The Russia-Ukraine war and the US-Israel-Iran war have recently demonstrated the effectiveness of drone warfare. Is the Pakistani military learning lessons from them to prepare for future conflicts? Let's examine the answer to this question based on recent announcements.
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| Pakistan's Long Range Drone D-248 |
Pakistan has revealed a 3,000-kilometer range one-way drone in July this year. The state-owned Heavy Industries Taxila (HIT) displayed two new long-range loitering munitions – the D-248 and the S-369 – at the 2026 Indus Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) Expo on July 22–23, 2026 in Islamabad.
The D-248 drone uses a tailless delta configuration – similar to Iran’s Shahed-136 – and carries a maximum take-off weight (MTOW) of 240 kg, a wingspan of 3.3 m, a payload of 30-50 kg, a maximum speed of 225 kph, a cruise speed of 185 kph, an endurance of 12-14 hours, and a flight ceiling of up to 4,500 m. Iran's Shahed drones have been used in both the Ukraine-Russia war and the US-Iran conflict. Shahed-136 is relatively inexpensive. It has a swarm capability, and a precision-strike capability at extended ranges.
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| Pakistani Military Official in Ukraine. Source: New York Times |
Pakistan is also in talks with Ukraine's Fire Point whose long-range drones have launched spectacular strikes deep inside Russia in recent weeks. Fire Point is promoting its FP-1 Deep Strike, a loitering munition with a range of 2,600 km, as well as FP-2 Front Strike, a loitering munition with a range of up to 200 km.
During a recent exercise, called Combined Resolve, Ukrainian drone units easily spotted and defeated U.S. troops and armored vehicles on rotation from Fort Hood in Texas, according to people familiar with the events, reports the Wall Street Journal. It's not just the Americans who fared badly against Ukrainian drones; the British and the Swedes have also witnessed easy Ukrainian triumphs in military exercises. The U.S. has also struggled to defend against Iran’s long-range Shahed drones, which have killed and injured many American soldiers and destroyed aircraft.
The exercising troops from the United States sent heavy armored vehicles into battle that threw up dust and were easy for Ukrainian reconnaissance drones to spot, according to a participant. Those drones were followed by drones dropping explosives and first-person-view drones, which smash into targets in combat, this person said.
Drones are becoming an important part of modern warfare, as demonstrated by ongoing conflicts in Europe and the Middle East. Gaining military advantage in future conflicts will increasingly depend on how well states conduct technology-driven multi-domain operations by integrating aircraft, drones, electronic warfare, cyber operations, intelligence and AI-assisted analysis.
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13 comments:
In 2006 or so, I met a few friends in a PECHS coffee and sandwich restaurant, where we discussed Musharraf's multiple requests for more F16s. Bush-2 declined. I had claimed then that F16s will soon have far less value, and certainly not begging for. I predicted then that soon, within our lifetimes, on-board pilots will be history and remote-controlled fighter drones will be the norm, I also said that Pakistan was making a mistake sending its then existing F16s to the US for upgrades, as the US is bound to surreptitiously add remote controls on F16s to place checks on PAF abilities.
Both assessments have come to fore now,
Modern warfare, or as historic as sword and shields, have two aspects: attack and defense, the two of which require different equipment. A Punjabi friend of mine from my PIA days had then set up a company called Integrated Dynamics in Karachi. The founder is/was of the opinion that Pakistan could soon be successful producing attack (fly and forget) drones. but defence against drones, both ground-piloted and fly-and-forget, are extremely hard to defend against. This is what we are seeing in the current two wars.
As of right now, the only possible, effective, and cost-efficient solution, on the defense side, is a combination of great radars and manually piloted airplanes. Russia, Israel, and the US have experienced that already.
For Pakistan, the drone threat landscape is mainly two-pronged.
https://irregularwarfarecenter.org/publications/perspectives/drone-warfares-next-frontier-is-pakistan-ready/
First, Pakistan faces the risk of cross-border drone attacks from India. This evidently surfaced during the May 2025 India-Pakistan conflict, when militaries of both countries employed loitering munitions; mainly for suppressing each other’s air defense systems. Nonetheless, the employment of drones to target civilian areas expanded the battlespace. That indeed served as a pressure tool by eroding the perceived sense of security associated with physical distance from frontlines and by generating a sense of uncertainty among civilian populations. At the same time, using drones also causes significant? economic damage by targeting critical infrastructures such as oil refineries and even tech centers.
