Tuesday, August 30, 2016

History of US-India Partnership

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's decision to skip the upcoming Non-Aligned Summit in Venezuela sends a powerful signal of his Hindu Nationalist government's growing commitment to India's partnership with the United States.

The latest logistics deal allowing the US forces to use Indian military bases is an indication of how the Americans intend to play the India card against China after the Cold War,  just as they played the China card against the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The US-India deal is part of the  US “pivot” to Asia designed to check rising China. The U.S. Navy plans to deploy 60 percent of its surface ships in Asia in the near future. Instead of having to build facilities virtually from the ground up, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. has the benefit of simple arrangements for the tremendous Indian facilities, according to Forbes magazine. This deal will accelerate the unfolding post Col-War realignment taking place in South Asia.

Massive Western Aid to India:

US-India ties are not new. India has been the number one recipient of US aid since 1947, according to the US government data.   The country India's first Prime Minister turned to for help during the 1962 China-India war was also the United States.



India has received $65.1 billion in US aid since its independence, making it the top recipient of American economic assistance. Pakistan, with its $44.4 billion, is at number 5 on the list.  US data also shows that Pakistan is not among top 10 for military or total economic and military aid.



More recently, the US aid to India has been replaced by massive US investment in the country that keeps its economy afloat. Massive western money inflows help India, with its huge trade deficits, pay for its imports and help maintain significant foreign exchange reserves. U.S. investment in India has jumped 500% in the past two years, according to the Wall Street Journal.

US Help in 1962 Indo-China War:

Indian Prime Minister Nehru sought significant US material aid and diplomatic help as the Indian troops were in full retreat in the 1962 China-India war.  A former US intelligence official Bruce Riedel in his book "JFK’s Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA and the Sino-Indian War" notes that President John F. Kennedy played a “decisive role” in “forestalling a Pakistani attack” on India, even as Islamabad then was fully capable of going to war with India to wrest the disputed territory of Kashmir.

India's Pakistan Obsession:

The US efforts to partner with India are clearly aimed to check China's rise. However, India's actions and statements suggest that it expects to use this partnership to against Pakistan.

Anticipating questions about US-Pakistan ties during his India visit, here's what Carter told Council of Foreign Relation in Washington D.C. before leaving for New Delhi:

“I’m sure I’ll be asked about it in India, but I think the first thing one needs to say from an American policy point of view, these (India and Pakistan) are both respected partners and friends.”

"Pakistan is an important security partner", Carter added.

Pakistan-China Ties: 

While US is courting India to check China's rise, the China-Pakistan ties have now moved well beyond “higher than Himalayas and sweeter than honey,” as officials on both sides say. Chinese strategists openly talk of Pakistan as their nation’s only real ally. And China is investing heavily in Pakistan to build the Gwadar deep sea port as part of a much more ambitious and strategic China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) that India is attempting sabotage.

The result is that Pakistan is drawing closer to China, a rising superpower, while its rival India is partnering with the United States, a superpower in relative decline on the world stage.

Let me conclude with a quote from from Brookings' Stephen Cohen on India-Pakistan power equation:

“One of the most important puzzles of India-Pakistan relations is not why the smaller Pakistan feels encircled and threatened, but why the larger India does. It would seem that India, seven times more populous than Pakistan and five times its size, and which defeated Pakistan in 1971, would feel more secure. This has not been the case and Pakistan remains deeply embedded in Indian thinking. There are historical, strategic, ideological, and domestic reasons why Pakistan remains the central obsession of much of the Indian strategic community, just as India remains Pakistan’s.”

Here's a video discussion on the subject:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6sfliv7KJVM




http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x45590s_pak-leaders-in-london-us-india-defense-deals-trump-vs-gop_news



Pak Leaders in London; US-India Defense Deals... by ViewpointFromOverseas

https://vimeo.com/163190180


Pak Leaders in London; US-India Defense Deals; Trump vs GOP from Ikolachi on Vimeo.



Related Links:

Haq's Musings

India's Pakistan Obsession

Can India Survive Without Wester Money?

India's Superpower Delusion: Modi's Policy Blunders

Does Pakistan Really Need F-16s to Fight Terror? 

Pakistan-Russia-China vs India-Japan-US?

China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

Gwadar: Hong Kong West for China?

Indian Agent Kulbhushan Yadav's Confession

44 comments:

Iqbal Singh said...

In this logistics agreement, what questions regarding Pakistan were asked by the Indian Minister officially? I know the media asked some questions too but I hope you are not referring to those.

Riaz Haq said...

Singh: "what questions regarding Pakistan were asked by the Indian Minister officially?"

Manohar Parrikar is a Pakistan-bashing Muslim-hating Hindu Nationalist to the core.

Pakistan is always on Parrikar's mind, regardless of any deals or occasions, including signing the US-India partnership in Washington DC.

He recently compared Pakistan with hell, saying going to Pakistan is like going to hell.

Addressing a joint news conference with US defence secretary Ashton Carter at the Pentagon, Parrikar alleged that “forces from across the border” are trying to spread violence in the Valley. “As far as Kashmir is concerned, I think the government of India has been very proactive. A few small percentage is holding the majority to ransom,” he said.

Anonymous said...

FACT SHEET: The United States and Pakistan – a Strong and Enduring Relationship

President Barack Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama hosted Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and First Lady Kalsoom Nawaz Sharif at the White House on October 22, 2015. Their visit reinforced the commitment of both leaders to an enduring U.S.-Pakistan partnership, a prosperous Pakistan, and a more stable region. The two leaders expressed their conviction that a resilient U.S.-Pakistan partnership is vital to regional and global security and reaffirmed their commitment to address evolving challenges in South Asia and beyond. Since enactment of the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (“Kerry-Lugar-Berman” or “KLB”), the United States has committed $5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan and over $1 billion in emergency humanitarian response to disasters and conflict, including for 2010 flood relief. Security assistance has also strengthened cooperation on key national security interests. Building on KLB, the leaders committed to fostering a deeper, stronger, more multi-dimensional partnership to cooperatively tackle the global challenges of the 21st century. The leaders highlighted the following areas of U.S. cooperation:

Energy and Economic Growth

Energy: Since 2009, the U.S. Government helped add approximately 1,700 megawatts (MW) of electricity to Pakistan’s grid system, benefitting nearly 19 million Pakistanis. U.S. assistance funded the construction and rehabilitation of a number of hydropower dams and thermal power plants. U.S. assistance has also helped Pakistan improve governance and management systems, and increase revenue collection – by over $200 million in 2015– as well as provide commercial opportunities for U.S. businesses. Efforts also include Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) debt financing and political risk insurance that support U.S. investments in Pakistan. Additionally, U.S. business played an important role in facilitating Pakistan’s access to international liquefied natural gas (LNG) markets earlier this year. The new U.S.-Pakistan Clean Energy Partnership (USCEP) will help the private sector add at least 3,000 MW of clean power generation infrastructure to Pakistan’s national electricity system over the next five years.

Bilateral Trade and Investment: The United States and Pakistan will expand cooperation on the 2013 Joint Action Plan on Trade and Investment. The United States remains Pakistan’s largest bilateral export market and a significant source of foreign direct investment. In March 2015, during U.S.-Pakistan Economic Partnership Week, the first U.S.-Pakistan Business Opportunities Conference held in Islamabad was headlined by U.S. Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker and Pakistani Finance Minister Ishaq Dar. To promote private investment, OPIC has facilitated $800 million in financing and insurance for projects in Pakistan. Trade and investment assistance is provided under the bilateral Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).

Regional Connectivity

Private Sector Financing and Entrepreneurship

Agriculture

Support in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)

Women’s Economic Advancement

Education, Health, and Civil Society Cooperation

People-to-People Exchanges

Higher Education

Science and Technology Agreement

University Partnerships

University Governance

Basic Education

Let Girls Learn

English Language Programs

Civil Society and Democratic Institutions

Health Cooperation

Countering Evolving Threats

Civilian Law Enforcement and Rule of Law

Security Assistance

Military Training and Exchanges

Countering Violent Extremism

Improvised Explosive Devices

https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/10/22/fact-sheet-united-states-and-pakistan-%E2%80%93-strong-and-enduring-relationship

Nitin B said...

What is not clear from your write up is the military aid to Pakistan since 1947. Not counting that, India being six times the size has received only 1.5 times the economic aid to Pakistan. $62b versus $44b

Zhong Lee, Baltimore said...

China is not stupid. India is a big market and exports to India will reach $ 80 billion in 2016. China is very pro business and we like to be friends and do trade then discuss problems later. That is the Chinese culture.

Riaz Haq said...

NBRX: "What is not clear from your write up is the military aid to Pakistan since 1947. Not counting that, India being six times the size has received only 1.5 times the economic aid to Pakistan. $62b versus $44b"

The point of the post is to debunk the myth that US was hostile to India during the Cold War.

US not only gave aid but so much aid to India to make it the largest recipient.

Whatever military aid US gave Pakistan is not enough to put Pakistan among the top ten recipients of US military aid, as obvious from the graphic.

As India was losing its territory to China fast and suffering heavy casualty, Nehru in a letter to Kennedy in November 1962 said India needed “air transport and jet fighters to stem the Chinese tide of aggression.”
“A lot more effort, both from us and from our friends will be required.” Nehru wrote another letter to Kennedy in quick succession, Riedel writes.
This letter written by Nehru in a state of panicky was hand delivered by the then Indian Ambassador to the US B K
Nehru to Kennedy on November 19.
“Nehru was thus asking Kennedy to join the war against China by partnering in an air war to defeat the PLA (Peoples Liberation Army of China). It was a momentous request that the Indian Prime Minister was making. Just a decade after American forces had reached a ceasefire with the Chinese Community Forces in Korea, India was asking JFK to join a new war against Community China,” Riedel wrote in his book.

