The summit meeting of the leaders of China and the United States in Washington appears to signal a rapprochement between the two superpowers. President Trump has repeatedly referred to what he calls "G2", without mentioning "G7" or "G20", the groups that include many more countries. This development is seen as positive for world peace but it diminishes India's significance as a "counterweight to China" and the benefits Indians expected to flow from the US-China confrontation in Asia.
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| President Trump Personally Welcomed President Xi at Andrews Air Force Base |
The fact that President Trump personally received President Xi at Andrews Air Force Base upon his arrival is yet another indication that the US now recognizes China as a peer competitor. President Xi, for his part, has talked about the need for the two superpowers to avoid the "Thucydides Trap", a reference to the potential for war between an established superpower and a rising superpower.
Top American officials have been preparing for this moment for several years. In an interview on Fox News, Secretary of State Marco Rubio told Brian Kilmeade in 2025 that “China is going to be a rich and powerful country. No matter what we do, that’s what – we’re going to have to deal with that. But we have to deal with the reality. What we cannot have is a world where China is so powerful, we depend on them. And that’s right now where we’re headed, unfortunately. That’s going to change. That’s going to change under President Trump”.
Anthony Blinken who preceded Secretary Rubio made a similar acknowledgement earlier in 2022: “China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to do it,”
"One of the most complex and arguably most important relationships we have is the one with China. There are aspects of contestation, there are aspects of cooperation, and we want to avoid conflict. They're a lot bigger than we are, their market's a lot bigger, their manufacturing is three times ours, they've got more ships, they put forward more papers and more patents. As strong and as powerful as we are, playing one-on-one can be tough", Blinken added later in 2023.
The Beijing-Washington rapprochement is clearly in Pakistan's interest. Islamabad has long sought to balance its foreign policy between China and the United States through a pragmatic hedging strategy, gaining economic, military, and diplomatic benefits from both superpowers while maintaining strategic autonomy. But the relationship between Pakistan and China is not the same as the one between Pakistan and the United States. Pakistan's ties with China are strategic while those with the United States remain tactical and transactional. What has changed recently is that Pakistan is no longer waging war to help the United States as it did during the "Cold War" and the "War on Terror". Instead, Pakistan has emerged as a peacemaker between the US and Iran.
Related Links:
Haq's Musings
South Asia Investor Review
Pakistan Downs India's French Rafale Jets in a Major Aerial Battle
Has Modi Succeeded Diplomatically or Militarily Against Pakistan After Pahalgam?
Pakistan-Saudi Defense Pact
Pakistan's Key Role in US-Iran Ceasefire
Has Modi Succeeded Militarily or Diplomatically in Isolating Pakistan After "Operation Sindoor"?
China, Pakistan to "Further Deepen and Expand" Ties
Modi's India: A Paper Elephant?
Pahalgam Attack: Why is the Indian Media Not Asking Hard Questions?
Ukraine's Lesson For Pakistan: Never Give Up Nukes!
Pakistan Economy Nears Trillion Dollars
Pakistan's Sea-Based Second Strike Capability
Riaz Haq Youtube Channel
VPOS Youtube Channel
32 comments:
- "This development is seen as positive for world peace but it diminishes India's significance as a 'counterweight to China', and the benefits Indians expected to flow from the US-China confrontation in Asia.. The Beijing-Washington rapprochement is clearly in Pakistan's interest."
I guess this pretty much sums up the two reasons you have bothered with a writeup on this. A 'potential' US-China rapproachment 'supposedly' weakens India while strengthening Pakistan - a zero-sum game where the gain for one country is seen as a loss for the other. As in the case of your writeup on Mecca pact (which you rather 'hoped' was a Muslim counterweight against Israel rather than Saudi's desperate Plan B against the threat posed by Iran and the Houthis) I have a feeling this is more of a reflection of your wishful thinking rather than ground realities.
As for the Xi-Trump summit, the news I came across in BBC yesterday suggested it was more spectacle than substance - hardly surprising considering one of the two involved is Trump.
"Trump and Xi exchange warm words at state dinner but little progress on key issues"
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cxq63dqp93n1o
"Xi got Trump's red carpet welcome - but not everything he wanted"
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cr93e4x7kdjjo
Let's keep in mind a stark fact - Trump is perhaps the only US President in a century (or ever) who managed to alienate America's staunchest allies more than its adversaries. He gets along better with the likes of Xi, Putin and Kim Jong Un than the democratic leaders of the West. What bizzare times do we live in when the sitting US President tweets a map of US, Canada and Greenland in American colours and the Canadian PM even talks of the hypothetical possibility of a US invasion of Canada?
Does Trump represent the new mould of US leadership from now on? Can Trump's unpredictable swings be considered the framework of US foreign policy going forward? Or is this more of a temporary abberation that will not be replicated by the succeeding US administrations?
That said, there is indeed no question of the reality of "G2". The days of American hegemony is coming to an end and US and China are effectively the two superpowers in the world today. Whether the coming years will see rapproachment between the two superpowers or intensifying rivalry - and how other players like India or Pakistan fit in them - remains to be seen.
Chen Zhuo | Katrina
@SouthernM46171
When Trump visited China in May, my feed was packed with Indian foreign-policy takes. People seemed genuinely shaken. Every smile and handshake was analysed. Professor Happymon Jacob’s call to de-Americanise India’s grand strategy later sparked a debate I was glad to see. Some people were finally questioning old assumptions, though plenty dismissed him.
Four months later, after Xi’s visit to Washington, the same circles seem much quieter. The shock has given way to a weary “what can we do?” India’s opening with China remains limited, and its trade deal with the US is still unsigned. Yet the de-Americanisation debate already feels like old news. That is the depressing part, some people saw the problem early, but the discussion faded while India’s options kept narrowing.
Rajagopalan says there will never be a G2. Beijing may not want one either. But what a country wants is no guarantee of how things will turn out. Washington can make deals with Beijing without worrying about India, and India can lose out even if no formal G2 ever exists. What I don’t understand is the fixation on the label while India’s options keep narrowing. Do we need a third Trump-Xi meeting, or even a US-China-Russia summit, before that sinks in?
No, there won’t be a G2. It’s a phantom monster theprint.in/opinion/g2-us-… via @theprintindia
https://x.com/SouthernM46171/status/2103812897805930818
India's 'unsettled relations' with US a headwind for economy, adviser says | Reuters
https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indias-unsettled-relations-with-us-headwind-economy-adviser-says-2026-09-25/
NEW DELHI, Sept 25 (Reuters) - The Indian economy is facing near-term headwinds from "unsettled relations" with the United States, global energy prices, and the absence of "AI play" in the country, the country's chief economic adviser said on Friday.
One thing about India is that it has ruined its relationships with every single one of its neighbors since day one, and India has, over the years, managed to alienate the West across the political spectrum, both left and right.
https://counter-currents.com/2026/09/against-indian-immigration-part-1/
https://counter-currents.com/2026/09/against-indian-immigration-part-2/
https://counter-currents.com/2026/09/against-indian-immigration-part-3/
How India Plans To Take America...