Another dimension of drone threats from New Delhi pertains to India’s rapid expansion of its indigenous drone ecosystem. New Delhi has been producing a spectrum of systems ranging from micro and mini-UAVs to larger tactical platforms. New Delhi is also integrating drones into network-centric warfighting to enhance battlefield coordination. This increases the risk of saturation and drone strikes against Pakistan. Furthermore, New Delhi’s collaboration with Israel for drone procurements, joint drone production and technology transfers, will further coalesce New Delhi’s drone infrastructure.
However, the implications of India’s expanding drone ecosystem are not merely confined to tactical advantages; and impacts escalation dynamics between the two nuclear-armed neighbors. Mutual employment of drones by both India and Pakistan is more of a double-edged sword. On one hand, it can help both countries in offsetting conventional asymmetries. However, on the other hand, it also lowers the threshold for use of force. At the same time, drone warfare also holds the potential to prolong a conflict, converting a possible limited conflict into a war of attrition.
The second dimension of Pakistan’s drone threat stems from non-state actors, particularly from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a UN-designated terror outfit. The group has increasingly incorporated commercially available quadcopter drones for offensive strikes against Pakistan’s military installations, and lately urban centers as well. In 2025, the TTP and its affiliates conducted around 400 drone attacks using armed quadcopters in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. This is reflective of TTP’s newfound realization that drones could be a better substitute of its prior tactics of suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices. In addition to this, the TTP has also been employing counter-drone technologies to ward off aerial attacks and disrupt the surveillance and monitoring capabilities of police and security force.
It should be noted, that TTP’s employment of drones is currently in its rudimentary stages. Their drone strikes have not yet caused significant damage. This may be due to TTP’s limited technical capacity and operational shortcomings in technological adaptation, but the threat cannot be dismissed altogether. In 2026, Taliban-led drone incidents took place across Pakistani cities including Quetta, Kohat, Rawalpindi, Abbottabad, Swabi, and Nowshera. While earlier phases of TTP’s campaign appeared to focus on inflicting higher casualties on security forces, the emerging pattern signals its aim to generate psychological pressure among the broader civilian population.
The future of drone warfare is shifting rapidly toward total automation, AI-driven swarming, and multi-domain uncrewed operations across air, land, and sea. As mass-produced, low-cost systems reshape the battlefield, militaries are pivoting toward autonomous navigation, electronic hardening, and directed-energy countermeasures to survive saturation attacks.Key Technological ShiftsArtificial Intelligence & Full Autonomy: Drones are moving away from vulnerable radio links and human pilots, utilizing onboard AI for independent target identification, tracking, and strike execution.Swarm Intelligence: Hundreds of networked drones will coordinate split-second tasks—dividing duties between surveillance, electronic jamming, and kinetic attack—to overwhelm traditional air defenses.Anti-Jamming Innovations: To counter heavy electronic warfare (EW), systems are adopting physical workarounds like fiber-optic guidance cables alongside hardened, encrypted mesh networks.Multi-Domain Expansion: Unmanned systems are expanding past the skies into ground logistics/combat robots (UGVs) and autonomous maritime speedboats (USVs) for strike and rescue missions.Emerging CountermeasuresDirected-Energy & Lasers: High-powered lasers and microwaves are becoming critical economic necessities to shoot down cheap, mass-produced drones without depleting expensive conventional missile stockpiles.Decentralized Dispersion: Troops are forced into deeper underground concealment, extreme spatial dispersion, and heavy reliance on decoy hardware to survive transparent, real-time aerial surveillance.Industrial Scale: As outlined in aggressive defense programs like the Pentagon's mass-drone initiatives, the ultimate victor in future conflicts will rely as much on high-volume manufacturing capacity as on raw technology.