In the letter, Nehru asked for 12 squadrons of US air forces, Riedel told the Washington audience during the preview of the book at an event organised by the Brookings Institute – a top American think-tank – yesterday.
“A minimum of 12 squadrons of supersonic all weather fighters are essential. We have no modern radar cover in the country. The United States Air Force personnel will have to man these fighters and radar installations while our personnel are being trained,” Nehru wrote in the letter, which has been quoted by Riedel in the book.
In addition, Nehru also requested “two squadron of B-47 Bombers” to strike in Tibet, the author says quoting the letter.
In the letter, Nehru assured Kennedy that these bombers would not be used against Pakistan, but only for “resistance against the Chinese”.
The stakes were “not merely the survival of India”, Nehru told Kennedy “but the survival of free and independent Governments in the whole of this subcontinent or in Asia”.
Riedel said in the second letter Nehru was, in fact, asking Kennedy for some 350 combat aircraft and crews: 12 squadrons of fighter aircraft and crews: 12 squadron of fighter aircraft with 24 jets in each and two bomber
squadrons.
“At least 10,000 personnel would be needed to staff and operate jets, provide radar support and conduct logistical support for the operation,” Riedel said adding this was a substantial forces, large enough to make it a numbered air force in the American order of battle.
The British Prime Minister received a similar letter from Nehru, the American scholar writes. Referring to the subsequent instructions passed by Kennedy to his administration, Riedel described them as the one that of a president preparing for war.
But before the US would take further steps, China announced unilateral ceasefire. After making major advances and being in a strong position to annex entire of North East and reach as far as Kolkata, the Chinese leadership surprised the world by announcing a unilateral ceasefire fearing that both Britain and the United State were getting ready to provide material support to India in the war.
“Of course, we will never know what the specifics of American assistance to India would have been if the war continues,” he wrote in the book set to be officially released in the first week of November.
“We can be reasonably certain that America, India and probably Great Britain would have been at war together with China,” Riedel concludes.


http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jawaharlal-nehru-sought-us-assistance-during-1962-indo-china-war/

Riaz Haq said...

ZL: "China is very pro business and we like to be friends and do trade then discuss problems later. That is the Chinese culture."

China also has a long history of building a wall when its national security is threatened....not just any wall, but The Great Wall.


The US-India deal allows US to use Indian military bases to threaten Chinese interests, particularly its sea lanes in South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

NO matter how large a market any country might be, the Chinese national security is a much bigger concern for Beijing.

Ahmed F. said...

How about US military aid to India versus Pakistan? What are the dollars involved?

In terms of economic aid, India's larger size has to be factored in.

And if your overall thesis is correct, then why has Pakistan clung to the US for so long? It could find no one else? It could not stand on its own two feet? And why did it think that the US would come to its aid during the wars of 1965 and 1971?

Everything changed after India's China War in 1962, in terms of US interest in India versus Pakistan.

The naïveté in Rawalpindi was astounding. The generals continued to live in denial.

Now they are equally excited about China.

Along the way they were excited about the Saudi's.

Riaz Haq said...

Ahmad F: "How about US military aid to India versus Pakistan? What are the dollars involved? "

You are asking the wrong wrong question.

India's main arms supplier was the Soviet Union.

So the right question is whether the Soviet military aid to India made India the top recipient of Soviet military aid. And did the Soviet mil aid to India dwarf US mil aid to Pakistan?

http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00006

http://www.bannedthought.net/India/CPI(ML)-Orig/Liberation/1967-Nov/SovietAidToIndia-671100.pdf


US military aid to Pakistan is often played up by liberals like you but the fact is that Pakistan does not figure even in the top 10 US military aid recipients.

Also read my last comment here about Riedel's book on Nehru's massive aid request to Kennedy in 1962.

http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jawaharlal-nehru-sought-us-assistance-during-1962-indo-china-war/

Jon said...

Learning from history, as an American, in the post Cold War post 9/11 era, India is a better long term partner even without South China Sea issues

r_sundar said...

India and the US are natural allies. You don't need oil or strategic locations etched etc. It is only getting cemented even more, with the dynamic Indian American diaspora. We will see an Indian American president within the next 20 years.

Riaz Haq said...

sundar: "India and the US are natural allies."

How?

US elected a black president in 2008 and 2012. In 2014, India elected Modi, described as the equivalent of KKK wizard by pro-India Christine Fair. I'd say the electorates in the two countries are diametrically opposed.

http://www.riazhaq.com/2015/03/dr-christine-fair-compares-indias-bjp.html

Riaz Haq said...

Jon: "India is a better long term partner even without South China Sea issues"


There's no such thing as "better long term partner" for US policymakers.

As Henry Kissinger put it, “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.”

http://www.riazhaq.com/2015/04/post-cold-war-line-up-pakistan-china.html

Nitin B said...

As Henry Kissinger put it, “America has no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.”

That policy of yesteryears has become obsolete. I don't know why so many are still stuck in the Cold War mindset. Policy is now driven more by economics, trade and free-world democratic ideals.

r_sundar said...

Who cares what Christine or whoever has to say....unlike the toothless leaders of the past India finally has a true leader!
Well Henry Kissinger is wrong. No matter what Israel does, US will be its ally. And so will become India.

Anonymous said...

@r_sundar

Well people like Christine and Kissinger advise people that shape US foreign policy,unlike a random internet crybaby like you that amounts to nothing.

r_sundar said...

Me a random cry baby??
Just look at your self in the mirror. Don't even have the guts to reveal your identity, and remaining anaonymous. Looser.

Riaz Haq said...

#Pakistan in Talks With #Russia to Purchase Su-35 fighter Jets for #PAF http://sputniknews.com/military/20160905/1044975853/pakistan-russia-ambassador-su35.html … via @SputnikInt

Pakistan Air Force Chief of Staff had fruitful talks in Moscow in July on purchasing of Russian Su-35 fighter jets.

MOSCOW (Sputnik) — Chief of Air Staff of the Pakistan Air Force Sohail Aman had "fruitful talks" in Moscow in July on purchasing of Russian Su-35 (NATO reporting name: Flanker-E) fighter jets, Pakistani Ambassador to Russia Qazi Khalilullah told Sputnik. "Chief of Air Staff Marshal Sohail Aman had fruitful talks with the Russian partners on this issue in July," Khalilullah said answering a question on whether Islamabad could purchase the Su-35 aircraft. According to the official, the Pakistani Air Force "is considering different options of deepening cooperation with Russia."

Read more: http://sputniknews.com/military/20160905/1044975853/pakistan-russia-ambassador-su35.html

Anonymous said...

Riazhaq commented 'The US-India deal allows US to use Indian military bases to threaten Chinese interests, particularly its sea lanes in South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. '

This makes no sense. If the US wants to increase presence in South China sea then it can use the large bases it already has in Japan, South Korea & Philippines.

The US also has a very large base in the middle of the Indian Ocean called Diego Garcia. So India is not of much use there either.

As for the Arabian sea, the US already has large bases in the GCC countries and does not need India.

So what is this new arrangement going to do for the US?

As far as I can see, the only Indian base of value to the US is the Andaman & Nicobar naval station because the Malacca strait is where the US would like to create a new choke-point for China.

Apart from this, the US does not need anything from India and India has nothing of value to offer the US in terms of strategic basing rights.

Anonymous said...

....The Americans intend to play the India card against China after the Cold War, just as they played the China card against the Soviet Union during the Cold War......

.......The result is that Pakistan is drawing closer to China, a rising superpower, while its rival India is partnering with the United States, a superpower in relative decline on the world stage..........

This was the Cold war arrangement:
A) The US used China to balance against the USSR.
B) The USSR used India to balance against China.

So what is the new arrangement?
A) The US will use India to balance against China
B) China will use Pakistan to balance against India.

Comparing the two, we can see the following:
1) The US remains the same.
2) China is the new USSR.
3) India is the new China.
4) Pakistan is the new India.

Is this something for us to celebrate? Being the new India? Are you serious?

Wasn't everybody saying in the 60s & 70s that the USSR was the "rising superpower" while the US was "a superpower in relative decline"? How did that turn out?

Riaz Haq said...

Anon: "Wasn't everybody saying in the 60s & 70s that the USSR was the "rising superpower" while the US was "a superpower in relative decline"? How did that turn out?"

China and Soviet Union are fundamentally very different.

1. Soviet Union's economy was always very small compared to the US economy. Chinese economy is the 2nd largest today and will soon surpass the US economy to claim #1 spot.

2. Soviet Union was economically isolated by the West. It had very little trade. China's trade volume now exceeds that of the United States.

3. China is now the world's biggest investor and the biggest lender in the world, including the West.

4. China is setting up international institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and many of the top US allies have joined it as a member over US objections.

5. Chinese Yuan is now recognized by the IMF as an international reserve currency.

Riaz Haq said...

BOOK EXCERPT "The Nation Declassified"
Five declassified secrets reveal India’s moves with global superpowers during the Cold War
A new book examines files no longer classified as top secret.


