Tuesday, December 15, 2020

Najam Sethi on Desperation in PDM: Says It is "Now or Never" For PMLN

Prominent Pakistani journalist and political analyst Najam Sethi, a strong critic of Prime Minister Imran Khan, sees desperation among the Pakistani Democratic Movement (PDM) leaders. In a recent interview with well-known journalists Raza Rumi and Murtaza Solangi on Naya Daur social media channel, Sethi said the Pakistani opposition, particularly PMLN, believe it is "now or never" for them.  

PDM Leadership L to R: Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, Maulana Fazlur Rehman, Maryam Nawaz

Najam Sethi added that if the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf government led by Prime Minister Khan survives the current 5 year term and succeeds in stabilizing the nation's economy,  the ruling party will be re-elected for another 5 year term in 2023 with the support of what Sethi calls "Miltablishment" (a euphemism for Pakistani military). This, Sethi said, would mean that the PMLN would break up and lose its relevance. Sethi acknowledges there is genuine support for PTI in spite of Imran Khan government's failures in the first two years. This support is particularly strong among the youthful voters who are willing to forgive PTI's poor handling of the economy. 

Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais, Professor of political science at Lahore University of Management Science (LUMS), has offered similar analysis in an op ed published in Arab News. He asks: "Why can’t opposition parties wait for the next elections, is the six-million-dollar question". Here's an excerpt from Rais's op ed that captures its essence: 

"The two major dynastic parties— the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and the Pakistan People’s Party are concerned that if Khan continues to stabilize and devise strategies for reforms, which he is set to roll out in the coming months, he may win the next election. If that happens, it will end dynastic elite politics, as staying in the political wilderness could cause splits, defections and fragmentation". 


The PDM strategy of forcing mid-term elections by resigning from assemblies may not work because the interests of PPP and PMLN, the two biggest components of PDM, do not converge.  While it is true that PMLN has little to lose by resigning their seats, the PPP has a lot to lose because it is already the ruling party in Sindh with its patronage power intact. And the PPP has no hope of winning national elections to form federal government. If the PDM protests are sustained, however, it won't be smooth sailing for PTI either. Dr. Rais sums up the situation very well as follows:

"Resigning from the assemblies is an option, but why would the PPP do so, losing its government in Sindh. Things may not be easy for the government of Khan either, as instability and confrontation may continue to divert his attention away from reforms and rebuilding a ‘new’ Pakistan. Failure then would work well into the strategy of the opposition for the next elections". 


13 comments:

Mayraj F. said...

Gee even Najam Sethi sees the light.

Zia said...

Khan should focus on reforms and not on opposition, they dont matter, the reforms matter

he needs to address
1. universal education
2. universal health
3. energy crisis
4. law and order
5. judiciary reforms
6. financial stability
7. growth/jobs through manufacturing, infrastructure and agriculture

this isnt easy but it isnt impossible

Riaz Haq said...

Bennett-Jones, Owen. The Bhutto Dynasty (pp. 238-239). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.


"Perhaps, as some of those closest to her have suggested, Benazir transferred some of her strong feelings for her father onto her husband: Asif Zardari did, after all, take on some of her father’s roles, such looking after the family finances. For Benazir, having large amounts of cash to hand was both a natural state of affairs and a political necessity. If she could not buy the loyalty of her parliamentary supporters, then her opponents would. As another of her political advisers later recalled, ‘Asif’s role became more prominent when she beat back the motion of no confidence. There was some wheeler dealing in that. Some buying of votes. The moment money transactions came into play, Asif was in his element.’7 Asif Zardari has consistently denied any financial malpractice. During her second government, Benazir told an aide that you needed to have $200–300 million to go into an election so that you could fund your candidates and secure their loyalty.8 While many of her advisers gave her plenty of interesting suggestions about what to do, Zardari actually did things, proving himself to be a man she could rely on. His ability to understand what she needed and to do it without fuss or even discussion was the foundation of their relationship"

Bennett-Jones, Owen. The Bhutto Dynasty (p. 239). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Riaz Haq said...

