF officers launched the missile deliberately to create a crisis. We also argued that India's BrahMos missile system apparently lacks stringent safety protocols.
Recent news reports in India have found that a group captain of the IAF and his colleagues were allegedly involved in the missile launch. An Indian congress leader also asked the IAF to share details of why and how one of its personnel had fired the missile.
The group captain had charge of a Mobile Command Post, which controls four Mobile Autonomous Launchers (MALs)—a complex, land-based BrahMos missile system. Depending on the input of the commander-in-charge, the MAL can fire the missiles towards designated targets within four minutes. To clarify, the BrahMos flies on a “Fire-and-Forget” principle and cannot self-destruct once launched.
What makes it highly likely that the missile launch was unauthorized and not accidental? For one, nuclear scientists consider only those launches as accidental that occur because of a technical error. If it is fired by people in the chain of command with access to the codes but lacking political authorization, it would constitute an unauthorized launch.
Moreover, in the past, when India kept its warheads and their delivery vehicles separate (known as “de-mated”), it incorporated “super permissive action links (PALs),” which are mechanical and electronic codes to avoid unauthorized and accidental launches. With increasingly higher readiness levels of India’s conventional and strategic forces, one can expect far more stringent safety and security protocols.
Some technical experts also mentioned to us that an accidental fire is not usually expected to travel an optimum distance and fall into a foreign territory–let alone one that happens to be the most likely target anyway, given India and Pakistan’s tense historical relations. A defense expert quoted an example of past missile accidents where clamps remained fixed to a missile after the accidental launch, causing the missile to eventually fall at a shorter distance away.
With far greater safety protocols than previously installed “super PALs,” one can only assume that the commander in charge must have removed the mechanical and electronic locks and used the launch codes to fire the missile. There appears to be no other possible explanation unless India’s sophisticated missile system lacks rigorous safety and security protocols. In other words, India’s lower chain of command apparently knows the launch codes, and it would be extremely dangerous in the case of missiles mated with warheads and other cannisterized (permanently armed) missiles. Additionally, it reflects poorly on the training and psychological assessment of the Indian armed forces personnel and raises questions about their intent.
But why would IAF personnel deliberately launch an unarmed missile that aimed for a site of least possible damage? What could they have hoped to achieve? This is where our second argument comes into play.
India attempted to lure Pakistan into a rushed recourse to strategic forces
We argue that IAF personnel might have tried to ensnare Pakistan into mobilizing military forces or simply check the BrahMos missile’s capability to dodge Islamabad’s air defense system. Since IAF personnel arguably operated with a bad motive, they did not activate the military hotline of communication to inform Pakistan. In case of an escalation of the crisis, they likely expected the political leadership in New Delhi to manage and respond.
India’s former civilian and military officials of the Strategic Forces Command (which controls all of India’s nuclear warheads and delivery systems) have revealed to nuclear experts that some of India’s nuclear weapons, especially those designed to be used against Pakistan, remain at a high state of readiness–even in peacetime–and are “capable of being operationalized and launched within seconds or minutes in a crisis.” Additionally, “some nuclear bombs are collocated with aircraft on bases and stored in underground bunkers for rapid mating if necessary” even during peacetime.
As such, India’s supersonic BrahMos and hypersonic Shourya missiles are clearly meant for counterforce purposes. Add to this mix the canisterization of missiles which, in practice, means that warheads are permanently mated with a missile in a tube as opposed to maintaining separation until just before launch. The introduction of Agni-P, a short-range nuclear-capable ballistic and canisterized missile, is a case in point. This would as much reduce the time to launch missiles on alert as diminish the visibility of the movement of warheads. Moreover, increasing digitization of the arming and launching of nuclear weapons would do little to signal to Pakistan that a massive counterforce strategic strike was headed its way within a few minutes. These developments constitute grave consequences for crisis stability in South Asia.
In this context, a larger segment of Pakistan’s strategic community whom we interviewed or whose comments we read, feels that the fired missile was not accidental and that it was instead a deliberate attempt to assess Islamabad’s response spectrum, the types of conventional or strategic forces that Pakistan deploys, and the organizational level at which decisions are made. India could make effective use of this information to materialize its flirtation with counterforce strikes against Pakistan’s strategic forces and command and control system in the future.