The Nation Declassified reveals the secret history of how India’s Prime Ministers, their closest advisers, diplomats, intelligence agencies and military led the nation through the transformation of world order in the cold war era. Uncovering thousands of pages of top secret declassified documentation from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of External Affairs, the Department of Atomic Energy, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Intelligence Committee, the Cabinet Secretariat R&AW Reports, supplemented with extensive interviews, the book provides a glimpse of the functioning of the Indian state in protecting its interests during the Cold War.

President Kennedy, US and Kashmir
TT Krishnamachari, Minister in the Jawaharlal Nehru Cabinet met with President Kennedy after 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. TTK conveyed to JFK that India cannot take ad-hoc decision on Kashmir as this would not be acceptable to the Indian people. TTK also states that in talks with Ayub prior to the 1962 conflict, in course of the third round “we were prepared to alter the international boundary”. (Tape, 1963) He added that “personally, I am prepared to go even further”. (Tape, 1963)

In 1964, Ambassador Chester Bowles XE "Chester Bowles" met TN Kaul in Moscow XE "Moscow" and spoke of his visit to Kashmir and placed a “proposal” to the Indian Envoy on Kashmir presumably, as a result of the US Envoy’s discussion with Sheikh Abdullah. According to Bowles, Sheikh Abdullah’s participation in elections of 1965 XE "1965" on basis of Kashmir’s accession to India could be secured if India provided special status to the Valley. TN Kaul did not comment or respond to the proposal. (MEA, India-Pakistan-USA Relations, 1963.)

Nehru-Ayub Khan Talks
PM Nehru wrote in a “Note” from Cabinet Secretariat dated 21 October 1960 when President Ayub told him that he “wanted to talk to me about Kashmir”. (Krishnamachari.) Both heads of state agreed to speak privately while the advisors were asked to wait outside. Ayub put to Nehru the question of reaching a settlement between him and Nehru while both were still holding their positions because “a settlement might become much more difficult later on”. (Krishnamachari.)

Nehru stressed on a realistic approach. He put forward his approach as “accepting the position as it was” with partial adjustments. Ayub “went on repeating” that the cease fire was an “ad-hoc” position brought on by military conflict. (Krishnamachari.) In regard to Kashmir, the MEA XE "MEA" “Kashmir Unit” has a copy of a draft agreement of some sort based on distribution of areas with territory above Chenab and Chandar-Bhaga excluding Kashmir Valley to be with Pakistan XE "Pakistan" ; Kashmir Valley including Kargil as semi-independent areas with Joint administration by India XE "India" and Pakistan for five years; at the end of five years there may be no plebiscite if there is mutual consent between India and Pakistan. It is unclear as to what the source point of this draft is.

Chinese Air Threat after 1962
The report by Mountbatten gives a stark picture of overwhelming Chinese offensive capability in softening India before any negotiations. The talks between Prime Minister and Mountbatten in 1963 reveal that there was an assessment that Chinese MIG-19s could air raid on an “axis nearer to Delhi with a view to causing uneasiness in the capital and bringing pressure on the Government to negotiate on Chinese terms”. (Krishnamachari, Subject File 27, 1963.)


http://scroll.in/article/819603/five-declassified-secrets-reveal-indias-moves-with-global-superpowers-during-the-cold-war

Riaz Haq said...

BOOK EXCERPT "The Nation Declassified"
Five declassified secrets reveal India’s moves with global superpowers during the Cold War
A new book examines files no longer classified as top secret.


Emergency and Cold War
Both US and USSR extended support and understanding to Indira Gandhi during the Emergency period. USSR did so because their leadership had developed a sort of personal bond with her and her advisers as well as her direction of policy whereas US could do very little and also India did not quite interest them in this decade of détente as much as it had during 1962-63 when cold war was still in the phase of direct confrontation between the two superpowers.

In talks with Kissinger XE "Kissinger" , the “Emergency” was explained by Indian officials as aimed at extra constitutional challenge “by a motley group of reactionary elements belonging to extreme left and right including communal and sectarian elements”. (MEA, FM-US visit, 1976.) State Department XE "State Department" Officials even acknowledged that economic growth had been good even after announcement of Emergency.

Records of discussions tell us of a meeting between DP Dhar XE "DP Dhar" and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko XE "Gromyko" at Moscow XE "Moscow" on 10 February 1975. (MEA, Indo Soviet Relations, 1975.) DP Dhar XE "Dhar" explained internal politics in India XE "India" wherein “neo-fascist and reactionary groups” were taking political advantage of the economic situation. All right wing strands had joined the Jayaprakash Narayan movement. He said that the PM was confident about the elections which were to be held in a year’s time.

Discussions between Kewal Singh XE "Kewal Singh" and Firyubin on November 25 touched upon the domestic situation in India on the declaration of Emergency, XE "Emergency" which included detaining of “some leaders indulging in anti-patriotic activities”. (MEA, Indo-Soviet Consultation, 1975.) According to the brief, the Soviets were given the explanation that Emergency had “reinvigorated national discipline, enthusiasm and devotion to duty”. (MEA, 1975.) It had also discredited and exposed the “extreme right and extreme left”.

The Foreign Secretary stated that the Emergency had prevented a situation such as that in Bangladesh XE "Bangladesh" from coming about in India. The Government had used Emergency measures to consolidate and strengthen the socialist policies within the 20-point economic agenda. Kewal Singh described the Emergency as “a very courageous decision by the Prime Minister XE "Prime Minister" ”. (MEA, 1975.)

Firyubin conveyed “whole-hearted support” to the Indian Government and “the real meaning of democracy means that government should work for the interest of the people…that kind of democracy was real democracy”. Firyubin also added that “we highly appreciate her courage”. (MEA, Indo-Soviet Consultation, 1975.) In the garb of democracy, leaders were engaging in undemocratic activities and undermining democracy and “the (Emergency) measures taken by your Prime Minister are a bright chapter in the history XE "history" of India”. (MEA, Indo-Soviet Consultation.) He described the Jana Sangh as a fascist group.

PM Morarji Desai’s visit to the Soviet Union
In his meeting with LI Brezhnev XE "Brezhnev" at the Kremlin on June 12, 1979, Morarji Desai began with China XE "China" , and criticised Nehru XE "Nehru" as having “made a mistake of recognising in 1950 Chinese suzerainty over Tibet”. (Record of Discussions, 1979.) Brezhnev thought that India XE "India" must be prepared defensively as “there may be an unpleasant surprise in store”. (Record of Discussions, 1979.)



http://scroll.in/article/819603/five-declassified-secrets-reveal-indias-moves-with-global-superpowers-during-the-cold-war

Riaz Haq said...

BOOK EXCERPT "The Nation Declassified"
Five declassified secrets reveal India’s moves with global superpowers during the Cold War
A new book examines files no longer classified as top secret.


Chinese Air Threat after 1962
The report by Mountbatten gives a stark picture of overwhelming Chinese offensive capability in softening India before any negotiations. The talks between Prime Minister and Mountbatten in 1963 reveal that there was an assessment that Chinese MIG-19s could air raid on an “axis nearer to Delhi with a view to causing uneasiness in the capital and bringing pressure on the Government to negotiate on Chinese terms”. (Krishnamachari, Subject File 27, 1963.)

In such an “axis attack” the Chinese would use as many as 180 jet bombers XE "bombers" , 50 light bombers, 60 piston light with a total of 150 sorties a day. Jet light bombers could undertake tactical attack NEFA XE "NEFA" and Ladakh-Kashmir XE "Kashmir" -Jammu areas while “by day launch strategic jet light bombers against cities in Northern India including Calcutta XE "Calcutta" ”. (Krishnamachari, Subject File 27, 1963.)

Emergency and Cold War
Both US and USSR extended support and understanding to Indira Gandhi during the Emergency period. USSR did so because their leadership had developed a sort of personal bond with her and her advisers as well as her direction of policy whereas US could do very little and also India did not quite interest them in this decade of détente as much as it had during 1962-63 when cold war was still in the phase of direct confrontation between the two superpowers.

In talks with Kissinger XE "Kissinger" , the “Emergency” was explained by Indian officials as aimed at extra constitutional challenge “by a motley group of reactionary elements belonging to extreme left and right including communal and sectarian elements”. (MEA, FM-US visit, 1976.) State Department XE "State Department" Officials even acknowledged that economic growth had been good even after announcement of Emergency.

Records of discussions tell us of a meeting between DP Dhar XE "DP Dhar" and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko XE "Gromyko" at Moscow XE "Moscow" on 10 February 1975. (MEA, Indo Soviet Relations, 1975.) DP Dhar XE "Dhar" explained internal politics in India XE "India" wherein “neo-fascist and reactionary groups” were taking political advantage of the economic situation. All right wing strands had joined the Jayaprakash Narayan movement. He said that the PM was confident about the elections which were to be held in a year’s time.

Discussions between Kewal Singh XE "Kewal Singh" and Firyubin on November 25 touched upon the domestic situation in India on the declaration of Emergency, XE "Emergency" which included detaining of “some leaders indulging in anti-patriotic activities”. (MEA, Indo-Soviet Consultation, 1975.) According to the brief, the Soviets were given the explanation that Emergency had “reinvigorated national discipline, enthusiasm and devotion to duty”. (MEA, 1975.) It had also discredited and exposed the “extreme right and extreme left”.



http://scroll.in/article/819603/five-declassified-secrets-reveal-indias-moves-with-global-superpowers-during-the-cold-war

Riaz Haq said...

BOOK EXCERPT "The Nation Declassified"
Five declassified secrets reveal India’s moves with global superpowers during the Cold War
A new book examines files no longer classified as top secret.