Reports indicate that Pakistan and China are exploring or moving toward the acquisition and potential localized cooperation for the NORINCO SA-2 LD-76 mobile air-defense system, though formal confirmation of a joint production contract remains unverified by official state channels.System Capabilities of the LD-76Design & Chassis: Integrates a modified naval-derived 76mm automatic cannon onto a high-mobility 6x6 military truck chassis.Munitions: Utilizes programmable airburst and proximity-fused ammunition designed to effectively shred low-observable threats without requiring a direct hit.Operational Range: Delivers an effective slant range of up to 10 kilometers against aerial targets.Combat Role: Tailored for hard-kill terminal defense against drone swarms, loitering munitions, and incoming cruise missiles, while retaining secondary direct-fire capability against light ground armor.Strategic ContextLayered Defense: The interest in rapid-fire kinetic gun systems reflects a broader doctrinal shift in South Asian military planning toward cost-effective, hard-kill point defense for critical infrastructure and airbases.Bilateral Ties: Pakistan remains a primary recipient of China's military hardware exports, continually seeking technology integration and transfer arrangements to offset asymmetric aerial threats.
How the Iranian Shahed Drone Transformed War—With China’s Help
Proliferation of cheap one-way drones was made possible by a complex global supply chain that keeps leading back to China
https://www.wsj.com/world/how-the-iranian-shahed-drone-transformed-warwith-chinas-help-2671bb43?st=GYFFtG&reflink=article_email_share
In early July, terrifying shrieks were heard across Kyiv. As part of a wider attack on the Ukrainian capital, Russia had launched cheap one-way drones powered by turbojet engines instead of propellers.
The Shahed—a deceptively simple and destructive flying wedge of fiberglass, microchips and explosives costing as little as $20,000—helps show how weapons proliferation has changed, and why tapping global supply chains is now so important.
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The Shahed drones, now more like missiles, were capable of flying up to around 300 miles an hour—roughly three times as fast as older versions. Some 30 people were killed in the attack, which also included ballistic and cruise missiles.
It was the latest innovation in one-way attack drones and, like others, it only became possible thanks to China, whose factories provided the engines, according to Ukrainian officials who examined some of them.
Washington’s main strategic rival has long served as arguably the most important clearinghouse for Shahed components, including engine parts, servomotors and gyroscopes, according to current and former U.S. officials and analysts.
It is part of a complex global supply chain that analysts say enabled an isolated country—Iran—to pioneer and share one of the most transformative military innovations of the era: cheap, flying, killing machines that have bedeviled the U.S. and its allies, added to the civilian toll in Ukraine and undermined America’s military edge in the Middle East.
China’s foreign ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment. It previously said it strictly regulates the export of “dual use” components, which can serve both civilian and military purposes. It rejects unilateral U.S. sanctions that punish unauthorized trading of such parts, saying they violate international law.
The Shahed—a deceptively simple and destructive flying wedge of fiberglass, microchips and explosives costing as little as $20,000—helps show how weapons proliferation has changed, and why tapping global supply chains is now so important.
In the past, technological innovations in warfare tended to come from major powers that had their own industrial bases, enabling them to produce their weapons at scale. The AK-47 rifle is a good example: It was developed by Russian designers, influenced by a German assault rifle, then mass-produced by the Soviet Union’s sprawling factories.
In today’s world, however, any country with an idea for a weapon—even a middle power such as Iran—can turn to cheap parts suppliers abroad, especially in China.
To develop Shaheds, Iran employed a design pioneered by the U.S. and West Germany. To actually make them, however, Tehran had to source parts from across the globe, including Western nations as well as China. Yet even the Western parts tended to get moved through shell companies in mainland China or Hong Kong to disguise their origin, and over time, many were replaced by components made there, according to former U.S. officials, Ukrainian officials and analysts.
How the Iranian Shahed Drone Transformed War—With China’s Help
Proliferation of cheap one-way drones was made possible by a complex global supply chain that keeps leading back to China
https://www.wsj.com/world/how-the-iranian-shahed-drone-transformed-warwith-chinas-help-2671bb43?st=GYFFtG&reflink=article_email_share
Early Iranian drones, including some tested during the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, were used for reconnaissance and air support, with antitank rockets strapped under the wings.
But those UAVs were highly inaccurate. That spurred a shift toward one-way attack drones, which Iranian engineers reckoned could still do significant damage, even if they didn’t hit their targets. The name Shahed, or “witness,” came from Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center, an Iranian company tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, U.S. officials and analysts say.
One big obstacle for Iranian engineers was coming up with an engine that could sustain high speeds and temperatures for hours at a time. The best option was a German-designed engine known as the L 550 E.
A 2008 WikiLeaks cable from U.S. diplomats to their German counterparts detailed how Iran obtained the engine from its maker, Limbach Flugmotoren, possibly with the help of intermediaries using fake documents to throw customs inspectors off the scent.