Bennett-Jones, Owen. The Bhutto Dynasty (pp. 222-223). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Their suspicions that Benazir was too close to the US were bolstered when she failed to stop US officials holding direct meetings with mujahideen leaders. Despite strong US objections, Zia had always managed to prevent this, insisting that if Pakistan were to be used as a channel for US military supplies it would have complete control of communications with Islamist commanders. Under Benazir, that degree of control had been lost. The differences between the government and the military spilled over into the National Assembly, where the opposition planned a no-confidence vote for October 1989. The military’s first step was to persuade the MQM to switch sides, which it did just a few weeks before the vote. The PML leader Chaudri Nisar was reported as saying that it was army chief Aslam Beg who delivered these MQM votes to Nawaz Sharif.43 But the MQM leader Altaf Hussain was no longer as important as he used to be. Since the PPP had used its powers of patronage to win over more independent National Assembly members, even with the MQM, the IJI still needed some PPP defectors. In October the Intelligence Bureau, which owed its loyalty to the government, not the military, became aware that senior serving military officers were meeting with the IJI leadership. In a sting that became known as Operation MIDNIGHT JACKAL, it revealed a conspiracy in which one serving and one retired ISI officer attempted to bribe some PPP National Assembly members to switch sides. The Intelligence Bureau managed to record audio and video footage of the secret meetings. According to Benazir, the ISI officer was taped saying ‘The army does not want her, the President does not want her and the Americans don’t want her.’

Riaz Haq said...

The country’s big industries grew at a pace of 5.5% in the first four months of current fiscal year, which is in line with government’s expectations of economic recovery but the index still stands below pre-coronavirus outbreak levels.

https://tribune.com.pk/story/2276112/lsm-grows-55-raising-hopes-of-economic-revival

The Large-Scale Manufacturing (LSM) sector registered a cumulative growth of 5.5% in July-October of current fiscal year, reported the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) on Tuesday.

October was the second successive month when the index grew over the previous month, raising hopes that the momentum could continue in the midst of the second wave of Covid-19 in Pakistan.

Out of 15 major industries, nine sectors again recorded a surge in production while output of six industries contracted in the first four months of current fiscal year compared to the same period of previous year, according to the PBS.

The government expects 2.5% contraction in the LSM sector in the current fiscal year, according to the Annual Plan 2020-21 released by the Ministry of Planning and Development on the eve of federal budget. But the Ministry of Finance’s estimates suggest that instead of contraction, the LSM sector may grow 1.4% in the fiscal year.

Because of better-than-expected output in the industrial and agriculture sectors, the Ministry of Finance now expects economic growth to remain in the range of 2.6% to 2.8% in the current fiscal year - better than the official target of 2.1%. The industrial sector, which was earlier projected to grow only 0.1% by the government, may now grow at a rate of 2.1%.

---
LSM recorded 6.7% year-on-year growth in October but the index was still below pre-coronavirus level of 160.2 points recorded in March this year.

On a yearly basis, the petroleum sector contracted 0.1% in October over the same month of previous year. Provincial bureaus also reported a nominal growth of less than 1% in 11 industries. On a month-on-month basis, the LSM sector showed 3.4% growth in October over September.

Prime Minister Imran Khan won the July 2018 elections on the promise of creating 10 million jobs and constructing five million homes at affordable prices but the promises have remain unfulfilled so far. With the current sluggish economic growth, there will be increase in poverty and unemployment in the remaining tenure of the government.

Pakistan needs 6-7% annual economic growth to reduce poverty and unemployment, according to independent economic experts.

Data collected by the Oil Companies Advisory Committee (OCAC) showed that 11 types of industries registered an average growth of just 0.1% in the first four months of current fiscal year.

The Ministry of Industries, which monitors 15 industries, reported 3.7% growth in the LSM output. Provincial bureaus reported a growth of 1.6% in 11 industries in four months, according to the PBS.

Sectors that posted growth during the July-October period included textile that grew 2.2% and non-metallic mineral products that soared 22.9%.

However, the output of power looms slumped 41.7% in four months, contrary to the media hype generated about utilisation of power looms at full capacity.

The fertiliser sector grew 6% whereas the food, beverages and tobacco group expanded 12.2% in the four-month period under review.