Discussions between Kewal Singh XE "Kewal Singh" and Firyubin on November 25 touched upon the domestic situation in India on the declaration of Emergency, XE "Emergency" which included detaining of “some leaders indulging in anti-patriotic activities”. (MEA, Indo-Soviet Consultation, 1975.) According to the brief, the Soviets were given the explanation that Emergency had “reinvigorated national discipline, enthusiasm and devotion to duty”. (MEA, 1975.) It had also discredited and exposed the “extreme right and extreme left”.

The Foreign Secretary stated that the Emergency had prevented a situation such as that in Bangladesh XE "Bangladesh" from coming about in India. The Government had used Emergency measures to consolidate and strengthen the socialist policies within the 20-point economic agenda. Kewal Singh described the Emergency as “a very courageous decision by the Prime Minister XE "Prime Minister" ”. (MEA, 1975.)

Firyubin conveyed “whole-hearted support” to the Indian Government and “the real meaning of democracy means that government should work for the interest of the people…that kind of democracy was real democracy”. Firyubin also added that “we highly appreciate her courage”. (MEA, Indo-Soviet Consultation, 1975.) In the garb of democracy, leaders were engaging in undemocratic activities and undermining democracy and “the (Emergency) measures taken by your Prime Minister are a bright chapter in the history XE "history" of India”. (MEA, Indo-Soviet Consultation.) He described the Jana Sangh as a fascist group.

PM Morarji Desai’s visit to the Soviet Union
In his meeting with LI Brezhnev XE "Brezhnev" at the Kremlin on June 12, 1979, Morarji Desai began with China XE "China" , and criticised Nehru XE "Nehru" as having “made a mistake of recognising in 1950 Chinese suzerainty over Tibet”. (Record of Discussions, 1979.) Brezhnev thought that India XE "India" must be prepared defensively as “there may be an unpleasant surprise in store”. (Record of Discussions, 1979.)

Brezhnev conveyed to Desai that he had discussed India’s defence requirements XE "defense requirements" with Ustinov XE "Ustinov" (Soviet Minister of Defence) and recommended that 2 billion rouble worth of equipment be transferred to India. Desai brought up the issue of Pakistan XE "Pakistan" “trying to make nuclear XE "nuclear" weapons and carry out nuclear explosions” and he had raised this matter with the Pakistan President, who for his part denied any such plan. (Record of Discussions, 1979.)



http://scroll.in/article/819603/five-declassified-secrets-reveal-indias-moves-with-global-superpowers-during-the-cold-war

Riaz Haq said...


BOOK EXCERPT "The Nation Declassified"
Five declassified secrets reveal India’s moves with global superpowers during the Cold War
A new book examines files no longer classified as top secret.


At this point, Samoteikin spoke of the USSR XE "USSR" having “unconfirmed reports that they (Pakistan) are trying to build a uranium XE "uranium" enrichment XE "enrichment" plant but we have no report to say that they are attempting to have any bomb XE "bomb" ”. (Record of Discussions, 1979.) In response to the Indian PM’s talking about troubles in Iran XE "Iran" and fanatical elements in Pakistan and Afghanistan XE "Afghanistan" , Brezhnev said “the devil alone knows”. (Record of Discussions, 1979.)

The same day Desai held talks with Prime Minister XE "Prime Minister" AN Kosygin XE "Kosygin" at the Hall of Receptions. Desai placed the request for 200 tons of heavy water XE "heavy water" for RAPP XE "RAPP" . Kosygin replied that “I can immediately say yes….we will satisfy your request.” (Record of Discussions, 1979.) Kosygin remarked that these 200 tons requirement were in addition to the 205 tons already supplied to India XE "India" by the Soviet Union XE "Soviet Union" . Kosygin said that Soviet Union could supply 80 tons in 1980 and 50-60 tons every year thereafter. He informed Desai that he had accepted the Indian request for Soviet assistance in uranium XE "uranium" exploration, and a Soviet team was had already been selected for visiting India. Mention was also made of the Soviet rocket that had been used to launch Indian satellite XE "satellite" in June 1979.

http://scroll.in/article/819603/five-declassified-secrets-reveal-indias-moves-with-global-superpowers-during-the-cold-war

Riaz Haq said...

Aid wars: U.S.-Soviet competition in India
Dhruva Jaishankar and Shruti GodboleThursday, March 1, 2018

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/03/01/aid-wars-u-s-soviet-competition-in-india/

just as development aid had unexpected and significant consequences for India, Engerman argues that the aid policies of the United States and Soviet Union were both primarily defined by the India experience. Essentially both Washington and Moscow learned about the politics and economics of development aid – the potential and the pitfalls – from the process of dealing with India.

This was reflected in the changing nature of U.S. aid to India. U.S. assistance began with community development programs in the early 1950s, when technical assistance trainers were sent to Indian villages.

India was the largest recipient of U.S. community development assistance during this time. But while big on rhetoric and goodwill, it was accompanied by relatively little financial assistance (just 6 cents per beneficiary per year).

In the early 1960s, India asked the Kennedy Administration for funds that were unlinked to projects in order to finance imports, so called “free money.” But instead, as the Cold War heated up, aid became increasingly linked to outcomes and was subject to narrower U.S. conditions, such as on family planning, food aid, and reduced Indian criticism of the Vietnam War.

In other words, project aid initially meant to develop the Indian economy gradually evolved to programme aid whose express purpose was to shape Indian policy. The changing nature of U.S. assistance increased donor leverage and therefore presented new challenges to the Indian policy-making community. Among other consequences, it helped ensure that very little technological transfer took place.

Similarly, the Soviet approach to economic cooperation in the developing world began with India in the 1950s and was largely driven by Indian conditions. Over time, it eventually assumed a very different character from U.S. aid.

During the visit of Soviet leader Nikolai Khrushchev to India, the U.S.S.R. pulled off something of a coup with an agreement to support a steel plant in Bhilai in Madhya Pradesh. This was the first plan of Soviet assistance outside the Communist Bloc, and represented a move away from the relative economic isolationism of the Stalin years.

Ironically, India had sought Japanese and West German assistance before turning to the Soviets, and even the Soviet project at Bhilai benefited from components and services provided by Western companies.

The shock of the Bhilai announcement forced the United States to increase its support for India, but the Soviet Union soon ran into problems as its own economic growth began to slow. Gradually, Moscow discovered that it had an advantage over the United States in being more open to industrial licensing, which meant that military assistance to India came to predominate.

This was accelerated by the U.S. cut-off of military support during the 1965 India-Pakistan War. Yet, over time, as the technological gap between the United States and Soviet Union widened, India found that the over-dependence on Soviet military assistance put it at a disadvantage.

Riaz Haq said...

#India’s foreign policy is up a creek without a paddle, especially in its #SouthAsia neighborhood due to reckless adventurism. #Modi has abandoned non-aligned movement and antagonized #China and #Russia in its pursuit of alliance with #America, #Trump.

https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/is-indias-foreign-policy-adrift/article24343945.ece

The BJP government’s denseness has ended up antagonising both Russia and China. Nothing typified this more than Russia holding antiterror exercises with Pakistan in DRUZBA-2017. Similarly, rather than taking a nuanced position, the ill-conceived boycott of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in 2017 invited the wrath of China via the Doklam standoff. Notwithstanding government claims, the withdrawal from Doklam was sequential — India first, then China — rather than simultaneous. The sequel was that the Prime Minister had to travel to Wuhan and Sochi to effectively pay ‘court’ to Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively.

The worst casualty has, however, been India’s neighbourhood. In the past four years, the BJP government has swung from the sublime to the ridiculous on Pakistan, blockaded Nepal for not declaring itself as a Hindu Rashtra, lost Sri Lanka to the Chinese, been belittled by the Maldives and even Seychelles. Europe, Africa, Latin and South America have fallen off the map.

The list is interminable. The BJP government’s denseness has ended up antagonising both Russia and China. Nothing typified this more than Russia holding antiterror exercises with Pakistan in DRUZBA-2017. Similarly, rather than taking a nuanced position, the ill-conceived boycott of the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in 2017 invited the wrath of China via the Doklam standoff. Notwithstanding government claims, the withdrawal from Doklam was sequential — India first, then China — rather than simultaneous. The sequel was that the Prime Minister had to travel to Wuhan and Sochi to effectively pay ‘court’ to Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, respectively.

The worst casualty has, however, been India’s neighbourhood. In the past four years, the BJP government has swung from the sublime to the ridiculous on Pakistan, blockaded Nepal for not declaring itself as a Hindu Rashtra, lost Sri Lanka to the Chinese, been belittled by the Maldives and even Seychelles. Europe, Africa, Latin and South America have fallen off the map.

The list is interminable. India’s foreign policy is up a creek without a paddle.

Riaz Haq said...

#Maldives jabs #India again, signs power deal with #Pakistan http://toi.in/nVbwea/a24gk via @timesofindia


Riaz Haq said...

Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping's comments in Beijing to Albanian Communist Party's visiting delegation in 1962 (as quoted in China’s India War, 1962 as quoted in"Looking Back to See the Future: Looking Back to See the Future" edited by Air Commodore Jasjit Singh published in 2013:

"During the last two years it is clear that the American imperialists are helping two forces in Asia: Japan and India. These two forces have yet to form completely. The attempts by the American imperialists to increase the power of India are due to the fact that India is very populous, while Japan is both populous and technologically advanced. Of course, lesser countries of South Asia and Indochina are also included in this plan. Their specific measures are intended to help India become a great power, but its body is very weak. In other words, they are trying to shift India from a policy of neutrality to the side of the American imperialists. Should something like this come to fruition, it would be a blow not only to China, but to the Soviet Union as well. When they help India, they offend Pakistan. The public opinion in Pakistan is now on the side of a change in the government policy, and now Pakistan has a good position towards us. This has yet to be achieved completely. It would take a long time to achieve it."

https://books.google.com/books?id=p026DQAAQBAJ&pg=PT43&lpg=PT43&dq=Deng+Xiaoping++%22During+the+last+two+years+it+is+clear+that+the+American+imperialists...%22+are+helping+two+forces+in+Asia:+Japan+and+India.&source=bl&ots=FChSC5HL2H&sig=ACfU3U1RgRq5sz7kNB9e2DO_iS3hWjZXTA&hl=en&ppis=_e&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjQjrS3nf7lAhUTsp4KHV7uBokQ6AEwAHoECAEQAQ#v=snippet&q=Japan%20India&f=false

Riaz Haq said...

Excerpts of Bruce Riedel's "JFK's Forgotten Crisis: Tibet, the CIA, and the Sino-Indian War"


https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/books/story/20151102-jfk-to-the-rescue-820667-1999-11-30


https://twitter.com/clary_co/status/1259164657442525186?s=20

For (then US ambassador to India J.K.) Galbraith "the nightmare of a combined attack by Pakistan and China, with the possibility of defeat, collapse and even anarchy in India, was much on my mind. My concern was about equally divided between helping the Indians against the Chinese and keeping peace between the Indians and the Pakistanis". The ambassador was right to be concerned. From the beginning of hostilities (Pakistan's President) Ayub Khan began pressing for some kind of Indian "compensation" in Kashmir in exchange for Pakistani neutrality. As the United States began to back India publicly on the McMahon Line and then to send it arms, Ayub Khan felt betrayed by Kennedy. The promise he had gotten in July 1961 that Washington would not arm India, even if China attacked, without Pakistan's agreement seemed to be a dead letter: The "most allied ally" was being forsaken to help its bigger neighbor.

Washington sided immediately with Galbraith on Kashmir, but thought it would be useful for (US Ambassador to Pakistan Walter P.) McConaughy to be able to tell Ayub Khan that Nehru would welcome reassurances of Pakistani neutrality. Galbraith that evening saw the prime minister and wrote later in his diary, "Nehru was frail, brittle, and seemed small and old. He was obviously desperately tired". When asked if the United States could tell Ayub Khan that Nehru would welcome a Pakistani assurance of neutrality, the prime minister said he would not object. Galbraith then "moved in very hard saying this would not be sufficient, that we must be able to say that Nehru would warmly accept such assurances. He looked a little stunned". Nehru relented and agreed that such a letter would be helpful. Galbraith pressed further and asked Nehru to promise that he would positively respond to a Pakistani assurance. Nehru said "on some appropriate occasion he would". Galbraith pressed hard again and said, "This was a time for generosity and he should be immediately forthcoming. Again Nehru agreed." Thus Galbraith was increasingly becoming a key policy counselor to the Indian prime minister behind the scenes.

The next day, on October 29, Nehru formally asked Kennedy via Galbraith to supply arms to India. Kennedy had just sent a letter to Ayub Khan describing the Chinese attack on India as an act of aggression and informing him that the United States would provide support to India. Kennedy asked for Pakistan to reassure India that it would not take advantage of the Chinese attack to pressure India. Kennedy's message was, in essence, that the Chinese communists were now threatening a neighbor and that Pakistan, as a member of two alliances built to fight communism, needed to be on the right side. This was why the Pakistanis and Americans were treaty allies: to fight communism.

Nehru did write to Ayub Khan on October 29 to explain the situation as Galbraith had suggested and Ayub wrote back. Nonetheless, throughout late October and November Ayub Khan and his aides publicly criticised U.S. and British military aid to India. After all, Pakistan was an ally of the United States, whereas India was a neutral nonaligned state.

The U.S. State Department assured the ambassador that the rules for this equipment's use would be same as those for the U.S. weapons received by Pakistan: The military equipment was to be used against communist aggression, not India's neighbor.

Riaz Haq said...

The China-India Border War
CSC 1984
SUBJECT AREA Warfighting
ABSTRACT
Author: CALVIN, James Barnard, Lieutenant Commander,
U. S. Navy

https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/CJB.htm

The object of this paper is to present an overview of
the 1962 China-India Border War. The paper chronologically
examines the 19th and 20th Century roots of disputed border
areas between China and Indian the increase in tensions and
conflicts in the late 1950s, the skirmishes along the China-
India border, the October-November 1962 hostilities, and the
ceasefire.
The roots of the Border War extend back into the 19th
Century, when both China and British India asserted claims
to desolate, remote mountain areas between China and India.
Military expeditions, intrigue and unproductive diplomatic
exchanges marked decades of relations between the two coun-
tries. Rather than resolving the border issue, Chinese and
British Indian actions only set the stage for conflict.
Major changes in the governments of both China and
India in the late 1940s had brought the two countries to
friendly relations in the early 1950s. The paper examines
how "intrusions"--strategic military projections into each
others claimed territory--again created conflict over the
disputed border areas. The key issue was the 1956-57
construction of a Chinese military highway in the disputed
territory of Aksai China just west of Tibet. India protested
the Chinese "incursion"; diplomatic exchanges continued for
three years without progress or compromise. Each side firmly
asserted its claim to the Aksai Chin area. Large sections of
the North East Frontier Agency, east of Tibet, were also in
dispute. In 1959, India initiated a forward policy of sending
Indian troops and border patrols into disputed areas. This
program created both skirmishes and deteriorating relations
between India and China. The 1961 Indian invasion of Portu-
gese Goa further alarmed Chinese officials in Peking.
The paper examines the state of the Chinese and Indian
armies. In 1962, China was strong and well-prepared for
alpine warfare; India was logistically weak and unprepared.
The paper next examines the conduct of the Border War.
The war began with skirmishes in the summer of 1962. The
significant fighting occurred in October and November, 1962,
along three widely separated fronts. In virtually every
battled the Chinese forces either outmaneuvered or overpowered
the unprepared Indians. In less than six weeks of bloody
fighting, the Chinese completely drove Indian forces back
behind Chinese claim lines.
The paper outlines the November 21, 1962 ceasefire, which
the Chinese dramatically declared after achieving her limited
strategic objectives. Following the ceasefire, China kept
most of her claim in Aksai Chin but gave India virtually all
of India's claim in the North East Frontier Agency--about 70%
of the disputed land!
Finally, the paper evaluates the outcomes and lessons of
the China-India Border War. Significant lessons included:
(Prime Minister Nehru's) rigid adherence to assumptions,
(Nehru's) unwise practice of ignoring advice of senior army
officers, India's poor state of readiness both logistically
and for alpine warfare, and India's underestimation of intel-
ligence. Outcomes of the Border War included modernization
of the Indian army, the roots of the 1965 India-Pakistan Bor-
der War, and realization of China's limited strategic objec-
tives--the limited nature of which was again seen in the 1979
China-Viet Nam Border War.

Riaz Haq said...

Retired #Indian General: "#Ladakh is the only area where physical military collusion can take place between #Pakistan and #China...just to the East of Siachen glacier and is our (#India's) vulnerability" #LadakhStandoff #Kashmir #CPEC https://theprint.in/opinion/china-believes-india-wants-aksai-chin-back-thats-why-it-has-crossed-lac-in-ladakh/430899/ via @ThePrintIndia

China is extremely suspicious of India. It believes that in the long term, India’s strategic aim is to restore the status quo ante 1950 by recovering Aksai Chin and other areas captured/secured by China. India’s alignment with the US, the presence of Tibetan government-in-exile in India, and the aggressive claims on Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) and Gilgit Baltistan — through which the prestigious China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes — only strengthen China’s suspicion.

--------

In the absence of any government or military briefings, there are speculations galore about the details of the incidents on the LAC and the political/military aims of China. More so, after the two informal summits between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Xi — at Wuhan in 2018 and Mamallapuram in 2019 — wherein both leaders had committed to maintain peace and tranquility on the LAC and give strategic directions to their militaries on border management.

The starting point of any conflict between two nations is the political aim. Military actions are merely the means to achieve that aim. I will reverse the process and analyse the military situation and strategic importance of the areas of the India-China ‘face-offs’ to derive the political aims.

At the outset, let me be very categoric — just like in 1962, 1965, and 1999, we have once again been surprised both at the strategic and tactical levels. The manner in which we had to rush reinforcements from other sectors gives a clear indication that we were surprised. At the strategic level, it was the failure of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) to detect the build-up of the PLA formations from the rear bases to replace the border defence units. Our tactical surveillance with UAVs and patrols has been inadequate to detect this large-scale movement close to the LAC. The ITBP mans the border and ironically is not under the command of the army.

As per unconfirmed reports, the PLA has crossed the LAC and physically secured 3-4 km of our territory along Galwan River and the entire area between Finger 5 and Finger 8 along the north bank of Pangong Tso, a distance of nearly 8-10 km (the areas are marked in this Indian Express sketch in its 2017 report). There also seem to be minor incursions in the area of Hot Springs, in Ladakh’s Chang Chenmo River valley and at Demchok.