To be sure, Pakistan’s rushed military response to the fast-approaching “object” could have caused a serious escalation to disastrous levels. By acting with restraint, Pakistan demonstrated that it is a responsible nuclear power and has an accountable, centralized authority to launch missiles—even after being attacked. Pakistan’s officials told us that the launching of a missile or counterattack is always a political decision taken at the National Security Committee, the prime minister-led decision-making body for issues concerning national security and conventional strategy. For all nuclear issues or a military strategy involving nuclear factors, it is the National Command Authority, chaired by the prime minister, that makes decisions.
Another senior Pakistani official, however, clarified that the restraint was due to the fact that there was no ongoing crisis between the two countries, not necessarily because of consistent and effective surveillance of the missile and its ground-based stations. In a crisis, Pakistan is unlikely to show this restraint and risk a potential nuclear strike on its soil. Therefore, the response from Pakistan would be swift, and the missiles launched in a retaliatory strike could carry nuclear warheads.
#Nuclear arsenals of #China, #India, #Pakistan are growing. But it's not an arms race—yet. Combined arsenals of China (350 warheads), India (160) and Pakistan (165) are much smaller than #US's & #Russia's but exceed #British & #French stockpiles. #Nukes https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/08/11/the-nuclear-arsenals-of-china-india-and-pakistan-are-growing
Yet, in many ways, all three countries were hesitant nuclear powers. China did not deploy a missile capable of hitting the American mainland until the 1980s. When India and Pakistan fought a war over Kargil, in the disputed region of Kashmir, in the summer of 1999, India’s air force, tasked with delivering the bombs if needed, was not told what they looked like, how many there were or the targets over which they might have to be dropped.
All that has changed. China has been adding hundreds of new missile silos in recent years. When Pakistan celebrated its 60th birthday in 2007 it had roughly 60 nuclear warheads. Fifteen years on, that number has nearly tripled (see chart). The combined arsenals of China (350 warheads), India (160) and Pakistan (165), though modest by American and Russian standards (several thousand each), now exceed British and French stockpiles in Europe (around 500 in total). All three countries are emulating the American and Russian practice of having a nuclear “triad”: nukes deliverable from land, air and sea. South Asia’s nuclear era is entering a more mature phase.
That need not mean a more dangerous one. A new report by Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment, a think-tank in Washington, explores the dynamics among Asia’s three nuclear powers. Since 1998, most Western attention has focused on the risk of a conflagration between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. That danger persists. Yet the risk of an arms race has been exaggerated, argues Mr Tellis, a former State Department official.
India’s arsenal has grown slowly, he observes—it remains smaller than Pakistan’s—and its nuclear posture remains “remarkably conservative”. The comparison with the nuclear behemoths is instructive. America and Russia both maintain huge arsenals designed to enable so-called counterforce strikes—those which pre-emptively target the other side’s nuclear weapons to limit the damage they might do. That means their arsenals must be large, sophisticated and kept on high alert.
In contrast, China, India and Pakistan, despite their manifold differences, all view nukes as “political instruments” rather than “usable tools of war”, argues Mr Tellis. Both China and India, for instance, pledge that they would not use nuclear weapons unless an adversary had used weapons of mass destruction first, a commitment known as “no first use”. America disbelieves China’s promise, much as Pakistan doubts India’s. But the Chinese and Indian arsenals are consistent with the pledges, insists Mr Tellis.
He calculates that if India wanted to use a tactical (or low-yield) nuclear weapon to take out a Pakistani missile on the ground, it would have to do so within a few minutes of the Pakistani launcher leaving its storage site. That is implausible. India does not have missiles that can launch within minutes of an order, nor those accurate to within tens of metres of their target. And, for now, China’s rocketeers also train and operate on the assumption that their forces would be used in retaliation. The result is that things are more stable than the swelling arsenals suggest.
India sacks 3 air force (#IAF) officers for firing #missile into #Pakistan. Earlier, #India blamed a “technical malfunction” during routine maintenance. Military experts have warned of the risk of accidents or miscalculations by #nuclear-armed neighbors. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/23/indian-air-force-sacks-three-officers-for-accidentally-firing-missile-into-pakistan?CMP=share_btn_tw
The Indian air force has said it has sacked three officers for accidentally firing a missile into Pakistan in March.