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9u1zb9Z5HHQ
My Identity Does Not Include You
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ho0gTmaAD_4
India - Beyond Filth and Chaos
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1jhvCRFrZAY
Kushagra 🇮🇳
@KushagraSaxena_
India's former Ambassador to the United States has just demolished the Modi government's biggest foreign policy myth.
Mr Navtej Sarna who represented India in Washington & London, writes in The Week that the India-US relationship has cratered significantly & that in America's eyes, India is not the strategic partner we believed we were.
Read that again. This is not the opposition. This is one of India's most senior diplomats.
Here is what 20 months of Modi-Trump friendship has produced -
🔹A US sanctions law threatening India with 100% tariffs for buying Russian oil
🔹India clubbed with just four other countries for punishment
🔹Votes against India cutting across party lines, including from the Congressional India caucus
🔹Even an Indian American congressman voted in favour
🔹US senator publicly told India - Clean up your act
🔹A bipartisan consensus built over 25 years has now cracked
& what was the government's strategy? Mr Sarna spells it out -
🔹Begging for investment in the US
🔹Ego massages for Trump AND his family
🔹Fawning over his envoys
His verdict - it has NOT worked.
PM who shouted Ab ki baar Trump sarkar in Houston owes the nation an answer:
🔹Where is the strategic partnership you sold to India?
🔹What did years of hugs and stadium rallies actually get us?
🔹Why is India being lectured instead of respected?
India stood up to the world on the nuclear file and came out stronger. That took spine, not selfies.
Mr Sarna says it plainly, dignity of a nation is non negotiable.
Stop the photo ops. It is time to call the bully's bluff.
https://x.com/KushagraSaxena_/status/2104440762972959047?s=20
Sadanand Dhume
@dhume
I wish Indians would stop pretending—to themselves and to the world—that China and India are still clubbed together in any meaningful way. China has emerged as a major world power. There’s no guarantee that India will automatically follow suit.
https://x.com/dhume/status/2104039466369200343?s=20
-----------
Jayant Bhandari
@JayantBhandari5
The gulf between China and India is not merely economic. It is cultural. China has virtue, work ethic, honor, and skills. If India can bridge the gap in 17 centuries, it will be lucky. For now, India is falling apart, degrading, and getting lost in debauchery.
https://x.com/JayantBhandari5/status/2104290922762842220?s=20
Pravin Sawhney
@PravinSawhney
Contrary to what most analysts believe, President Xi's state visit to America was good for America, China & Russia with negative implications for India. The multipolar world is a reality & President Trump has acknowledged this.
Will explain all this in a video to be online by tomorrow ( September 29) evening!
https://x.com/PravinSawhney/status/2104458588660121809?s=20
While India is "falling apart, degrading, and getting lost in debauchery", Pakistan is surging ahead.
"A bailout state?" - Dr Niaz Murtaza
https://www.dawn.com/news/2033447/a-bailout-state
THE country’s external liquidity rests shakily on the two crutches of endless IMF loans and rollovers of patron-state deposits. Both carry high costs — economic and political.
Our rulers entice patron states to bankroll a near-bankrupt state via its geopolitical, not economic, value. Rulers exploit both for personal, not public, gains. They court patrons well, but turn patronage into public progress poorly and personal profits ably. So, our growth spurts are all import-led rather than export-led. We spend dollars faster than we earn and court crises. We recover by choking growth instead of increasing it alongside exports. We have had several chances but have squandered most of them.
Musharraf squandered the biggest one this century. He ruled the longest, with the deep state and opposition under his thumb, and gained over $45bn in US aid, debt relief, FDI, and portfolio inflows after 9/11. Yet, a strong export base eluded him. Inflows fuelled consumption, imports, and property binges and bubbles; volatile portfolio funds and domestically focused FDI later led to outflows. They initially kept the rupee high, hurting exports. Their value doubled, but value-added dawdled and the export-GDP ratio fell below 1990s levels. A record current account deficit of 8.2 per cent of GDP in 2008 led to a big crisis. Bad security policies fuelled two conflicts that still hurt progress. The PPP cut the deficit. But energy woes, insecurity, ineptitude and failed reforms reduced growth.
Later, CPEC provided over $20 billion for energy and roads. This eased energy gaps, but the PML-N failed to build a durable export base. An expensive rupee led to an import surge and a current account deficit of about 6pc by 2018. The PTI had brought it down to 0.6pc by 2021 and managed the Covid phase well. But the Covid stimulus raised imports as exports lagged. The deficit rose to 4.6pc in 2022, partly due to global price shocks and political turmoil. So, the PML-N bequeathed a crisis to the PTI only to inherit one back, karma-style.
Import-led growth led to dollar crunches. Instead of curbing crises, high reserves made them more likely as rulers increased imports to fuel growth. Their frequency and common causes could have taught the current rulers how to avert such crises. But they are as clueless about them as they are about regular floods, even though such crises can be foreseen and forestalled. This is worse than incompetence; it shows wilful neglect. They cause and gain from such crises. The people are worse off now.
As CPEC flows shrank, we courted IMF loans and state deposits, which ballooned from 36pc of the State Bank’s reserves in 2016, when deposits were only $700 million, to nearly 600pc in early 2023. About $11bn in IMF debt, $8bn in Saudi deposits and $4bn in Chinese deposits together still exceed even our highest-ever SBP reserves of $21bn. We are the most persistent user of both crutches over time, and we now have the second-most such deposits and the third-most IMF debt globally. On top of this is an external debt of over $80bn, which doesn’t fund projects or jobs directly, earns no direct revenue to pay the interest, and is taken only because of a dollar crunch. Even these crutches may not carry the weight of our follies, so we now eye a $10bn lifeline from our oldest but most fickle patron — the US. Bangladesh, once our lesser half, has no such deposits, and its IMF debt is only 13pc of reserves as its $48bn exports mock our $30bn levels.
(Contd..)
(Contd..)
https://www.dawn.com/news/2033447/a-bailout-state
Such crutches hurt. The PML-N and PTI both ignited growth spurts as reserves peaked. Despite higher SBP reserves now, this set-up hasn’t changed outcomes, given the nature of its reserve cushion. The IMF keeps us on a leash, and patron-state deposits can be recalled quickly (as in the UAE case), unlike flows with longer, fixed return dates. So, even patronage quality has fallen: from post-9/11 aid and debt relief to CPEC flows to harsh loans and fickle deposits. We now build reserves precariously rather than finance them prudently or earn them creatively.
After four years, this set-up boasts only stabilisation and opaque foreign forays. But as a strong export base and growth elude it, stabilisation is really stagnation. Foreign forays are sucking us into endless wars, jeopardising our own security for the sake of others. We face two risky paths: hobble on with slow growth and risk unrest, or rush recklessly into import-led growth to court a dollar crisis and unrest. With no major investments here even from the patrons it serves loyally, only the two crutches prop up a bailout state. How long will its weak life jackets keep it afloat?
India readies $25 billion for Deep Tech investment as U.S. and China race ahead
https://www.cnbc.com/2026/09/29/india-investment-billions-tech-ai-us-china.html
India is planning to invest $25 billion in its nascent deep tech industry as it tries to catch up to China and the U.S.
Deep tech is a broad term used for start-ups in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, drones and space tech.