My assessment is that the PLA has deployed maximum one brigade each in Galwan River valley and along the north bank of Pangong Tso. Precautionary deployment would have been done at likely launch pads for offensive and other vulnerable areas along the LAC. Reserves would be on short notice to cater for Indian reaction/escalation. The airfield at Ngari has been upgraded and fighter aircraft have been positioned there. It is likely that additional troops have been deployed at Depsang plains, Hot Springs, Spanggur Gap, and Chumar.

It is pertinent to mention that the intrusion by regular troops is not linear like normal border patrols going to respective claim lines. If a brigade size force has secured 3-4 km in Galwan River, it implies that the heights to the north and south have been secured, thus securing a total area of 15 to 20 square km. Similarly, along Pangong Tso, the PLA brigade having secured 8-10 km on the north bank would have also secured the dominating heights to the north to physically control 35-40 square km. And if China subsequently realigns its claim line based on the areas secured, the net area secured would increase exponentially.

Riaz Haq said...

US President John F.Kennedy declared Nehru’s “the worst State visit” he had ever experienced and found infuriating Nehru’s focus on his wife and his inability to keep his hands from touching her.
(Wolpert, "Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny", p. 480)

https://twitter.com/_merajhasan/status/1281271898773618688?s=21

--------------------

http://contrarianworld.blogspot.com/2016/03/jfk-nehru-tibet-cia-and-sino-indian-war.html


Amidst all of this Nehru signed a treaty with China in 1954, called the Panch-Sheel (5 principles). Though Nehru gave it the sentimental flavor of HIndi-Chini bhai-bhai the agreement was grounded in pragmatism and the lopsided military superiority of China was a critical factor. The Dalai Lama sought refuge in India in 1959. The capture of a U2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, in 1961 by USSR plunged US-Soviet relationship to it's lowest. Further flights over USSR were stopped by US but flights over Tibet continued.

Ike departed office gifting incoming president JFK a world steeped in chaos. JFK's first year in office was rocked by the disastrous Bay of pigs invasion of Cuba. JFK retained Allen Dulles at the CIA. At a meeting held on Fenruary 14th 1961 JFK approved support for continued stoking of insurgency in Tibet. Now declassified CIA files show that by 1961 CIA had escalated the insurgency in tibet with more air drops, more arms and ammunition, use of larger C-130 planes instead of C-118 planes for air drops. Seidel says JFK persisted with this despite the objection of his ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith. "Galbraith thought the whole Tibet covert operation was too dangerous, recklessly provoking the Chinese".

Unhappy over Kennedy becoming friendly with India Ayub Khan rescinded permission for US access to air bases in East Pakistan but retaining access to those in West Pakistan. International diplomacy is an art in skulduggery.

Nehru visited US in 1961 and met with JFK. The visit was unmitigated disaster. The aging Indian leader and the charismatic young president did not get along. By all accounts Nehru was frosty, except when chatting with Jacqueline.

1961 was a watershed year that paved the year for the calamitous events next year. The Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco convinced Kruschev that he needed to supply Cuba with nuclear missiles. In India, alarmed by China constructing a road in Aksai Chin area, Nehru, in a meeting held on November 2nd 1961, initiated what came to be called 'Forward policy'. In 1959 China had proposed that India cede Aksai Chin in return for them agreeing to honor the McMohan line in the west. Nehru had rejected that.

The 'Forward Policy' was completely ill thought out. Indian intelligence bureau and CIA which were monitoring the Communist Party of India intercepted communications from China that had propaganda material meant to bolster China's case when war came.

Events moved on many fronts across the globe now. USSR had signed a treaty with India on August 17 1962 which included sale of MIGs. Alarmed Pakistan moved towards China. Pakistan had it's own border problem with Afghanistan for which Afghanistan turned to USSR for help. Pakistan was not backed up by US contrary to expectation. When the UN voted on allowing China to become part of UN for the first time Pakistan voted 'yes'.

Riaz Haq said...

US President John F.Kennedy declared Nehru’s “the worst State visit” he had ever experienced and found infuriating Nehru’s focus on his wife and his inability to keep his hands from touching her.
(Wolpert, "Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny", p. 480)

https://twitter.com/_merajhasan/status/1281271898773618688?s=21

https://books.google.com/books?id=YGdiqF6V8wYC&pg=PA153&lpg=PA153&dq=US+President+John+F.Kennedy+declared+Nehru%E2%80%99s+%E2%80%9Cthe+worst+State+visit%E2%80%9D+he+had+ever+experienced+and+found+infuriating+Nehru%E2%80%99s+focus+on+his+wife+and+his+inability+to+keep+his+hands+from+touching+her.&source=bl&ots=4rSz-NLZK_&sig=ACfU3U1SrDesStohZc8zhDpPIy35be5C1Q&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjm8LyTysHqAhVjMX0KHbUJBtUQ6AEwAHoECAcQAQ#v=onepage&q=US%20President%20John%20F.Kennedy%20declared%20Nehru%E2%80%99s%20%E2%80%9Cthe%20worst%20State%20visit%E2%80%9D%20he%20had%20ever%20experienced%20and%20found%20infuriating%20Nehru%E2%80%99s%20focus%20on%20his%20wife%20and%20his%20inability%20to%20keep%20his%20hands%20from%20touching%20her.&f=false


--------------------

http://contrarianworld.blogspot.com/2016/03/jfk-nehru-tibet-cia-and-sino-indian-war.html


Amidst all of this Nehru signed a treaty with China in 1954, called the Panch-Sheel (5 principles). Though Nehru gave it the sentimental flavor of HIndi-Chini bhai-bhai the agreement was grounded in pragmatism and the lopsided military superiority of China was a critical factor. The Dalai Lama sought refuge in India in 1959. The capture of a U2 pilot, Francis Gary Powers, in 1961 by USSR plunged US-Soviet relationship to it's lowest. Further flights over USSR were stopped by US but flights over Tibet continued.





Ike departed office gifting incoming president JFK a world steeped in chaos. JFK's first year in office was rocked by the disastrous Bay of pigs invasion of Cuba. JFK retained Allen Dulles at the CIA. At a meeting held on Fenruary 14th 1961 JFK approved support for continued stoking of insurgency in Tibet. Now declassified CIA files show that by 1961 CIA had escalated the insurgency in tibet with more air drops, more arms and ammunition, use of larger C-130 planes instead of C-118 planes for air drops. Seidel says JFK persisted with this despite the objection of his ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith. "Galbraith thought the whole Tibet covert operation was too dangerous, recklessly provoking the Chinese".

Unhappy over Kennedy becoming friendly with India Ayub Khan rescinded permission for US access to air bases in East Pakistan but retaining access to those in West Pakistan. International diplomacy is an art in skulduggery.

Nehru visited US in 1961 and met with JFK. The visit was unmitigated disaster. The aging Indian leader and the charismatic young president did not get along. By all accounts Nehru was frosty, except when chatting with Jacqueline.

1961 was a watershed year that paved the year for the calamitous events next year. The Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco convinced Kruschev that he needed to supply Cuba with nuclear missiles. In India, alarmed by China constructing a road in Aksai Chin area, Nehru, in a meeting held on November 2nd 1961, initiated what came to be called 'Forward policy'. In 1959 China had proposed that India cede Aksai Chin in return for them agreeing to honor the McMohan line in the west. Nehru had rejected that.

The 'Forward Policy' was completely ill thought out. Indian intelligence bureau and CIA which were monitoring the Communist Party of India intercepted communications from China that had propaganda material meant to bolster China's case when war came.

Riaz Haq said...

One hard truth that Indians have to contend with is that America has also had difficulty treating India with respect. In recent years, many Americans have proudly proclaimed that America and India have a friendship built on a strong foundation since both are fellow democracies. This argument cuts little ice among thoughtful Indians since most of them remember well that America stood shoulder to shoulder with communist China and dictatorial Pakistan for several decades during the Cold War and beyond. One of the critical weaknesses of Washington, DC, is that the administrations and their officials change regularly; they have poor memories. Many Americans, like many of their fellow Westerners, have a higher degree of respect for Chinese civilization than they do of Indian civilization. Many Americans will deny it because it is an uncomfortable truth. They will proclaim loudly that they respect India as much as they respect China. But you cannot feign respect: it is best demonstrated not through words but in deeds. Every country in the world demonstrates its respect for another country by the amount of time and attention it gives to that country, and America has devoted far more time and attention to China than it has to India. If America wants to develop a close long-term relationship with India over the long run, it needs to confront the deep roots of its relative lack of respect for India. Is it a result of a perception among Western scholars that Indian civilization is not as impressive as Chinese civilization? Is this a result of the fact that the American media has broadcast a steady stream of stories about poverty in India, so much so that just as Americans naturally associate Africa with poverty, they may also do the same with India? Or were America’s condescending cultural attacks a result of romantic fascination with British dramas set in British India, with Indian culture presented as inferior? Unless Americans reflect on the roots of their lack of respect for India, they will fail to develop a strong partnership of equals. The tragedy of this failure is that such a partnership would bring massive benefits to both countries. As the American century gradually fades away in the coming decades and an Asian century emerges in force, America will need to build bridges to engage the new self-confident Asian societies. Clearly, China cannot provide America a bridge to the new Asia as China will be perceived as the main challenger to America for the coming decades. However, India can, as there are several common links to build upon. The first is the exceptional success of the Indian community in America. America’s free enterprise system is, in many ways, the most competitive market in the world for human achievement as the best minds from nations all over the world migrate to America. The pool of migrants in America represents the highest achieving segments of societies around the world. When the best brains of the world compete on a level playing field, which ethnic community does the best? The data show it is the ethnic Indian community in America.