“A court of inquiry, set up to establish the facts of the case, including fixing responsibility for the incident, found that deviation from the standard operating procedures by three officers led to the accidental firing of the missile,” the air force said.
At the time of the accidental firing, India blamed a “technical malfunction” during routine maintenance.
Military experts have warned of the risk of accidents or miscalculations by the nuclear-armed neighbours, which have fought three wars and engaged in numerous smaller armed clashes, usually over the disputed territory of Kashmir. The incident raised questions about safety mechanisms.
Pakistani officials said the missile was unarmed and crashed near the city of Mian Channu, about 310 miles (500km) from the capital, Islamabad.
Is There a Persistent Threat of Nuclear Crises Among China, India and Pakistan?
Southern Asia — India, Pakistan and China — is the only place on earth where three nuclear-armed states have recently engaged in violent confrontations along their contested borders. As a USIP senior study group report concluded last year, the problem of nuclear stability in Southern Asia is getting harder to manage because of geopolitical changes, such as rising India-China border tensions, as well as evolving military technologies, including growing nuclear arsenals and more capable delivery systems. Unfortunately, in the time since that senior study group completed its work, little has happened to revise its worrisome conclusion or to prevent the most likely triggering causes of a nuclearised crisis in Southern Asia. To the contrary, there are some good reasons to fear that the situation in Southern Asia has even deteriorated over the past year.
No one wants nuclear escalation — but it can still happen
To be clear, just because states invest in nuclear weapons and delivery systems does not mean that a crisis or war is imminent. Leaders in China, India and Pakistan have always viewed their nuclear arsenals primarily as tools of deterrence, less for practical warfighting than to convince adversaries of the extraordinary costs that a war would risk. Nor do any of the region’s leaders take their nuclear programs lightly; all feel tremendous incentives to keep their arsenals safe and secure and to build systems of command, control and communications intended to prevent accidents, unauthorised use or theft.
Nevertheless, because even a single nuclear detonation could be massively destructive, US policymakers have an obligation not to accept these sorts of logical assurances passively or uncritically. Accidents do happen. India’s misfire of a Brahmos missile test into Pakistan last year proved that point perfectly. No matter how well designed, nuclear systems are complicated and involve the potential for human or technical error. When something does go wrong, overreaction by opposing forces is less likely when they have a greater degree of confidence in, and knowledge of, the other side. Reliable and secure communications — in the form of hotlines — can help, but only to the point that they are actually used in a timely manner. Apparently, India failed to do so during the Brahmos incident.
Fear, hatred and other emotions can cloud human judgment, especially in the heat of a crisis when information is imperfect and communication difficult. Reflecting on his own experience of crisis management in Southern Asia, former secretary of state Mike Pompeo recently wrote that he does “not think the world properly knows just how close the India-Pakistan rivalry came to spilling over into a nuclear conflagration in February 2019.” The question — for Pompeo and current US policymakers — is what more they are doing now to prepare for the next crisis.
Is There a Persistent Threat of Nuclear Crises Among China, India and Pakistan?
The terrorism tinderboxA return to serious India-Pakistan crisis could be just one terrorist attack away. Not even when Pakistan suffered devastating floods last summer could leaders in Islamabad and New Delhi create sufficient political space to open basic commodity trade. Hostile rhetoric is high, and there is reason to anticipate it could get far worse over the coming year as national leaders on both sides prepare for elections. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has learned he can whip up domestic political support from tough talk and cross-border retaliation. In Pakistan, neither civilian nor army leaders can afford to look weak in the face of Indian attacks, especially when they face jingoistic (if transparently opportunistic) criticism from ousted prime minister Imran Khan.The prospect of anti-Indian terrorism is also growing. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan shows no greater commitment to eliminating terrorist safe havens than it did in the 1990s, and Pakistan’s will (and capacity) for keeping a lid on cross-border terrorism will be tested as it faces heightened security and economic pressures at home. In addition, India’s repression of its Muslim minority community, especially in Kashmir, is simultaneously a reaction to past anti-state militancy and nearly guaranteed to inspire new acts of violence.
No matter the specific cause or circumstances of anti-Indian militancy, Modi’s government is likely to attribute culpability to Pakistan. That, in turn, raises the potential for an emotionally charged crisis that could, under the wrong circumstances, spiral into another India-Pakistan war.