Deep tech is becoming “very critical” to every country amid rising geopolitical tensions, leading to an investment push from the Indian government.
While venture capital and private equity leaders in India are confident that a global Deep Tech champion would emerge out of India, they were hesitant to put a timeline on it.
India is preparing to deploy $25 billion to support Deep Tech start-ups in the country, as it tries to catch up with the U.S. and China in the global tech race to cut its reliance on frontier foreign technology.
In the last decade, India invested $11.6 billion in Deep Tech, Rajat Tandon, president of the Indian Venture and Alternative Capital Association, told CNBC.
But now, the government alone has committed to invest $11 billion under the Research Development Infrastructure Fund, which will be matched by venture capital and private equity fund managers, he said.
Three or four billion more will be added, making ”$25 billion available to be spent on Deep-Tech investments,” Tandon said.
Deep Tech is a broad term used for start-ups in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, drones and space tech. Experts told CNBC that the funding push comes as the government has realized that frontier tech is becoming “very critical” amid rising geopolitical tensions.
China and the U.S. currently lead the global AI race, and while Chinese tech is seen with suspicion in India, Washington’s curbs on tech exports make it unreliable.
“Tariffs from the U.S. actually help this [Deep Tech] segment a lot,” Anandamoy Roychowdhury, managing director of Crane Venture Partners, said, adding that India will develop local Deep Tech companies as it fears that “important technology can get cut off at any point.”
Some of these fears were realized earlier in June when Anthropic disabled access to its new models — Fable 5 and Mythos 5 — for foreign nationals, complying with an export-control directive from the U.S. government.
The start-up funding leaders who had gathered for SuperReturn Asia said that India’s Deep Tech companies were at a nascent stage but added that the ecosystem was poised to create global champions eventually given the quality of ideas and talent in the country.
There is a “dramatic acceleration of innovation” in the Deep Tech space in India, Shweta Rajpal Kohli, president and chief executive of Startup Policy Forum, said, adding that some companies are moving from prototype to “real commercialization.”
Earlier this year, Vibe-coding startup Emergent, space tech company Skyroot and India’s full-stack sovereign AI company Sarvam became unicorns as their valuations crossed $1 billion during the latest fundraising round.
‘Candy store’
“I feel like a kid in a candy store,” Roychowdhury of Crane Ventures said, describing his experience of scouting for Deep Tech start-up investments in the country. About 80% of his $150 million APAC fund is currently concentrated in India, he shared.
In August, the IVCA, in a report, said that its survey across 100 funds in the country showed that nine out of 10 funds in India were deploying capital in Deep Tech startups, with 37% holding a stake in 11-20 such companies,
The report added that in 2025 the sector received nearly $3 billion in funding—its highest ever, even as overall start-up funding in India fell. However, it also underscored the massive funding gap with the U.S., where $136 billion was raised.
One of the key disadvantages for Indian Deep Tech start-ups over those in the U.S. is the lack of domestic capital required to scale these long-gestation, innovative investments.
Annon, "One thing about India is that it has ruined its relationships with every single one of its neighbors since day one..."
That is actually by design.
The whole concept that such enthnically, linguistically, racially and culturally diverse groups can be called a nation is laughable.
So, they have created these external boogies to keep the population in line.
G. Ali
G Ali,
- "The whole concept that such enthnically, linguistically, racially and culturally diverse groups can be called a nation is laughable."
And yet you refuse to answer my question of how Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochis and Pakhtuns who natively speak a mix of Indo-Aryan and Iranian languages are supposed to constitute a "nation"? :-)
But I don't blame you in case you feel lost. It would seem Pakistani intellectuals themselves are confused about the whole thing. I came across two different articles in DAWN within the last few days on the inherent contradictions in TNT that lie at the foundation of Pakistan.
https://www.dawn.com/news/2032205/history-reading-ambedkar-and-jalal-on-the-idea-of-pakistan
"The logical flaw in the demand for Pakistan was this: it advanced a solution that was unnecessary for Muslims in the Muslim-majority provinces, if provincial autonomy were conceded in independent India; and it was of no help to the Muslim minorities in Hindu-majority provinces, as they would not be a part of Pakistan anyway!"
"There was something about the logic of the demand of Pakistan that made post-Partition federalism questions difficult to resolve. Resolving these would involve acknowledging space for affiliations other than religion to be the basis of a distinct political identity."
https://www.dawn.com/news/2033922/misunderstanding-pakistan
"Pakistan was always intended to be pluralistic, with communities coming together to pool their resources and cede certain freedoms for the collective good.. Abdul Wali Khan articulated well the vision of what Pakistan could be, noting that despite their distinct identities, the federating units were akin to “flowers with their distinct colours and fragrance” that “blend into a bouquet, manifesting their unity in diversity”. Ultimately, the country’s founding idea is rooted in protecting its people, their cultures, languages, and rights. That is what it ought to be, and whether anyone likes it or not, this is what it was always meant to be."
Except, this 'pluralism' and 'unity in diversity' was pretty much the foundational idea of the modern Indian Republic as well, which would raise the pertinent question about how this idea of diverse and pluralistic "Pakistan" was supposed to be different from that of a diverse and pluralistic "India". And as I mentioned in our earlier chitchat on the matter, the idea of "India" is civilizational (not political) and is inherently pluralistic.
(If you aren't yet convinced about the idea of "India" as a distinct civilization, ask a historian).
Without the China/India/Pakistan oft-repeated comparisons, I would like to honestly share my comments on my visit to India without the hype. Each country has its own unique challenges and achievements and honestly the common man is least concerned about country comparisons.
1. The youth want jobs and those that are employed don’t want to be stuck at ₹ 25-30k per month. At that wage it is a struggle.
2. Broad infrastructure improvements yet maintenance of it is challenging. Last mile/yard connectivity is lacking in cities though affluent areas are least affected.
3. Everyone I spoke to is aspirational and blame the government for not doing enough.
4. Small and medium sized businesses blame corruption as the biggest obstacle.
5. Digital payments so easy and fast.
6. Jugaad or frugality has become culture.
@Chellaney
Trump Is Not the Whole Problem
The belief in some quarters in India that U.S.-India relations will return to normal once Donald Trump is no longer president ignores the structural shift in American policy toward India. The shift began in the latter half of the Joe Biden presidency and has accelerated under Trump. Washington no longer views India’s rise as entirely benign and is determined, as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau bluntly stated on Indian soil, not to repeat its China mistake with India.
When Indian Foreign Minister Jaishankar earlier this week called out Washington’s “lack of empathy” over India’s terrorism concerns and pointed to U.S. tariff shifts as a source of “bumps,” Modi responded with a phone call to Trump. The Indian leadership is seeking to maintain a warm working relationship with the Trump administration for strategic reasons while ensuring that its official voice clearly records India’s discontent on sensitive issues.
It is also addressing the political necessity of blunting critics at home who accuse the government of being overly compliant with Washington. That effort has been reinforced by the public outcry over the government’s recent release of American covert operative Matthew Aaron VanDyke and his six Ukrainian accomplices following an intervention by Secretary of State Marco Rubio. The seven had been arrested by India’s National Investigation Agency, which accused them of terrorist conspiracy and waging war against the Indian state.