In 2012, a Chinese company began distributing Limbach’s engines and then bought the German company outright in 2017, making it easier for Iran to import the engines. The Treasury Department later sanctioned the Chinese company’s affiliate, Xiamen Limbach Aircraft Engine, for supplying the engines to Russia for its drone program.
Xiamen Limbach didn’t respond to requests for comment.
Iran eventually developed its own engine based on the Limbach models, led by Oje Parvaz Mado Nafar Company, a Revolutionary Guard-linked firm, according to the U.S. Treasury. But it, too, relied on cheap components sourced through China.
The U.S. imposed sanctions on Mado in 2021. Ukraine later said the company’s co-owner and chairman, Brig. Gen. Abdollah Mehrabi, was directly responsible for a 2022 deal that sold more than 13,000 Shaheds to Russia, along with components and manufacturing equipment, for $324 million.
How the Iranian Shahed Drone Transformed War—With China’s Help
Proliferation of cheap one-way drones was made possible by a complex global supply chain that keeps leading back to China
https://www.wsj.com/world/how-the-iranian-shahed-drone-transformed-warwith-chinas-help-2671bb43?st=GYFFtG&reflink=article_email_share
Iranian and Russian officials didn’t respond to requests for comment.
The U.S. sanctions against Mado also targeted a Chinese businessman named Ma Jie for helping supply parts. The work allegedly included arranging meetings between Iranian defense officials and Chinese suppliers and using companies in mainland China and Hong Kong to buy parts to make engines for Shaheds, such as aluminum alloy castings.
Iran’s and Russia’s one-way drones have also relied on parts from Western countries. These include microcontrollers from Texas Instruments and linear regulators from STMicroelectronics in Switzerland, according to teardowns of the drones by Ukrainian state researchers, leaked documents from Russia and analysts.
However, investigations by the Treasury Department found that virtually all of the American and European parts were being diverted through Chinese intermediaries. Shell companies, often in Hong Kong, would order parts from Western suppliers while disguising that the ultimate destination was Iran or Russia.
Texas Instruments said it “strongly opposes the use of our chips in Russian and Iranian military equipment and the illicit diversion of our products to Russia and Iran.” STMicroelectronics said it doesn’t support or condone the use of its products in applications outside their intended purpose.
Chinese advancements
Over time, Western components have been disappearing from the Shahed, Ukrainian officials and analysts say, even as the drones gain more sophisticated navigation and attack capabilities.
Col. Oleksandr Zaruba, a senior government researcher in Ukraine, said in June that Shaheds are now found with more antennae, modems and SIM cards to correct flight paths using local networks—and that the components increasingly come from China.
Some of the drones have been found with antiaircraft weapons, Zaruba added, which would make them a far greater threat to the planes and helicopters used to shoot them down. Photographs of one such drone shown to reporters in Kyiv in June showed a large antiaircraft missile strapped to the top of a Shahed, an echo of the antitank weapons that Iranians attached to early drones in the 1980s.
The missile wasn’t functional and was likely intended to scare off aircraft attempting to down the drone, Zaruba said.
Russia sometimes launches Shaheds, which it calls Geran, alongside ballistic missiles in an effort to overwhelm defenses. The missiles carry more punch and caused many of the deaths in the July 2 attack on Kyiv. But Shaheds are cheaper and can be sent in far greater numbers, straining Ukrainian defenses.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky singled out Russia’s use of turbojet-powered Shaheds after the July 2 attack. Ordinarily, Ukraine is able to stop more than 90% of the older one-way drones Russia sends. But the new turbojet models can outrun interceptor drones made by Ukraine and must be downed by jet fighters or Ukraine’s limited supply of interceptor missiles, Ukrainian officials say.
The Chinese company that Ukraine’s government says makes the turbojet engines, Telefly Telecommunications Equipment, was founded in 2010 in the southern Chinese commercial hub of Shenzhen. It is chiefly a maker of computer hardware and communications equipment, but also sells its own line of micro turbojets, which are small engines used in drones.
How the Iranian Shahed Drone Transformed War—With China’s Help
Proliferation of cheap one-way drones was made possible by a complex global supply chain that keeps leading back to China
https://www.wsj.com/world/how-the-iranian-shahed-drone-transformed-warwith-chinas-help-2671bb43?st=GYFFtG&reflink=article_email_share
Telefly didn’t respond to requests for comment.