The manufacturing of chemical products increased 9.2%, paper and board 10.4% and rubber products 3.3%. The pharmaceutical sector registered a growth of 13.5% in the July-October period. Output of the coke and petroleum sector increased 1.6%.

Industries that registered a dip in manufacturing included the automobile sector, which saw a contraction of 1.6% but the pace of negative growth slowed down.

Iron and steel production fell 5.4%, electronics 23%, leather products 43%, engineering products 34% and wood products 64% during the July-October period.

Riaz Haq said...

A survey held by Gallup Pakistan has revealed which party is likely to win if elections are held today.



https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/760678-which-party-is-likely-to-win-if-elections-are-held-today



To begin with, a majority of the people (22%) were not sure of what their choice would be



Setting that lot aside, 17% of the people responded by saying they would vote for PTI, 13% said they would support PML-N and 13% picked PPP.

MQM-P were not far behind with 12% of the vote.

JUI-F got 4%, PSP 3%, whereas MMA and independent candidates got 1% of the vote each.

The remaining 13% chose "others" among the options given.

The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews of 535 people taken between October 27 and November 17.

Riaz Haq said...

"Despite these issues, many consider the 1973 constitution to have been Zulfikar’s greatest achievement and credit it with holding West Pakistan together as a single country. It was, by any standards, extraordinary that Zulfikar managed to push it through with no one in the National Assembly voting against it. Mubashir Hassan described how the final hold-out – a cleric – was persuaded to vote in favour with a payoff: ‘The amount was settled and Bhutto described the scene to me how when the fellow came to President’s House to collect the money, Bhutto threw a packet of notes on the floor and ordered him to pick it up. There the man was, moving over the carpet on all fours, picking a bundle from here and a bundle from there. Bhutto was mightily amused.’83 By using all his political skills – bribery included – Zulfikar had made a significant contribution to Pakistan’s national story. ‘The country owes him everything,’ said Hafeez Pirzada, the man who worked on the constitution for Zulfikar, ‘even its continuance as a sovereign country. He was not the founder, but the saviour of the country.’84 It’s a fair point – 1971 was as big a disaster as could be imagined, and Zulfikar dealt with it in a way that it is hard to imagine any other civilian or military leader in the country’s history having been able to do"

Bennett-Jones, Owen. The Bhutto Dynasty (pp. 107-108). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.

Riaz Haq said...

A new book offers riveting and memorable reporting, though it falls back on outdated narratives of a country that has moved on.

https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/05/pakistan-has-problems-but-it-wont-perish-declan-walsh-book-review/

Part of the problem is how far removed much of the book is from the current moment. The “unplanned revolution,” in the words of eminent researcher Arif Hasan, at the intersection of demographic change, urbanization and its attendant economic shifts, and the erosion of traditional structures in Pakistani society were well underway during Walsh’s time in Pakistan. But the political expression of many of these changes, the emergence of the middle class and a post-ethnic politics that would carry Imran Khan to the prime minister’s office in 2018, in particular, was brought into focus in the 2013 election. So it is a shame that Walsh was expelled at that moment, just ahead of a dramatic reduction in violence nationwide that may have allowed for a focus on the understudied structural changes in Pakistan that aren’t easily explained by the well-worn narratives.

-----------

A decade before the arrival of New York Times correspondent Declan Walsh’s The Nine Lives of Pakistan: Dispatches from a Precarious State—which was released in the United States on Nov. 23—another major book of long-form reportage about the country’s chaotic post-9/11 years was published: Nicholas Schmidle’s To Live or to Perish Forever. The two books open with anecdotes of the authors being suddenly ordered to pack their bags and expelled from the country after reporting stories that crossed a red line for Pakistan’s security services—Schmidle for reporting on the Pakistani mutation of the Taliban and Walsh for his coverage of the insurgency in the vast, rural Balochistan province. Walsh’s book comes more than seven years after he was kicked out of Pakistan in May 2013.


In news reporting, most of the work must frustratingly remain in a journalist’s notebook. Walsh draws on these notebooks to write his book, finally able to give previous reporting trips the full literary treatment that they deserve. But it raises the question of whether reporting from Pakistan, some of it nearly 20 years old, gives readers new insights into a uniquely complex society. Walsh himself claims he will take the reader with him, retracing his steps, on a journey “deep into the psyche of the country.”