New Delhi must face up to a difficult reality: Simply waiting for Trump’s departure will not restore the old U.S.-India relationship. The underlying shift in Washington’s view of India predates Trump and is likely to outlast him. New Delhi will have to adjust to an American policy that increasingly sees India's rise not simply as a strategic opportunity but also as a source of economic and geopolitical friction.
https://x.com/chellaney/status/2105837169029890523?s=46&t=Uy6jyUH6DlEyIPi6Mq6AGQ
Vineeth,
"how Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochis and Pakhtuns who natively speak a mix of Indo-Aryan and Iranian languages are supposed to constitute a "nation"?
Fair enough.
So, the question is who decides which group(s) constitutes a nation?
Personally I believe it should be people's choice or individual groups choice.
So let's look at the history here.
The concept of Pakistan was first presented by two gentlemen from Punjab, one was a doctor in philosophy and a famous poet, the other was an Oxford student. They proposed that the four Muslim majority province of noth west India be united together and separated from India.
The resolution to create Pakistan was presented by an elected Prime Minister of Bengal.
In March 1943 elected members of Sindh assembly proposed to join Muslim majority provinces to create Pakistan, they did that again in 1947.
In 1946 referendum was held in KPK, then known as NWFP, where 99.2% of the people voted to join Pakistan.
The elections of 1946 were sort of referendum on Pakistan where, according to VP Menon, 89.2% of Muslims of India voted for Pakistan.
In Bengal ML won 113 of 119 Muslim seats.
Punjab: 75 out of 85
Sindh: 27 out of 34
NWFP: 17 of 38, but according to Molana Azad, ML didn't do well because they started campaigning qyite late. Later referendum was held where over 99% voted for Pakistan
Balochistan was the only province of 1947s Pakistan which did not voluntarily join because no elections were held there. The the shahi jirga (the assembly of elders) voted to join Pakistan. Most of Balochistan was not under direct British rule. Quetta was under British rule, their elected city counsil unanimously voted to join Pakistan.
So, in conclusion these groups themselves decided to form a union being quite aware of their diversity.
About your second point:
"I came across two different articles in DAWN within the last few days on the inherent contradictions in TNT that lie at the foundation of Pakistan."
Personally, though i don't agree with them, but people have a right to have thier opinion and i am really proud that these things are openly discussed in Pakistan.
G Ali.
G Ali,
- "So, the question is who decides which group(s) constitutes a nation?"
So, you have decided to skirt the question of WHAT constitutes a nation and moved on to WHO gets to decide on it. That's "fair enough" too! :-)
As a reminder, your original statement was this - "The whole concept that such enthnically, linguistically, racially and culturally diverse groups can be called a nation is laughable."
Perhaps in your zeal to project 'India' with its ethnic and linguistic diversity as a hodgepodge of 'nations', you happened to forget for a moment that if the criteria for constituting a 'nation' were to be a single language or ethnicity, Pakistan itself would be 4 or 5 such 'nations'!
So, I guess you wouldn't want to go anywhere near that argument now. :-)
But, as I stated in my earlier comments, 'nation' and 'nationalism' are relatively modern European political thought. So there isn't any need to fret over how diverse ethnic or linguistic groups can form a 'nation'.
- "They proposed that the four Muslim majority province of noth west India be united together and separated from India."
Hold it right there. What's the 'India' here that the Muslim majority provinces wanted to be separated from? An 'India' that existed before Pakistan did? Where did that come from? :-D
Okay, being serious once again. From the story of referendums and resolutions, the gist of your argument as far as I can make out is that 'Pakistan' was only meant to be a political entity carved out of the Muslim-majority provinces of British-ruled 'India'.
Now, that raises a question whether the 'Two Nation Theory' that proclaimed the distinct nationhood for Muslims (despite their ethnic and linguistic divides) applied ONLY to the residents of Muslim-majority provinces, leaving the question of 'nationhood' of Muslims in Hindu-majority provinces in a limbo.
For example, would a Malayalam-speaking Muslim in Keralam constitute a separate Muslim 'nation' from their Malayalam-speaking Hindu or Malayalam-speaking Christian neighbours despite sharing the same ethnicity, language, and even sharing broadly similar food habits, and the taste for popular films and music?
That said, what exactly is the problem that you saw with Indian national identity that you did not see in Pakistan's here? That there were no resolutions or referendums in Hindu-majority provinces to create an independent 'India'? They were never needed. The idea of India, Bharat or Hindustan (take your pick) as a distinct civilization or cultural realm had existed long before it took on a political form ('Indian nationalism') under British rule. The campaign for home rule and later independence for British-ruled 'India' that was spear-headed by 'Indian National Congress' (founded 1885) and other revolutionary organizations like 'Hindustan Socialist Republican Association' (founded 1924), 'Communist Party of India' (founded 1925) and the later founding of 'Indian National Army' or 'Azad Hind Fauj' during WWII under Subhash Chandra Bose naturally cemented the political idea of an 'Indian nation' among the masses. In the conception of these freedom fighters, 'independent India' was to be the natural political successor to British-ruled 'India', while on the other hand 'Pakistan' was seen as a relatively novel and disruptive political thought (the term 'Pakistan' itself did not exist before 1933 unlike 'India', 'Bharat' or 'Hindustan') that sought to separate from this 'India' on the basis of religion.
(contd..)
G Ali,
- "Personally, though i don't agree with them, but people have a right to have thier opinion and i am really proud that these things are openly discussed in Pakistan."
Reading this, I can't help feeling that somehow this isn't the same 'G Ali' that I had the privilege to converse with earlier. :-D
Either way, the reason one frequently encounters such discussion in op-eds in Pakistani media is perhaps because the ideological foundation of 'Pakistan' and TNT is inherently riddled with contradictions and isn't a settled question as yet.
But to be fair, the idea of 'Indian nationhood' is openly discussed and debated these days in India too (though the matter was widely considered a settled thing earlier), thanks to Sangh parivar's efforts to redefine it. The Hindutva organizations (whom I must stress has had little role in India's freedom movement or the framing of its Constitution) believes their idea of 'Bharat' - their preferred name for the country - is defined by a monolothic 'Hindu' cultural identity (though they condescend to accomodate Buddhists, Jains and Sikhs under the broader umbrella of 'Hindus'), while others - including liberals, seculars and minorities - continue to believe the idea of 'India' is pluralistic.
Regards.
"How India became dangerously addicted to Chinese imports"
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5pve834grpno
Take a walk into an Indian toy shop and as well as picking up a new favourite plaything for a child, you might just get an insight into how the nation is battling for a batter economic relationship with its all-powerful neighbour China.
Six years ago, in an attempt to push local manufacturing and keep substandard toys out of its market, India raised tariffs on imported toys from 20% to 60% and eventually to 70%.
Retailers were up in arms and said that domestic firms could never match the foreign-made stuff. But the combination of higher customs duties and quality control standards worked.
Indian imports of toys fell by a third from nearly $300mn in 2020 to $100mn this year, while exports rose from around $129mn to $200mn in the same period. Moreover, the country was able to drastically reduce its dependence on China, which held a 70% share of the local toy market.