After Ukraine publicized the discovery of Telefly engines in Russian drones, the turbojets section disappeared from English-language pages on the company’s website. They can still be found on its pages in Chinese and other languages and on other Chinese vendors online.
“For a long time the focus for making the Shahed was about getting Western parts. They focused on that a lot,” said Kerri Bitsoff, a former Treasury Department official. “Now I think that has shifted as China has become better at manufacturing parts and technology like this.”
Kyiv suffers hours of daytime air raids as Russia deploys new jet-powered drones | Ukraine | The Guardian
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/aug/31/russia-fires-jet-powered-drones-ukraine
Volodymyr Zelenskyy says about 800 Shahed drones fired into Ukraine in four days in effort to ‘wear down’ country
Kyiv is enduring hours of daytime air raids and air raid warnings as Russia has fired 800 jet-powered drones into Ukraine in four days, using the faster weapons to sustain prolonged waves of attacks
The new-model Shahed drones have a cruising speed of 200mph to 250mph , about double the 115mph achieved by the piston-engine version and beyond the speed of Ukraine’s cheap interceptors, making them harder to stop.
Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s president, said on Sunday that the jet-powered models now accounted for more than half the drones used by Russia to attack and “wear down” the country.
“There were almost 1,500 drones of all types in these four days alone – about 800 of them jet-powered,” the president said. Ukraine was currently relying on combat aircraft to shoot them down, he added.
A Geran-4, the latest jet-powered model, struck an ammunition dump at Myla, a village 15 miles west of Kyiv on Thursday. Thirty-eight people were killed as the strike unleashed hours of secondary explosions in one of the deadliest single attacks of the war, destroying warehouses and damaging nearby homes.
Russia has also made heavy use of the drones in waves of daytime attacks in the past five days, leading to hours of air alerts, particularly in Kyiv. Eight air raid alerts sounded in Kyiv by lunchtime on Monday.
Daytime attacks, although far from unknown, were uncommon previously, prompting some businesses to halt operations until the alert had passed, and leaving residents with the decision of whether to remain indoors, seek shelter, or ignore the warnings entirely.
Close drone threats also force emergency services to leave an attack site, potentially worsening the impact of any fire caused by a hit, as happened when a food storage facility was struck in Boryspil, to the east of Kyiv, earlier this month.
Kremlin forces have attacked warehouses around Kyiv in the past month, in retaliation to a Ukrainian campaign targeting the Wildberries and Ozon distribution chains inside Russia. The attacks have led to food shortages in the shops, but a Ukrainian official urged people not to panic.
China’s HQ-17AE Shorad system to boost Pakistani drone defence as India tensions simmer | South China Morning Post
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3366797/chinas-hq-17ae-shorad-system-boost-pakistani-drone-defence-india-tensions-simmer
Successful integration with other foreign systems by Pakistan would strengthen China’s export case ‘considerably’, analyst notes
Pakistan has unveiled a newly acquired Chinese-made short-range air defence system that analysts say could boost its ability to counter Indian drones and low-altitude threats in a future conflict.
A social media video posted by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) on Sunday confirmed for the first time that it was operating the HQ-17AE short-range air defence (Shorad) system.
The HQ-17AE is an export version of China’s HQ-17A air defence system – a wheeled variant of the original HQ-17 that was reverse-engineered from the Russian Tor-M1 missiles.
The HQ-17AE has an operational range of up to 20km (12 miles) and a flight altitude of up to 10km. It is designed to engage with low-altitude and short-range threats such as unmanned aerial vehicles, helicopters, cruise missiles, guided munitions and aircraft.
It is known that it has been exported to Saudi Arabia, Serbia and Tajikistan. Pakistan’s revelation makes it the fourth foreign operator of the Chinese-made system.
Sunday’s video sought to promote the PAF’s multidomain operational skills, as deployed in the border conflict with India in May last year.
Apart from the HQ-17AE, air defence systems showcased included the also Chinese-made HQ-9P long-range surface-to-air missiles, as well as the Turkish-made Korkut self-propelled anti-aircraft gun and Sahin counter-unmanned aircraft system.
These systems are part of Pakistan’s new “layered integrated air defence system” designed to counter a range of modern aerial threats, including drone swarms.