Mahbubani, Kishore. Has China Won? (pp. 239-241). PublicAffairs. Kindle Edition.

Riaz Haq said...

#US sees opportunity in #India’s increasing focus on #China — a turnaround from the days when #Pakistan claimed most of India’s attention. Others fear #US support for #Modi worsens persecution of #Indian #Muslims. #Ladakh #Islamophobia —The New York Times


https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/03/world/asia/india-china-trump.html

India’s border dispute with China has accelerated its relations with the United States. Others worry that warming ties ignore India’s persecution of Muslims.
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“Both the U.S. and India have recognized the importance of the other,” said Nisha D. Biswal, President Barack Obama’s assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asian affairs. “It’s not a surprise that the Indians are looking for like-minded strategic and security partners, given concerns around a destabilizing environment in the Indo-Pacific.”

But social justice advocates worry that the Trump administration is turning a blind eye to India’s rights abuses against Muslims under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, prioritizing military and geopolitical alliances over all else.

“They are warming relations under the same authoritarian banner,” said Wasim Dar, who campaigns for rights of people in the disputed territory of Kashmir. “They’re prioritizing military, or hegemony, over any kind of human rights or political freedom.”

The United States and India have increasingly soured on China in recent years.

A looming presidential election in the United States — and President Trump’s eagerness to paint China as a rival — has caused Washington to sharply shift its policies toward Beijing. The Trump administration has taken a series of economic, political and diplomatic actions against China, citing its crackdown on democratic protests in Hong Kong, human rights abuses against the largely Muslim Uighur minority, unfair trade practices and aggressive expansion into the South China Sea.

At the same time, India and China have engaged in increasing aggression in recent months.
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Washington’s relationship with India has a rocky history. During the Cold War, the United States grew closer with Pakistan, India’s border rival, and Russia with India. U.S. relations with India started to warm in 2000, after President Bill Clinton became the first American president to visit the country since 1978. Since then, every American leader has made the trip to India and extolled the virtues of teaming with the world’s largest democracy.

Still, the United States and India have not signed a formal alliance. India, which for years has maintained a stance of nonalignment, has been reluctant to engage.

But the Himalayan crisis is helping change that.

India’s increasing focus on China — a turnaround from the days when Pakistan claimed most of its attention — is a welcome sign for American diplomats, who believe the shared anger can draw India into a strategic partnership that will help neutralize China’s growing influence in the region.

Of most interest, experts say, is whether the border dispute will move India closer into a regional partnership with the United States, Japan and Australia — known as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or “Quad.”

The forum — proposed in 2007 by the Japanese prime minister at the time, Shinzo Abe — was billed as the Asian “arc of democracy.” China has seen it as a threat to its dominance in the region, saying the Quad is a U.S. attempt to create an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization directly aimed at counterbalancing its interests.

In the past, India was hesitant to fully engage in the partnership, spurned by Australia’s exit in 2008, and fearful of upsetting China and ruining its trade ties with the country. Australia has since rejoined.

Riaz Haq said...

#Pakistan alarmed by #US-#India #Intelligence sharing pact that bolsters #Delhi's position in #Kashmir against #Islamabad & #Beijing. Some experts, however, don't believe the deal will pose an immediate security threat to Pakistan or #China. #Modi #BECA https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Pakistan-alarmed-by-US-India-information-sharing-pact

Pakistan is alarmed by the U.S.-India intelligence pact signed during a visit by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Defense Secretary Mark Esper to India last week. The agreement could give India an advantage in any future conflict over Kashmir, a region both Delhi and Islamabad claim.

"Pakistan has been consistently highlighting the threats posed to strategic stability in South Asia as a result of the provision of advanced military hardware, technologies and knowledge to India," read the statement issued by the Foreign Office of Pakistan immediately after the signing of the agreement.

The statement further said that India's acquisition of armaments and expansion of nuclear forces have serious repercussions for peace and stability in South Asia.

The agreement -- Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation -- was signed last Tuesday when the U.S. emissaries attended the third "two plus two" ministerial dialogue with India's External Affairs Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar and Defense Minister Rajnath Singh.

Under the pact, the U.S. will share with India advanced satellite and topographical data for long-range navigation and missile targeting. BECA will give India's armed forces access to a wealth of data from U.S. military satellites.

Defense cooperation between New Delhi and Washington has increased. The U.S. is the second-largest exporter of military equipment to India since 2000.

"Pakistan has to be vigilant on this development [because] it has implications for the [China-Pakistan Economic Corridor] and regional security," Anwaar ul Haq Kakar, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of Senate of Pakistan told Nikkei Asia.

Kakar added that this step will further cause the regional balance of power to shift, pushing Pakistan toward China.

Observers believe the BECA will considerably enhance India's defense capabilities.

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Some, however, do not believe the agreement will pose an immediate security threat to Pakistan or China.

"[Even] equipped with American intelligence under the BECA, I doubt that India would move on Pakistan, let alone the militarily powerful China," said James M. Dorsey, senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies at Singapore. "In case if there is a conflict between India and Pakistan in the future, then it will definitely impact CPEC projects," he told Nikkei. "However, I doubt that America will take sides in such a conflict and it will try to de-escalate the tensions instead."

Kugelman says there have been a lot of threats from New Delhi, but he thinks they are more talk than anything else.

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Both the US State and Defense departments have added footnotes to the transcripts they released on Rajnath Singh’s remarks at 2+2. The State Department has also updated the text.

https://theprint.in/defence/here-is-why-us-changed-rajnath-singhs-statement-on-reckless-aggression-by-china/534515/

On 27 October, the US had issued a statement quoting Singh as referring to “reckless aggression on India’s northern borders” — seen as a reference to China. However, the US State Department has since updated the statement, with the fresh version quoting Singh as simply referring to “challenges” India is facing. The latter is the accurate translation of what Singh said.

Riaz Haq said...

Excerpts of "A Promised Land" by Obama:

“Expressing hostility toward Pakistan was still the quickest route to national unity (in India)”.

"(Manmohan) Singh had resisted calls to retaliate against Pakistan after the attacks, but his restraint had cost him politically. He feared that rising anti-Muslim sentiment had strengthened the influence of India’s main opposition party, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)"

"Across the country (India), millions continued to live in squalor, trapped in sunbaked villages or labyrinthine slums, even as the titans of Indian industry enjoyed lifestyles that the rajas and moguls of old would have envied".


"Violence, both public and private, remained an all-too-pervasive part of Indian life”.


“Joe (Biden) weighed in against the (Usama Bin Laden) raid (on compound in Pakistan)”

Riaz Haq said...

#US-#India #military #tech collaboration: #Raytheon to invest $100 million in setting up production/research facilities in #India. #Boeing interested in Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul hub for systems like the P8I maritime reconnaissance #aircraft. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-shares-document-outlining-military-tech-cooperation-with-us/articleshow/90965405.cms

New Delhi: India has shared a document with the US outlining emerging areas where military technology cooperation can be undertaken by the two nations and specialised teams are likely to conduct visits in the coming weeks to take the proposals forward, highly-placed defence ministry officials have told ET.

The document, which specified the emerging technology areas where joint development and production would be beneficial, was shared during the recent two plus two dialogue in the US,with officials saying that it was greeted positively and with enthusiasm.

Describing the dialogue as "very warm, receptive and cordial", officials said several areas of mutual cooperation have been identified that are set to be taken ahead in the coming months. US defence companies, including those which met Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, are also likely to invest in India, officials said, adding that India's commitment to self-dependence has been received well.


Major US arms manufacturer Raytheon is likely to invest $100 million in setting up production and research facilities in India, while Boeing is exploring the possibility of creating a Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul hub for systems like the P8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft that are used by both nations. Plans by Raytheon could result in the creation of over 2,000 jobs in India.

Co-production of military systems was a key component of the talks, with emerging technology areas including artificial intelligence, cyber defence and space cooperation on the table. "There is now a clear understanding by both sides that jointly working on futuristic technologies is the way forward. It's a major step above a simple buyer-seller relationship," officials said.

The Indian side also pitched its shipyards for upcoming purchases planned by the US Coast Guard, showcasing their capability to deliver low cost, high quality products as well as a proven track record on delivery.

US teams are also expected to visit India soon to take forward a proposal to utilise Indian shipyards for repair and overhaul of American warships in the region. Such an arrangement, where US warships can be quickly turned around at Indian facilities, would be a key signal on the level of strategic partnership achieved.

"Closer military-military cooperation, increased engagement, information sharing and possible joint patrolling were discussed, with a focus on high end technology sharing," officials added.

On the strategic front, the security scenario in the Indo-Pacific was discussed, with both sides sharing their commitment to peace and open access to all. The importance of the Quad initiative was appreciated during the talks and enhanced cooperation discussed. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh is likely to visit the remaining quad nations -- Japan and Australia -- in the coming months.

On the Russia front, officials said that India's position on the matter was explained in detail and has been understood by the US. All official statements regarding the talks remained positive and constructive.

Riaz Haq said...

America Has Never Really Understood India
The two countries conceptually seem destined to be partners, yet for decades have held remarkably divergent worldviews.

By Meenakshi Ahamed


https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/joe-biden-narendra-modi-us-india/629823/

Partly as a result of all these factors, India came to rely heavily on the Soviet Union for its military equipment. The Pentagon, suspicious of the Indo-Soviet relationship, refused to sell India sophisticated weapons or computers and continued to strengthen Pakistan’s military. Nor would the U.S. permit India, which was keen to be an independent actor, to manufacture arms domestically through joint ventures or cooperation agreements. The Soviets were more accommodating to India’s goals and soon became the country’s primary arms supplier. India has long worried about its military dependence on Moscow, but though it has made recent moves to diversify its suppliers, Russian military equipment still accounts for the majority of India’s total defense stock.