The sector stands out as a rare exception in India's otherwise unsuccessful attempts to rebalance an increasingly lopsided trading relationship with its larger neighbour, which some experts say, is now among the most asymmetric in the world.
Even as diplomatic ties between the two countries completely broke down following the Galwan Valley clashes in 2020 and Delhi announced a slew of anti-dumping duties and a ban on Chinese apps such as Tik Tok, its trade deficit with Beijing has only ballooned - from $44bn in 2020 to an eye-popping $112bn this year.
"India's economic dependence on China continued to deepen while political, security, and investment ties were at their lowest point," Kevin Zongzhe Li, a Washington-based Fellow at the Asia Society Policy Institute's Centre for China Analysis, told the BBC.
More worryingly, exports to China remained below pre-pandemic level even as imports doubled in this period.
"China now supplies over 30% of India's industrial imports, and India depends on it for more than 100 critical products. And the imbalance is worsening," says Ajay Srivastava of the Delhi-based Global Trade and Research Initiative (GTRI).
If the rapid pace of imports continues, bilateral deficit could jump to $134bn, giving Beijing even more leverage over Indian industry, according to Srivastava.
On the sidelines of the Brics summit in Delhi in September, amid a deepening thaw between the Asian giants, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping vowed to address these "structural trade imbalances and supply chain issues".
But given how deeply entrenched Chinese imports have become to India's industrial economy, this will be a formidable task for Delhi, experts told the BBC.
That's primarily because India depends on China to not merely consume end-products, but increasingly to produce industrial goods.
To be true, India has reduced its reliance on imports of finished goods such as smartphones and solar equipment, and now produces more than a quarter of the world's iPhones.
"Yet, production remains largely assembly-based and depends heavily on imported components, particularly from China," says Srivastava.
(contd..)
(contd..)
https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c5pve834grpno
It's the same story with industrial machinery, battery inputs, chemicals, solar cells, and manufacturing equipment.
Electrical machinery and electronics alone account for 36% of imports, followed by machinery and mechanical appliances at 21.7%, while organic chemicals and plastics also have a significant share, according to the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) think tank.
"Their interruption would not merely affect consumption; it would disrupt production itself," according to Soumya Bhowmik, a Fellow at ORF's Centre for New Economic Diplomacy, who argues that this reflects India's difficulty in substituting Chinese inputs with local production.
Besides a growing reliance on inputs and raw material, Chinese imports to India are also being propelled by other macroeconomic trends.
China has huge excess capacity in sectors from steel to solar panels and electric vehicles, while its slowing economy cannot absorb the output.
Manufacturers are therefore increasingly turning to overseas markets, selling goods cheaply. China's trade surplus is expected to top $1tn for a second straight year.
A lot of these goods are coming to Indian shores because it is rapidly expanding manufacturing across segments of the economy, but also as "Western markets impose tariffs and other restrictions", says Srivastava.
On the other hand, lack of access to the Chinese market remains a major challenge for Indian companies.
"Indian products face a variety of tariff and non-tariff hurdles in China that make it difficult to scale exports," says Li.
"If normalisation [of ties] continues without a serious push for reciprocal market access, India risks a situation where the political relationship improves but the economic dependency stays the same."
The long term solution to both reducing avoidable imports and improving exports performance will be to strengthen manufacturing, says Srivastava.
But that requires sector-specific industrial policy and stronger fundamentals – affordable power and credit, efficient logistics and stable regulations – areas where India still falls short.
India has also recently softened foreign direct investment rules, which could open the door to Chinese companies wanting to expand Indian investments. But these too will need careful vetting, he adds.
"Investment that merely expands distribution networks or assembles products using Chinese parts could increase imports and deepen dependence. Approvals should therefore prioritise technology transfer, local value addition, domestic component production and exports from India."
More immediately, India could focus on targeting higher exports to China in specific sectors to reduce its trade asymmetry, says Li. Sectors like pharmaceuticals could be a natural fit with China's population aging and healthcare costs rising.
"But narrowing a $112 billion deficit won't come from finding niche export sectors alone," he adds.
"The key question is whether Beijing is ready and willing to make concessions on market access as part of the broader normalisation. Alternatively, India will need to find its own leverage to force that conversation."
Ignis Rex
@Ignis_Rex
Sunak’s Slap in New Delhi: China Is a Superpower, India Is the Aspirant
Multipolar Reality Check: Vietnam Won ‘China+1,’ Not India
Rishi Sunak stood in New Delhi, in front of India’s business elite, and said the quiet part out loud: China is now a peer competitor to the United States. Not India.
For years, since the US–China trade war heated up in 2018, Indian elites have been thumping their chests, declaring India the “next economic superpower.” They told themselves that as America tried to “decouple” from China, India would be the natural replacement. Western think tanks and media fed this fantasy, calling India the “counterweight” to China. But Sunak’s words were a slap across the face: the world has already moved to multipolarity, and India is not sitting at the top table among the 2 superpowers.
Multipolar Reality
Sunak’s statement confirms what many outside the Western bubble already know: the US-led order is finished. Trump is not the cause of this collapse—he’s the symptom. His rise reflects America’s contradictions: a superpower drowning in debt, polarized at home, overstretched abroad. Just like late Ottoman sultans who clung to populism while their empire crumbled, Trump embodies decline, not renewal.
China, meanwhile, has emerged as a full-spectrum rival—economically, militarily, technologically. That’s the reality Sunak acknowledged. And he did it in India, where elites have been desperate to believe they are equal to China. The contrast could not be sharper.
India as “Supply Chain Hub”?
Sunak dangled a carrot: India could be a “trusted partner” and “potential supply chain hub” as the West diversifies away from China. But let’s be honest—this is the same “China + 1” narrative we heard back in 2020. Back then, Western firms said they’d move factories out of China. The winner wasn’t India. It was Vietnam.
Why? Because Vietnam is next door to China, plugged directly into Chinese supply chains. Its ports, logistics, and industrial clusters are integrated with southern China’s manufacturing ecosystem. Multinationals could shift assembly lines to Vietnam without breaking their supply chain backbone. India, by contrast, was too far, too bureaucratic, too expensive in logistics, and too unpredictable in policy. India had a PR win over China – when it was crowned “most likely to succeed” in China + 1 as Modi was a good friend of Trump! See where Modi is now with Trump?
India’s Missed Chances
If India truly wants to be a manufacturing hub, it needs to face hard truths:
1.Foreign investment friendliness – Investors complain about red tape, sudden tax changes, and weak infrastructure. India must fix this.
2.Integration with Chinese supply chains – Pretending you can replace China is fantasy. The smart move is to plug into China’s ecosystem, not fight it. Vietnam understood this. India resisted, and lost.
3.Geopolitical realism – India wants to be a “swing state,” hedging between blocs. But hedging only works if you have leverage. Without manufacturing depth, India’s leverage is limited.
OECD Debts near Breaking Points?
Western debt markets are turning into a casino. Just look at US, Japan and France.
Sunak warned tech firms may soon issue more debt than the US government, showing how private capital dominates—chasing quick profits and leaving economies unstable.