The layered network deploys the HQ-9 for long-range aircraft and missile defence; the LY-80 – the export variant of the Chinese-made HQ-16 – against medium-range threats; and the HQ-17AE to counter short-range penetrators, complemented by the Turkish systems targeting drones and low-flying threats.
Jagannath Panda, head of the Stockholm Centre for South Asian and Indo-Pacific Affairs, Institute for Security and Development Policy, said Pakistan was likely to view the HQ-17AE mainly as a mobile battlefield and point-defence system.
“More importantly, Pakistan appears to be filling a vulnerability at the lower end of its layered air-defence architecture,” Panda said.
“Its acquisition also reflects changes in warfare. Pakistan cannot economically use expensive long-range interceptors against every drone or loitering munition. The HQ-17AE gives it another layer for dealing with increasingly dense, low-altitude aerial threats.”
Panda added that the important question was whether the Pakistani military could network sensors, command systems and engagement procedures into a coherent layered architecture.
Liselotte Odgaard, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, said anti-drone defence was likely to be a key mission for the HQ-17AE in Pakistan but not its only one.
“More importantly, Pakistan appears to be filling a vulnerability at the lower end of its layered air-defence architecture,” Panda said.
“Its acquisition also reflects changes in warfare. Pakistan cannot economically use expensive long-range interceptors against every drone or loitering munition. The HQ-17AE gives it another layer for dealing with increasingly dense, low-altitude aerial threats.”
Panda added that the important question was whether the Pakistani military could network sensors, command systems and engagement procedures into a coherent layered architecture.
Liselotte Odgaard, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, said anti-drone defence was likely to be a key mission for the HQ-17AE in Pakistan but not its only one.
This marked both the first reported combat kill by the Chinese fighter jet and the first-ever downing of a Rafale.
September 8, 2026 at 10:56 AM
China’s HQ-17AE Shorad system to boost Pakistani drone defence as India tensions simmer | South China Morning Post
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3366797/chinas-hq-17ae-shorad-system-boost-pakistani-drone-defence-india-tensions-simmer
Odgaard said a successful integration of the HQ-17AE with Turkish systems by Pakistan would strengthen China’s export case “considerably”, by proving that Chinese systems could operate within mixed-vendor architectures.
“[It] makes Chinese short-range air defence solutions more attractive to countries already using Nato or Turkish equipment,” Odgaard said.
But the real test lay in actual combat, she pointed out. “Export success will depend less on technical compatibility alone and more on whether Pakistan can demonstrate effective real-world performance against drones, cruise missiles and saturation attacks. Combat credibility remains the strongest advertisement for any air defence system.”
Panda said the HQ-17AE could “matter” in any future India-Pakistan confrontation, which was “increasingly unlikely to be dominated simply by manned fighter aircraft”.
“The 2025 confrontation reinforced the significance of stand-off weapons, drones, electronic warfare and layered air defence. The HQ-17AE is designed precisely for this increasingly crowded lower-altitude battlespace,” Panda said.
The HQ-17AE’s successful integration into the Pakistani military indicated a denser layered air defence network intended to “raise the risks and costs of Indian stand-off and low-altitude strikes”, Panda added.
“The more consequential trend is therefore not one particular missile system, but Pakistan’s attempt to construct an increasingly integrated anti-access and air-denial architecture combining Chinese long- and short-range missiles with Turkish counter-drone and gun-based systems,” he said.
“That could gradually make the aerial offence-defence competition between India and Pakistan more technologically intensive.”
“The 2025 confrontation reinforced the significance of stand-off weapons, drones, electronic warfare and layered air defence. The HQ-17AE is designed precisely for this increasingly crowded lower-altitude battlespace,” Panda said.
The HQ-17AE’s successful integration into the Pakistani military indicated a denser layered air defence network intended to “raise the risks and costs of Indian stand-off and low-altitude strikes”, Panda added.
“The more consequential trend is therefore not one particular missile system, but Pakistan’s attempt to construct an increasingly integrated anti-access and air-denial architecture combining Chinese long- and short-range missiles with Turkish counter-drone and gun-based systems,” he said.
“That could gradually make the aerial offence-defence competition between India and Pakistan more technologically intensive.