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On the surface, this apparent distance between Washington, D.C., and New Delhi will seem odd. For more than a decade, the U.S. has sought to build a strategic partnership with India, and the two countries have much in common, including their democratic political systems and their shared concern over China’s rise. Analysts have largely attributed India’s unwillingness to turn against Russia to its reliance on Moscow for military equipment and energy exports. These are undoubtedly significant factors, yet they underplay just how uncertain and shallow the U.S.-India relationship remains.

In fact, the U.S. and India—two countries that conceptually seem destined to be partners—have for decades held remarkably divergent worldviews, finding themselves all too often pursuing conflicting objectives.

To make sense of the course India has taken in 2022, it is helpful to understand India’s relations with the U.S. during the Cold War.

When India became the world’s newest and largest democracy in 1947, its relations with the U.S., the world’s most powerful democracy, should by all accounts have been friendly. Both countries subscribed on paper to the same set of values—a commitment to a rules-based international order, a belief in free and fair elections, the rule of law, civil liberties, and free speech. Yet time and again, they saw things through very different lenses, misunderstanding each other’s goals in the process, ultimately leading to periods where they worked at odds with one another.

Riaz Haq said...

America Has Never Really Understood India
The two countries conceptually seem destined to be partners, yet for decades have held remarkably divergent worldviews.

By Meenakshi Ahamed


https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/joe-biden-narendra-modi-us-india/629823/



America’s transactional approach to aid also disappointed Indians. Nehru felt that begging for assistance was demeaning, but he had hoped that as the richer, more established democracy, the U.S. would offer India a helping hand. The U.S. Congress was governed by different sentiments. Some lawmakers argued that any country receiving American aid should show gratitude and were irritated that India had not supported American positions at the United Nations on Israel and the Korean War. “Our relations with India are not very good, are they?” Tom Connally, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said in 1951. “Nehru is giving us hell all the time, working against us and voting against us.” The same year, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge asked, “What are the Indians going to do for us?” His conviction that India would show no appreciation for American help was shared by many on Capitol Hill.

Beyond aid, economic relations were fraught. Nehru had embarked on an ambitious plan after independence to industrialize India and make the country self-reliant, a key Indian goal, but a lack of capital and expertise required the country to partner with others. As part of these efforts, the U.S. held protracted negotiations with India to build a large steel plant in the eastern-Indian city of Bokaro, a project that had become a symbol of Indian national pride, but fundamental differences in economic ideology ruptured negotiations. In the end, the Soviet Union stepped in to rescue the plans.

After Nehru’s death, other disagreements over aid and economics exacerbated the distrust. When Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, traveled to Washington, D.C., in March 1966 to request food aid in the middle of India’s worst famine since independence, the World Bank and the White House put pressure on her to devalue the rupee as a precondition. Three months later, she did just that, though against the wishes of several members of the government who accused her of auctioning the country. The aid promised to India in return was slow to arrive and it wasn’t the economic success that she had hoped for. Domestically, the entire episode was a political disaster, and to recover support from the left, Gandhi criticized U.S. policy in Vietnam, which enraged then-President Lyndon B. Johnson. He responded by delaying food shipments to India that had already been approved by Congress. Indians were appalled that Johnson was using food aid as a weapon and began to sour on America.

Relations between the U.S. and India have warmed considerably in the past couple of decades. By 2000, India’s economic reforms had propelled growth, which, combined with the country’s military strength and nuclear capability, made it an attractive counter to China’s rise. George W. Bush, who sought to cultivate India as a potential strategic partner, undertook the herculean task of getting congressional approval for a special nuclear deal with India, and relations improved further when Modi was elected India’s prime minister in 2014: He made good relations with the U.S. a cornerstone of his foreign policy.

Riaz Haq said...

India and the United States: Two Countries That Can’t Live With Each Other or Without Each Other


https://www.nytimes.com/2022/07/11/books/review/a-matter-of-trust-meenakshi-ahamed.html


A MATTER OF TRUST
India-US Relations From Truman to Trump
By Meenakshi Ahamed

Indian leaders’ admiration for the Soviet Union, their refusal to condemn its invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968) and Afghanistan (1979), and its reliance on Soviet arms made for a Cold War relationship between India and the United States that was correct at best and, not infrequently, downright hostile. The low point was undoubtedly 1971, when, in response to the Pakistani Army’s assault on East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and Chinese and American support for Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed a friendship treaty with the Soviet Union. As a gesture of support for Pakistan, Richard Nixon dispatched the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal. Anti-Americanism in India soared.

Nixon, who loathed Mrs. Gandhi, often referring to her in words unprintable here, backed Pakistan, which had been a steadfast ally during the Cold War and, in 1971, was helping to arrange Henry Kissinger’s secret and transformative trip to Beijing. It didn’t matter that Pakistani troops were committing rape, mass killings and pillage in East Pakistan, forcing three million Bengalis to flee to India. India’s defeat of Pakistan, which culminated in East Pakistan’s independence, confirmed Nixon and Kissinger’s conviction that India had used the occasion to achieve its longstanding goal of truncating Pakistan.

.....A series of able, sympathetic American ambassadors, notably Chester Bowles and John Kenneth Galbraith, adroitly navigated the often turbulent diplomatic waters and became beloved figures in India because of the genuine affection they had for it.

By contrast, Nehru’s reflexively anti-American defense minister, Krishna Menon, seemed to make it his mission to alienate American leaders with his hectoring, arrogance and prickliness. Mrs. Gandhi, aloof, quick to take offense, slow to forgive slights, and thus remarkably similar to Nixon, aggravated his insecurities, and stoked his rage. (Another photograph in Ahamed’s book captures their mutual disdain.) George W. Bush admired India’s democracy and probably did more to forge today’s India-United States strategic partnership than any other president. A particularly significant achievement was the 2008 agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, which cleared the path for India to purchase American nuclear fuel and technology. Because India had not only steadfastly refused to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty but had also become a nuclear-armed state, many barriers had to be overcome to clinch the deal, and Ahamed’s explanation of the intricacies is masterly. So is her explication of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s 1991-96 economic reforms, which unshackled India’s regulation-bound economy, boosted growth rates and laid the foundation for increased trade with, and investment from, the United States.

Riaz Haq said...

New Order with a Blend of Western Liberalism and Eastern Civilizational Nationalism | Institut Montaigne


By Ram Madhav Founding Member of the Governing Council of India Foundation (Hindu Nationalist RSS)

"...no one wants the present world order to continue except the US and its [Western] allies."

https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/new-order-blend-western-liberalism-and-eastern-civilizational-nationalism

The conflict in Ukraine has begun reshaping the global order. Ram Madhav, Former National General Secretary of the Bharatiya Janata Party and Member of the Governing Council of India Foundation, questions the legitimacy of the Western leadership model for “Ukraine Shifting the World Order”. Shedding light on the increasingly heteropolar nature of our world, he advocates for a new world order based on 21st century realities: one where nationalism and liberalism can coexist and where the Global South is a primary stakeholder.



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The Western leadership model
Two important questions arise. Firstly, is a uniform world order wedded to those three principles mandatory for the world, or can there be diversity? Secondly, who is responsible for wrecking the current liberal order? The Western powers themselves or their recalcitrant challengers like Russia and China?

After the Second World War, Western leadership villainized national identity. Nationalism was blamed for the two wars and all modern nation-states were mandated to follow the same template: liberal democracy, open market capitalism and globalization. Other forms were condemned as retrograde. When India’s Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru mobilized nations to build a non-alignment movement, the Western leadership disapprovingly dubbed him a "neutralist". The Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991, and a wave of enthusiasm engulfed the Western world. A unipolar world order based on Western liberal principles seemed inevitable and a fait accompli.

Fukuyama's 1992 book The End of History and the Last Man argued Western liberal democracies would become "the endpoint of mankind’s socio-cultural evolution, and the final form of human government". Samuel Huntington directly challenged Fukuyama with his provocative 1996 "Clash of Civilizations" thesis, stating that far from unipolarity, the ideological world had been divided on civilizational identities, the new source of conflict in the world, with "each learning to coexist with the others". Later years proved that the collapse of the Soviet Union had not moved the world from bipolarity to unipolarity, but to multipolarity. Several nation-states, with long cultural and civilizational histories, like China, Arab countries and India, have emerged as the new poles in the world. We also witnessed the rise of non-state poles - multinational corporations, social media giants, new age religious movements, non-governmental bodies like the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Oxfam and CARE, and even terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda and ISIS. With influences beyond the national boundaries of the states, these created a heteropolar world.

The erosion of the liberal democratic world order is a Western failure
The hegemonic nature of the world order is eroding with the rise of the heteropolar world. Lofty ideals that it cherished - liberal democracy, open markets, human rights and multilateralism - have been facing severe scrutiny and challenge in the last two decades. Unfortunately, the institutions created for sustaining that world order have increasingly grown weak and ineffective. The world appears to be moving inexorably in the direction of anarchy. The Ukrainian-Russian war is the latest, not the first, in the sequence of events that have catalyzed the collapse of the old world order. The West wants the world to believe that Russia and Putin were the culprits for ushering in anarchy and attempting to destroy what they had built over the last seven decades. But the West cannot escape responsibility for the failure of its hegemony.