In my opinion, China’s model is different. Debt is directed by the state, used to build railways, factories, and green tech, not gamble on short term returns. This approach is civilizational: China has always valued stability and long term planning. For developing countries, that predictability is far more sustainable than Western finance, which is predatory and short lived. In a multipolar world, China’s debt system looks built to last.
The Bigger Picture
Sunak’s speech in India was more than a policy talk. It was a reality check.
•China is the new superpower and peer to the US.
•India is still the aspirant.
•Multipolarity is here.
•OECD debts are worrisome
https://x.com/Ignis_Rex/status/2110124311310991813?s=20
- "China Is a Superpower, India Is the Aspirant.. China is now a peer competitor to the United States. Not India."
Why should this be news to anyone? It should be obvious. China has a 5-6 times larger economy and industrial capacity than India. There would be no sense in India pretending to China's rival or equal until that kind of gap narrows significantly.
- "For years, since the US–China trade war heated up in 2018, Indian elites have been thumping their chests, declaring India the next economic superpower... And he did it in India, where elites have been desperate to believe they are equal to China. The contrast could not be sharper."
The only "elites" who would even *pretend* to believe India is equal to China is its current political leadership - and that would be purely for domestic political propaganda. Privately, they would know the ground reality, and so would India's business class and its industrialists.
- "Because Vietnam is next door to China, plugged directly into Chinese supply chains. Its ports, logistics, and industrial clusters are integrated with southern China’s manufacturing ecosystem.. Pretending you can replace China is fantasy. The smart move is to plug into China’s ecosystem, not fight it. Vietnam understood this. India resisted, and lost."
That's classic Chinese propaganda - "you can't fight us, join us". Such level of dependence on Chinese supply chains would be Vietnamese industry's greatest vulnerability as well. Sure, Vietnam is ruled by a Communist Party just as China is. But just as in the case of India-China relations, Vietnam-China relations hasn't exactly been friendly either, due to past history of conflicts (1979 Sino-Vietnamese war) and simmering territorial disputes (eg: South China Sea). China can wield Vietnamese industry's dependence on China's supply chains as a weapon against Vietnam if geo-political tensions were to flare up.
Of course, Indian industry has a similar dependence (and vulnerability) with regard to China's supply chains as well. Indian authorities recognize this risk, which is why it has been striving to diversify its sources of supplies and to develop its own domestic supply chains wherever possible. It isn't easy, and is long term work. But India's trump card in this regard is its large and growing market that makes localized production of parts economically feasible.
For eg:, India's passenger car sales last year (CY2025) totalled around 4.4 million units, and it is widely expected to surpass 5 million units this year, with its domestic production (which constitute overwhelming majority of these sales) rising by a similar proportion. This would only be one-fifth or one-sixth that of China's numbers, but is still large enough to propel further growth in the sector as India is expected to emerge as the world's second largest vehicle market and manufacturer behind China within the next decade.
@DerekJGrossman
Chinese reassessment of India: "...in the past year, China has watched India lose its balance and simmer in a sense of strategic disorientation due to America’s change of heart...Many Chinese experts see India as returning to middle-power alignment for 'economic authority and strategic freedom,' which translates into vigorous outreach to Europe, Japan, Canada, and all the middle powers. It’s almost as if India is returning to its middle-power roots."
https://x.com/derekjgrossman/status/2111099241389253110?s=61&t=mgTxrmITUbpo9NntN5677Q
————-
China’s Strategic Reassessment of India
https://warontherocks.com/chinas-strategic-reassessment-of-india/
s China and India have improved their relations in recent months, many observers have attributed this improvement to the end of U.S. strategic altruism toward India. Indeed, in the past year, China has watched India lose its balance and simmer in a sense of strategic disorientation due to America’s change of heart. Delegation after delegation of Indian strategists visited China, trying to mend ties in search of balance in the Chinese view. Many Chinese experts see India as returning to middle-power alignment for “economic authority and strategic freedom,” which translates into vigorous outreach to Europe, Japan, Canada, and all the middle powers. It’s almost as if India is returning to its middle-power roots.
The Chinese reassessment of India’s power status and its strategic malleability — the extent to which its choices can be shaped — and predictability has significant implications for understanding future dynamics between the two powers. The renewed improvement in ties raises questions about its sincerity and limits. While China recalibrates its relations with India, it is also building fences and chokeholds, first and foremost through supply chain dependence. It is unclear what future policy the next U.S. administration will pursue toward either China or India. Both powers therefore keep their options open.
Debating India’s Power Status
In the Chinese policy discourse on India, the first and foremost question has always been India’s power status: Is India a great power, or is it simply a middle power with great-power potential? While India’s gross domestic product has consistently been a fraction of China’s, its claim to great-power status has had major sway over China’s calculus. Vishwa Guru — “India the world’s guru” — is a famous slogan created under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi that, in the Chinese view, best represents India’s strategic aspiration: India not only aspires to be a world-class great power but also sees itself as superior and therefore will teach all the other great powers. Although Chinese policymakers do not have romantic misperceptions of India’s actual power status, India’s aspiration and, even more so, its boldness have been no small shock to Chinese policymakers, who follow the tradition of overestimating adversaries’ capacity and hiding their own strength （料敌从宽，判己从严）. India’s bold statement made Beijing question whether it underestimated fundamental aspects of Indian capability and potential that warranted India’s great-power status.
More importantly, during the first Trump administration and the Biden administration, China stopped questioning India’s great-power status. India played a pivotal role in America’s Indo-Pacific strategy during these eight years, to the extent that Washington “hyped India’s power status” （大肆吹捧印度） and “exaggerated India’s development potential.”（夸大其发展潜力）
- "While India’s gross domestic product has consistently been a fraction of China’s, its claim to great-power status has had major sway over China’s calculus."
Chinese probably doesn't understand how politics in electoral democracies work, and may take political rhetoric of leaders at face value. The "Vishwa Guru" nonsense and the claims of "great-power status" are manufactured PR campaigns directed at Modi's domestic Hindu-nationalist political base and the Indian diaspora abroad. Others wouldn't even understand what the term "Vishwa Guru" means.
India is a "middle power" for now, but with a *potential* to emerge as a "great power" in the future *IF* it manages to resolve the fundamental problems constraining its growth. India cannot become another China overnight. Its going to be a long haul. It has some basic ingredients right - a large and growing market, developing industrial base, macro-economic stability etc., but has many more to resolve in the areas of infrastructure, job generation, social upliftment, public education and health, tackling bureaucratic red tape and corruption etc.
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Ignis Rex
@Ignis_Rex
Regional Power, Global Pretender: India’s Great Power Illusion
From 1962 to Quad: Washington’s Favorite Sidekick
I wrote this article after chancing on a post by Kanwal Sibal claiming “We should not belittle ourselves (India) by classifying ourselves as a middle power”. See image attached.
So here we are again, folks, with the eternal question: Is India a Great Power? Spoiler alert—no. At best, India is a regional power, a convenient pawn for Washington to wave around whenever it needs someone to “balance China.” The U.S. pats India on the back, whispers sweet nothings about “shared democratic values,” and then quietly reminds itself: “Hey, didn’t China thrash India in 1962? Yeah, let’s keep them around as our junior partner.”