Pakistan relies on a multi-layered counter-drone and short-range air defense network combining Chinese surface-to-air missiles with advanced Turkish anti-aircraft gun systems. The Pakistan Air Force publicly showcased this integrated shield in September 2026. [1] (https://www.facebook.com/fetchpakistan/posts/pakistan-air-force-has-publicly-showcased-a-layered-integrated-air-defence-archi/1525160172962137/)Key Systems in the NetworkHQ-17AE (Missile Shield): This is a mobile, wheeled missile system built by China. It protects against low-flying drones, cruise missiles, and helicopters. As reported by South China Morning Post, “The HQ-17AE has an operational range of up to 20km (12 miles) and a flight altitude of up to 10km.” [1] (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3366797/chinas-hq-17ae-shorad-system-boost-pakistani-drone-defence-india-tensions-simmer), [2] (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HenLOLckyYc)ASELSAN KORKUT (Gun Shield): This is a Turkish twin 35 mm gun system designed to destroy incoming drone swarms. According to Migflug, it features “a twin 35 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft gun firing programmable airburst ammunition out to about four kilometres.” [1] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Pakistan_Air_Force), [2] (https://migflug.com/afterburner/pakistan-hq-17ae-air-defence-china-state-media-2026/)ASELSAN ŞAHİN (Point Defense): This is a mobile 40 mm smart-munition system from Turkey. It handles ultra-low altitude destruction of tiny rockets and drones. [1] (https://migflug.com/afterburner/pakistan-hq-17ae-air-defence-china-state-media-2026/), [2] (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_Pakistan_Air_Force)Broader Air Defense IntegrationPakistan places these short-range tactical units inside a wider national air defense umbrella. Longer-range systems like the Chinese HQ-9P and HQ-16 provide the upper tiers of protection for major cities and military bases. [1] (https://www.facebook.com/telegraphpk/posts/the-pakistan-air-force-has-officially-revealed-new-additions-to-its-layered-inte/122232380906488307/), [2] (https://www.facebook.com/fetchpakistan/posts/pakistan-air-force-has-publicly-showcased-a-layered-integrated-air-defence-archi/1525160172962137/)
Pakistan police counter drone attacks with Ukraine-style nets
https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20260909-pakistan-police-counter-drone-attacks-with-ukraine-style-nets
Resembling fishing nets, the mesh lacks the sophistication of other military hardware.
Their use shows how lessons from the war in Ukraine are reverberating on distant fronts such as Pakistan, where security forces are improvising new defences against Islamist insurgents armed with the cheap, easily obtainable devices.
"These drones are easily available in markets, and with a bit of modification a kit for dropping shells can be installed. So it is quite easy and everyone has access to them," Khyber District police officer Waqar Ahmad told AFP.
"We have started installing these... nets to protect our personnel from aerial attacks and to reduce the risk of attacks involving drones."
Made from extra-durable thread, the bespoke, reinforced nets can scupper attacks by entangling enemy drones or by catching munitions, like mortars or grenades, high above the compounds so that they cause less damage if they explode
They are suspended several metres (feet) above the ground, between the top of the front of buildings and roadside concrete walls, forming a protective canopy.
In some frontline Ukrainian cities, nets are hung high and wide across long stretches of road, forming corridors like spiders' webs to thwart aerial attacks.
Draped over the facade of several police premises in the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), which borders Afghanistan, the nets are a new line of defence alongside concrete blocks and other barriers.
KP is experiencing a growing insurgency by the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), with dozens of police killed in attacks on checkpoints this year.
Police are playing catch-up against the militant group, which has deployed drones extensively in attacks since 2024.
About 30 percent of police stations still lack their own devices, a senior officer in the provincial capital Peshawar told AFP.
Drones are readily available at specialised electronics shops across the province, with AFP finding them in around a dozen such stores in shopping malls in Peshawar alone.
They have become a vital part of the TTP's attack toolkit, used not only to strike targets but also for surveillance.
Another senior officer from KP said the militants use drones to monitor "every movement" of their operations, "which creates serious difficulties for us in countering them".
For Muhammad Aamir, a policeman posted at a checkpoint along a road in the province, the nets, alongside boundary walls, have "considerably" reduced the risk of drone attacks and hand grenades being lobbed at the building.
"These incidents caused significant damage and casualties among the police and other security forces. However, the situation has improved now," the 38-year-old told AFP.
But with attacks continuing to claim lives, locals say police need to do more to protect them.
"We want some peace and security in this area. Either the police post should be removed from this location, or the authorities should eliminate the threat posed by the Taliban from this area," said 48-year-old corn seller Gul Haleem.
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