Walsh’s book is better than Schmidle’s, but the nearly identical opening scenes are a metaphor for a larger problem with writing about Pakistan, an ethnically diverse nation of more than 200 million people that is in constant flux. In the decade between the publication of these two major books of reportage that purport to explain Pakistan, the country itself has grown and evolved rapidly. The Pakistan discourse has still not caught up.

It would be unfair to dismiss Walsh’s efforts. He spent nine years reporting from Pakistan, at least twice as long as a normal foreign correspondent’s tenure. He covers Islamist militancy, radicalization, terrorism; liberal reformers and elite subjects; the military’s reach into domestic politics and foreign policy; and, uniquely for Walsh, the hidden unrest in Balochistan. His lively portraits of a range of Pakistani political figures (almost all of whom are now dead, either through violence or natural causes) are imbued with qualities that only time and experience in a society can produce.

The best chapters are those whose subjects and stories, while famous, are less well known outside of Pakistan, drawn out with new details and anecdotes. Walsh profiles the retired Inter-Services Intelligence officer Sultan Amir Tarar, known as Col. Imam, who was a key field liaison with the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s and then the Afghan Taliban movement in the 1990s. Walsh’s many sessions with the Muslim cold warrior as a source over the years allow him to go behind the screen of the man’s true belief—eventually, inevitably, his demise—and witness moments of disenchantment and doubt.

Riaz Haq said...

Windfall for "NGOs" in #Pakistan: Latest #US #COVIDReliefPackage includes $15 million for "democracy programs" and $10 million for "gender programs" in Pakistan! Is this a shot in the arm for #PDM & other groups destabilizing Pakistan? #NGO https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/covid-19-relief-legislation-pakistan


The lengthy coronavirus relief bill lawmakers agreed upon over the weekend – and are hoping to approve this week – includes a number of lesser-known provisions that have raised some eyebrows.

Among them are a pair of assistance programs in Pakistan, whereby $15 million will be put toward “democracy programs” and $10 million will be distributed to “gender programs.”

Some Twitter users were frustrated about the intent to distribute funds for such purposes in the midst of a pandemic where many American households are struggling to make ends meet.

While it is not made explicitly clear what is meant by “gender programs” in the legislation, gender equality is a central component to development in the country, according to the United Nations Population Fund.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) website also states that it works with Pakistan to improve women’s access to economic opportunities, increase girls’ access to education, improve maternal and child health, combat gender-based violence, and increase women’s political and civic participation in Pakistan.

Pakistan ranks the second lowest country in the world for gender equality.

The relief legislation was attached to a broader omnibus spending bill lawmakers were looking to approve to avert a government shutdown.

Anonymous said...

Good time, with the PDM in complete shambles, to once again share my favourite quote from the TV series Homeland. "Don't go to war with your own national security establishment. It's a war you won't win."

https://twitter.com/AsharJawad/status/1343960929206206465?s=20

Riaz Haq said...

‘Homeland,’ Season 6, Episode 10: The Facts vs. What People Want to Believe




There’s a lot to sort through and digest this week, so let’s jump right in:

Dar Adal has declared war. 

Not that he hadn’t, by other means, before. But now it’s overt. “Don’t go to war with your own national security establishment,” he has intoned. “It’s a war you won’t win.”


https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/26/arts/television/homeland-recap-season-6-episode-10.html


Riaz Haq said...

#Pakistan arrests 24 people over demolition of #Hindu temple in #Karak. According to police and witnesses, the mob was led by Shareef and supporters of radical Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam led by #PDM chief Maulana Fazlur Rehman. #PPP #PMLN #KarakAttack https://news.yahoo.com/pakistan-arrests-14-people-over-063134256.html?soc_src=social-sh&soc_trk=tw&tsrc=twtr

Pakistani police arrested 24 people in overnight raids after a Hindu temple was set on fire and demolished by a mob led by supporters of a radical Islamist party, officials said Thursday.

Meanwhile, dozens of Hindus rallied in the southern port city of Karachi to demand the rebuilding of their place of worship.