The 1962 Border War: India’s “Great Power” Reality Check
Let’s start with the elephant in the room—or should I say the dragon. In 1962, India strutted onto the Himalayan stage, puffed up with Nehru’s rhetoric about “non alignment” and “moral leadership” but unfortunately he has an Intelligence Chief that told him erroneously that the PLA will not react if he occupy the disputed region on the Chinese side of the border. Then China showed up, slapped India across the mountains, and sent its army running downhill faster than Bollywood plot twists.
That war was India’s baptism of fire—and humiliation. A supposed “Great Power” doesn’t get thoroughly defeated in its own backyard. Yet India did. And ever since, the U.S. has been dangling India like a battered sword, hoping it can still scare China. Spoiler: it can’t.
Economy: Big Numbers, Small Reality
Yes, India has a massive population. Yes, it has a big GDP in aggregate. But per capita? Still scraping the bottom compared to actual great powers. A billion people with smartphones doesn’t equal industrial depth. India’s economy is like a Bollywood set—flashy on the outside, hollow scaffolding inside.
Great powers build aircraft carriers, hypersonic missiles, and AI ecosystems. India builds call centers, software outsourcing hubs, and WhatsApp forwards. The U.S. loves to hype India’s “potential,” but potential doesn’t win wars or shape global orders.
Dependent of Remittances from Overseas Indian Workers
India’s “Great Power” fantasy collapses when you look at its rural economy, propped up not by industrial might but by remittances from overseas workers. And not the glamorous expat elite—think construction workers, kitchen help, and labourers sweating in the Gulf. Their wages flow home through the underground Hundi network, untaxed and invisible, because many are working without proper visas. The untaxed remittances complicate GDP estimation for the rural economy and inflate it during recession.
A supposed global power shouldn’t rely on shadow finance from illegal migrant labour to keep villages afloat. Yet India does. Great powers export technology; India exports cheap manpower. That’s not sovereignty—it’s dependency dressed up as pride.
https://x.com/Ignis_Rex/status/2112302040504533003?s=20
gnis Rex
@Ignis_Rex
Regional Power, Global Pretender: India’s Great Power Illusion
Military: Import Nation
A true great power makes its own weapons. India buys them. Russia sells India jets, France sells it Rafales, Israel sells it drones, and the U.S. dangles Patriots and F 21s like candy. India’s military is a Frankenstein’s monster stitched together from foreign suppliers.
Imagine calling yourself a great power while begging Moscow for spare parts and Paris for upgrades. That’s not autonomy—that’s dependency. And dependency is the opposite of power.
Technology: The Missing Link
India likes to brag about its space program—“We put a probe on the Moon!” Sure, but so did China, Russia, and the U.S. decades ago. Great powers dominate cutting edge tech: AI, quantum computing, aerospace, cyber warfare. India? It’s still trying to figure out how to keep its domestic chip industry alive.
Meanwhile, Indian IT firms are busy fixing bugs in American software while China is building sovereign AI ecosystems that empower the world. That’s not great power behavior; that’s subcontractor behavior.
Geopolitics: The Junior Partner
Here’s the kicker. India’s role in global geopolitics is basically: “Be the sidekick.” In BRICS, it’s the cautious one. In the Quad, it’s the hesitant one. In U.S. strategy, it’s the “swing state”—translation: useful, but not decisive.
Washington loves India because it’s not China. That’s it. India is the “Not China” option. The U.S. doesn’t see India as an equal partner; it sees India as a convenient counterweight. A regional power to poke Beijing, nothing more.
The Pretender Syndrome
India talks like a great power but acts like a middle power. It waves its population size like a trophy, but when push comes to shove, it can’t project decisive power beyond South Asia. Its navy is still struggling to dominate the Indian Ocean, let alone the Pacific. It’s 2 aircraft carriers are nothing but glorified floating platform, as they lack air wings as India is still waiting for the delivery of Rafael M fighter jets, which will probably not come till after 2035 as France is prioritizing NATO’s requirement in the event of a war with Russia.
China builds Belt and Road; India builds excuses. China builds infrastructure across continents; India builds bureaucratic bottlenecks. China shapes the global order; India debates whether it should even show up.
Why the U.S. Loves This Setup
For Washington, India is perfect. Big enough to look impressive on paper, weak enough to stay dependent, and insecure enough to cling to American approval. The U.S. doesn’t need India to be a great power—it needs India to be a regional foot soldier in its rivalry with China. Think of India as the geopolitical equivalent of the junior recruit in a military drill. The U.S. is the seasoned commander, China is the rival competitor across the field, and India is the eager soldier who stumbles in the first skirmish but still insists it’s “part of the campaign.”
The 1962 Lesson Still Echoes
India’s defeat in 1962 wasn’t just a military loss—it was a strategic revelation. It showed that India’s ambitions outstripped its capabilities. And sixty plus years later, not much has changed. India still talks big, still gets flattered by Washington, and still lacks the hard power to back it up. Not surprisingly India is still afraid to release the 1963 Indian Army’s Henderson Brooks–Bhagat Report outlining why India suffered the catastrophic defeat by China.
Great powers don’t get used as pawns. They set the board. India is still a pawn, sometimes promoted to knight when Washington feels generous, but never the queen.
Conclusion: India the Regional Power
https://x.com/Ignis_Rex/status/2112302040504533003?s=20
gnis Rex
@Ignis_Rex
Regional Power, Global Pretender: India’s Great Power Illusion
So, let’s cut through the rhetoric. India is not a Great Power. It is, at best, a regional power—a South Asian heavyweight that can balance Pakistan, poke at China, and provide Washington with a convenient talking point.
But global power? No. India lacks the economy, the military autonomy, the technological depth, and the geopolitical leverage. It remains a junior partner, a subcontractor, a sidekick.
And until India stops sending its men overseas to work as cheap labourers, stops importing weapons, stops outsourcing its tech talents, and stops clinging to Washington’s approval, it will remain what it has been since 1962: a regional power that talks like a giant but gets humbled whenever the real giants step onto the stage.
https://x.com/Ignis_Rex/status/2112302040504533003?s=20
Riaz Sb,
This anonymous handle @Ignis_Rex is clearly nothing more than a Chinese propaganda handle. There is no info whatsoever on the identity of the author(s), and there is hardly any objectivity visible in its narrative. Its just vitriolic diatribe from the beginning till the end, and the slant is clear with its frequent references to 1962. I'm surprised you even bother to read these, unless they give you some momentary relief or escape from the hard reality of the far more dismal situation that Pakistan finds itself in.
Think of it this way - How much credibility would you give for an anonymous Indian propaganda handle that indulge in a similar diatribe against Pakistan with frequent references to 1971? One can easily write a similar piece against Pakistan referring to its dysfunctional political system, its moribund economy, its chronic dependence on IMF bailouts and handouts from "friendly countries", the frequency of terror attacks etc. Would you read that and lend it credence?
- "India likes to brag about its space program—“We put a probe on the Moon!” Sure, but so did China, Russia, and the U.S. decades ago."