Nor can Pakistan afford only to worry about its border with India. Relations between Islamabad and Kabul have deteriorated drastically ever since the Taliban swept back into power. Rather than controlling Afghanistan through its favoured militant proxies, Pakistan is suffering a surge in violence on its own soil, most recently the devastating bombing of a police mosque in Peshawar claimed by the anti-state Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Such violence, along with national political turmoil, environmental calamity and economic crisis, will raise concerns among some in the United States about threats to the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear enterprise. Sadly, that will probably lead Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division — the guardians of its nuclear arsenal — and other Pakistani military leaders to fear a phantom threat of American military intervention rather than to address actual causes of the Pakistani state’s fragility.
Events along the contested border between India and China hardly inspire confidence that New Delhi and Beijing have found a path back to normal relations after their bloody border skirmishes of 2020. To the contrary, the prospects of rapid military escalation have grown, principally because both sides have positioned greater numbers of more lethal forces close to the border. Before 2020, relatively small, unarmed Chinese and Indian patrols routinely risked coming into contact as they pressed territorial claims on the un-demarcated border. This was dangerous, but extremely unlikely to escalate rapidly into a serious military encounter. In early December 2022 hundreds of Chinese troops attacked an Indian camp in what could not possibly have been an unplanned operation. With tens of thousands of troops stationed not far away, conventional military escalation is far more plausible than it was just a few years ago.
Is There a Persistent Threat of Nuclear Crises Among China, India and Pakistan?
Against this backdrop of tensions, China’s growing nuclear, missile and surveillance capabilities will look more threatening to Indian nuclear defence planners. New Delhi may even come to fear that China is developing a first strike so devastating that it would effectively eliminate India’s retaliatory response and, as a consequence, diminish the threat of its nuclear deterrent. In response, India could seek to demonstrate that it has thermonuclear weapons capable of destroying Chinese cities in one blow as well as more nuclear submarines capable of evading China’s first strike
Not only would those Indian moves raise serious policy questions for the United States, but they would demonstrate the region’s “cascading security dilemma,” by which military capabilities intended to deter one adversary tend to inspire dangerous insecurities in another. When India arms itself to deter China, Pakistan perceives new threats from India and will likely pursue enhanced capabilities of its own. In a worst-case scenario, Southern Asia could be entering an accelerated nuclear arms race in which uneven waves of new investments in capabilities and delivery systems will alter perceptions of deterrence and stability in dangerously unpredictable ways.
#Indian #Brahmos firing into Pak could have started #India-#Pakistan war, #Modi gov't tells #Delhi High Court. IAF cannot ignore it. It put India in an embarrassing situation in front of the international community, said Solicitor General Sharma. https://www.livemint.com/news/india/it-could-have-been-another-india-pakistan-war-why-did-centre-dismiss-3-air-force-officers-11679033549704.html?utm_source=share&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=share_via_web
India's supersonic missile BrahMos was fired and landed in Pakistan on March 9, 2022, leading to the dismissal of three Air Force officers who were found guilty in a Court of Inquiry. One of the officers challenged the decision and the Central government presented its stance in the Delhi High Court.
The Additional Solicitor General, Chetan Sharma, appeared for the government and expressed that the incident could have sparked a war with Pakistan due to negligence in the line of duty. The Air Force cannot ignore such incidents as they put India in an embarrassing situation even in front of the international community, he stated.
The officer who approached the court argued that the accident occurred during a simulation exercise and he was only responsible for maintenance, not firing the missile. He claimed that only the CO and training officer were accountable for the operation of the missile and the action taken against him was wrong.
He further added that he was not aware of the allegations against him during the inquiry and that he had no experience in operating the missile or dealing with its emergencies. Therefore, he requested the court to order his reinstatement to the job.
The US Director of National Intelligence, in its annual threat assessment report, earlier warned of a potential conflict between India and Pakistan. The report highlighted concerns over the possibility of India retaliating against Pakistan in the event of a terrorist attack on India or orchestrated "violent unrest in Kashmir" by extremist groups based in Pakistan. The report cited the risk of an "escalatory cycle between two nuclear-armed states" as a particular concern.
The report acknowledges that Pakistan has a history of supporting extremist groups, which increases the probability of India responding with military force under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, to what they perceive as provocations by Pakistan. The report warned that heightened tensions on either side could increase the risk of conflict, with Kashmir or a militant attack in India as potential flashpoints.
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