The temple's destruction Wednesday in the northwestern town of Karak also drew condemnation from human rights activists and leaders of Pakistan's minority Hindu community.

Local police said they detained 24 people overnight and more raids were underway to arrest radical cleric Maulana Shareef and other individuals who participated or provoked the mob to demolish the temple.

The attack happened after members of the Hindu community received permission from local authorities to renovate the temple. According to police and witnesses, the mob was led by Shareef and supporters of Pakistan's radical Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam party,

Angered over the attack, about 100 members of the Hindu community rallied in Karachi. Among them was Ramesh Kumar, a member of the National Assembly, the lower house of Parliament.

Kumar, also a Hindu leader, told demonstrators he received assurances from the government that their temple would be rebuilt and that those responsible for the attack would be arrested and punished.

Kumar said he received a call from Prime Minister Imran Khan and Khan expressed his sympathy. He said Khan assured him all steps will be taken to ensure the protection of minorities and their places of worship.

Kumar said Pakistan's Supreme Court had sought a report from authorities about the attack, which also damaged a shrine located next to the temple. “We are very sad, our hearts are broken," he said.

Kumar said the same temple had been damaged in 1997 and local clerics linked to Wednesday's attack had also incited Muslims previously. He claimed that Shareef, the local cleric who led the attack, had fled with armed men in tow and authorities ordered troops to capture them.

Earlier, Pakistan’s minister for religious affairs, Noorul Haq Qadri, called the attack on the temple “a conspiracy against sectarian harmony." He took to Twitter Thursday, saying attacks on places of worship of minority religious groups are not allowed in Islam and “protection of religious freedom of minorities is our religious, constitutional, moral and national responsibility."

The incident comes weeks after the government allowed Hindu residents to build a new temple in Islamabad on the recommendation of a council of clerics.

Although Muslims and Hindus generally live peacefully together in Pakistan, there have been other attacks on Hindu temples in recent years. Most of Pakistan’s minority Hindus migrated to India in 1947 when India was divided by Britain’s government.

Riaz Haq said...

Crisis of #Pakistani #democracy. Most of these dynastic political groups have actively collaborated with successive #military regimes in order to protect their vested interests and receive state patronage. #PPP #PMLN #PDM #Bhutto #Zardari #NawazSharif https://www.dawn.com/news/1598642


A number of political parties that form the PDM have been in power in the past and some of them still have strong stakes in the current engineered system. Each one has played the establishment’s game in the past to protect its own interests and may be willing to do so again.

While refusing to talk to the PTI government, some of the alliance leaders appear ready to negotiate with the security agencies. Back-room contacts never cease. It is not surprising that the PDM is divided on the issue of resigning from parliament. One can also understand the PPP’s refusal to give up the Sindh government as such a move could sound the death knell for the party whose political clout is restricted to the province.

For over 70 years, the country has alternated between authoritarian military regimes and ineffective elected civilian rule. But there have been no fundamental changes to Pakistan’s political power structure. A small power elite has dominated the country’s political scene under civilian as well as military rule.

The extractive nature of the state’s institutions has prevented the country from embarking on a path of economic and political progress. Despite the economic and social changes that have occurred over the past seven decades, the stranglehold of family-oriented politics remains. A limited number of influential families continue to control Pakistani legislatures.

A sense of dynastic entitlement dominates the country’s political culture impeding the development of institutional democracy. With few exceptions, political parties are an extension of powerful families with hereditary leaders. There is no concept of intra-party democracy. The only change is the transfer of leadership from one generation to the next.

Over the years, families from urban, religious and military backgrounds have also emerged on the political scene, but this has not changed Pakistan’s personalised and dynastic political culture. Studies show that a few hundred families have monopolised the political scene in Pakistan. Interestingly, hereditary politics have been stren­gthened under successive military governments.

Dynastic control has dire implications for our political and economic institutions. It reduces the legitimacy of a government, impacts the quality of government policies, promotes patronage and corruption and has negative consequences through the selection effect.

Most of these dynastic political groups have actively collaborated with successive military regimes in order to protect their vested interests and receive state patronage. The control of a narrow oligarchic elite and the patriarchal political system have impeded critical structural reforms that are needed for sustainable economic development and to strengthen democratic and economic institutions.