China didn't land on moon "decades" ago. It landed in 2013. India's first (albeit unsuccessful) attempt happened in 2019 and successful landing came later in 2023, 10 years after China. To be fair, that's no small technological achievement for a country with a much smaller economy and industrial base than China's. Very likely you would read the same dismissive narrative when India launches Gaganyaan as well - "China already did that decades ago!". So what? China's first manned space mission in 2003 came FOUR decades after US and Soviet missions too! :)
- "Not surprisingly India is still afraid to release the 1963 Indian Army’s Henderson Brooks–Bhagat Report outlining why India suffered the catastrophic defeat by China."
Fair enough. But Pakistan never officially released the Hamdoor Rehman commission report on the 1971 debacle as well. :)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hamoodur_Rahman_Commission_Report
- "But global power? No. India lacks the economy, the military autonomy, the technological depth, and the geopolitical leverage. It remains a junior partner, a subcontractor, a sidekick."
West said the same about China decades ago. So lets see where India stands a couple of decades from now.
India’s average rocket launch cost stood at $13,302 per kg, the highest among six major space markets
India’s Rocket Launch Costs Over $13k Per Kg, Four Times Higher Than US
The findings highlight a challenge for India's commercial space ambitions, even as private companies begin entering the launch market
https://www.outlookbusiness.com/deeptech/indias-rocket-launch-costs-over-13k-per-kg-four-times-higher-than-us
The figure was more than four times the US cost of $3,225 per kg
Limited launch frequency and smaller rocket payload capacities are key factors behind the gap
India has the highest rocket launch costs among six major spacefaring markets, with the average cost of placing payload into low Earth orbit estimated at $13,302 per kg at the end of 2025 — more than four times the US figure of $3,225 per kg, according to a study published in the peer-reviewed journal Economics Letters.
First reported by Mint, the study by Alessio Terzi of the University of Cambridge and Francesco Nicoli of Politecnico di Torino placed India above the European Union, Russia, China and Japan in terms of launch costs.
Europe was the next most expensive market at $9,897 per kg, followed by Russia at $6,682, China at $5,809 and Japan at $5,287, the study said.The research analysed more than 6,740 rocket launches between 1960 and 2025 to assess how accumulated experience and launch activity affect costs.
India's estimates were based on launches coordinated by NewSpace India Ltd (NSIL), the commercial arm of the Indian Space Research Organisation (Isro), using a mix of domestic launch vehicles, as per Mint.
- "Limited launch frequency and smaller rocket payload capacities are key factors behind the gap"
I came across this report months ago. What needs to be noted is that their calculation of "launch costs" are not based on actual "launch pricing", but based on a complex methodology of calculating the "costs" involved when taking into account the fixed costs of establishing and running facilities, salaries etc and how these get amortised over time from launch revenue based on the frequency of launches and payload capabilities of rockets etc.
India's launch frequency is quite low in comparison to China's (India's launch count in 2025 was only 5 vs China's 93), and the payload capability of its most powerful rocket LVM3 at ~4 tonnes to GTO is only one-third of China's Long March 5 at ~14 tonnes to GTO. These are significant factors in the calculations of their "cost" in the report.
You can find their original report and methodology of calculation here.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176526003782
Here's a link to a Reddit discussion thread on the report.
https://www.reddit.com/r/ISRO/comments/1vo8cnj/despite_its_reputation_indias_perunit_space/
Maitreya Bhakal
@MaitreyaBhakal
India might be poor in manufacturing, but it's very efficient in manufacturing excuses. Indian and western propagandists have a ready inventory of reasons to explain why India lags behind China.
First, the excuse was that India launched its economic liberalization a decade later than China. So obviously, India will take time to catch up.
Then, the excuse became that India's "democracy" - once trumpeted as an advantage over China - was now the very thing holding India back. India can't just force through reforms or policies like authoritarian China can. And that's why India cannot develop as fast as China.
Today, they have yet another excuse: India lags behind China because China itself is "throttling" and "stiffling" India's rise. China doesn't want a rival and is hellbent on destroying any chance India has of developing its own industry and manufacturing.
In summary, everyone is to blame for India's failures - except India itself. India is completely blameless, it's all someone else's fault, or just bad luck or poor timing.
Such blame games reveal a lot about the Indian liberal mindset. Attributing all of India's failures to some external factor provides a psychological excuse and a convenient justification for incompetence. If it's always someone else's fault, no matter what you do, it will never be enough. So what's the point in doing anything at all?
Blaming others is an easy way to absolve oneself of blame - and escape responsibility for one's own failures. Indians themselves are never to be blamed for anything about India, the fault always lies somewhere else.
https://x.com/MaitreyaBhakal/status/2112503670214734209?s=20
- "First, the excuse was that India launched its economic liberalization a decade later than China... Then, the excuse became that India's "democracy"... Today, they have yet another excuse: India lags behind China because China itself is "throttling" and "stiffling" India's rise..."
I do not know who exactly are the 'Indian propagandists' that the author is referring to when he says they make excuses or indulge in blame games to explain India's backwardness relative to China - whether they are Indian govt sources, media or random social media handles or users - but the first two 'excuses' he has listed are indeed genuine, though the third one is less so. India did indeed begin economic reforms a decade late than China, and when it did the pace has been slow due to stiff resistance on account of its complex political system.
China has an 'advantage' that parliamentary democracies like India do not have. Since power is highly centralized and one party controls all institutions - whether it be the central govt and provincial govt, police, courts or media - its far easier for Chinese authorities to push through its developmental agenda. Land can be acquired relocating masses of people and massive infrastructural and industrial projects established without worrying about opposition from the local population, rival political parties or court injunctions. Changes to law and regulations can be pushed through without worrying about political opposition in the parliament. People are taught and trained from school days to obey the govt and its laws, not question or challenge it. There is no independent media to raise hue and cry or dig up stories of irregularities, corruption or misuse of authority. Above all, the Chinese govt doesn't have to worry about facing elections and being voted out of power.
The case of Modi's farm laws and the delays in his pet project of running a 'bullet train' from Mumbai to Ahmedabad is instructive here. The first had to be repealed due to protests from a key politically sensitive constituency eventhough the law had been passed by both houses of Parliament and signed into law by the President. The second was delayed for years due to land acquisition issues and non-cooperation from an opposition-ruled state government in Maharashtra. All of these headaches and hurdles are relatable in democracies, but non-existent in authoritarian political systems like China.
In fact, the contrast between Philippines and Vietnam that someone mentioned in the comments to that X post further underline the critical role of the political system in determining the 'speed' of economic development.
As for that third 'excuse', there have been recent instances where China had stopped exports of certain critical raw materials, components or machinery that ended up adversely impacting Indian industrial production. For example, during last year the production in India's auto manufacturing sector was impacted for several months when China imposed curbs on export of rare earth magnets leaving Indian auto firms scrambling to find alternative sources. Even more recently, China imposed curbs on export of tunnel boring machines (TBMs) which India had been using to build road and rail links to its remote and border regions.
But I certainly wouldn't consider this 'excuse' as defensible in any way. It is imperative that India make efforts to localize its supply chains or at least diversify its sourcing inorder to insulate its economy and manufacturing industry from external shocks. It cannot and should not count on cooperation from anyone, and certainly not from a potential adversary.
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